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Chapter 1
Optimal Corporate Taxes in the Open Economy without Pareto
1.1 Introduction
The trade literature with heterogeneous firms has in its great majority assumed Pareto
distributions of productivities.1 Recent studies have started a debate on how this “standard"
assumption affects the outcomes of the models in question, with particular attention to the
most widely used model of this type: the Melitz model. For example, Head et al. (2014)
finds that using a lognormal distribution, instead of Pareto, allows them to fit their model
significantly better using sales data from French and Spanish firms. Additionally, Bee and
Schiavo (2015) provide a thorough comparison between the gains of trade obtained under
both distributions to highlight that the standard assumption might be overstating the gains
of trade in a significant way. I follow in these steps, but on a parallel path, by investigating
the implications to optimal corporate taxation in a Melitz model when one departs from the
standard assumption of Pareto productivity distribution in favor of a lognormal distribution.
I also provide evidence that the latter distribution is consistently a better fit for productivities
in over 100 countries that are part of the World Bank Entrepreneurial Survey.
This paper studies a multi-sector trade model à la Melitz in which I include governments
that must provide a fixed amount of public goods, which they finance through the taxation
of firms’ profits. The tax framework used is modeled after the corporate taxation systems
observed in most countries, which usually contain a single statutory corporate profit tax rate
(τ), which is imposed on all firms producing in the country; and a set of sector-specific
depreciation allowance rates for capital (δs), which in the case of my model is assessed in
the fixed cost of production. What is special about this corporate tax framework is that the
1 The justification for this assumption has roots in empirical evidence from Axtell (2001), Del Gatto et al.
(2006). However, the real advantage of using the Pareto distribution lyes in the analytical tractability that it
provides to the models.
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effective tax rate is not only different from the statutory tax rate but it can vary significantly
across sectors.2
The question of what are the optimal corporate tax rates is answered substantially dif-
ferently depending on which productivity distribution is assumed. For example, the optimal
statutory tax rate under lognormal is always lower than the rate derived under Pareto assump-
tion. This property is complementary to the finding that depreciation allowance rates (δ ),
under the assumption of Pareto distributions, do not explicitly include sector specific fixed
costs of production and/or entry cost. On the other hand, the optimal policy for the govern-
ment in the lognormal model is to exploit these asymmetries in cost across the sectors by
using a targeted approach through δ instead of τ which has an economy wide scope.
The difference in the optimal formulas for fiscal instruments is traced to a channel of
transmission that is shut down when Pareto distributions are assumed. The channel is based
on the ratio between the average firm and the marginal firm, which is fixed under Pareto but
variable under lognormal distributions. This modification in the market landscape is obviated
if we assume Pareto distributions, which eliminates one channel through which governments
can influence the equilibrium outcomes through the fiscal instruments.
There are non-trivial welfare losses associated with using the simpler policy functions
derived under the Pareto assumption in a country which has lognormal distributions. In the
closed economy the welfare losses are enhanced with the degree of asymmetry across the
sectors, with one of our numerical examples showing a 3 % loss of welfare relative to using
the “correct" policy functions. When the open economy is considered, not only does the
degree of asymmetry across sectors in one country plays role but a more important driver
is the heterogeneity between countries. In this setting the same scenarios considered in the
closed economy yield welfare losses 5 to 10 times as high. The significant welfare losses
warrant the use of the more complicated policy functions (obtained under lognormal) when
such corresponds to the appropriate distributional assumption of the country being studied.
2 Effective tax rates are usually defined as the ratio of taxes paid over net profits. For a recent study in the
variability of this measure across sector see Barrios et al. (2014)
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Adding the proposed tax framework to a Melitz model also provides a basis to reconcile
two contradictory findings about the relationship between corporate taxes and export dynam-
ics. Using French firm level data Bernini and Treibich (2013) find that small and medium
sized firms are less likely to export their products when they face higher corporate tax rates.
On the other hand, Federici and Parisi (2014) use longitudinal data from Italian firms and find
the opposite relation. My model is able to produce both relationships and it shows that the
export cutoffs are not solely functions of domestic taxes but also depend on taxes from the
target country.
The tax collected by the government is used to purchase an exogenous amount of a public
good qG0 , which is produced under perfect competition. Thus, my model uses the Ramsey
approach in which governments choose tax rates to maximize the welfare of their citizens
while raising enough tax revenue to cover an exogenous level of expenditure. This simple
framework can be used to replace the decentralization scheme proposed by Nocco et al.
(2014) – to achieve the efficient outcome in a multi-sector Melitz type model – which is
based on subsidies and lump sum transfers.3 If the amount qG0 is set to the optimal amount
found by Nocco et al., then my model provides a framework to compute the optimal tax rates
that could be implemented in current tax codes to achieve such outcome.
1.2 Closed Model
This section presents an extended Melitz (2003) with asymmetric sectors and the addition
of a set of fiscal instruments: a statutory corporate tax rate and depreciation allowance rates
3 Recent papers have shown that market outcomes are inefficient when the economy is composed of a perfect
competitive sector and a monopolistic competitive one. In particular, Dhingra and Morrow (2012) show that
resources are mis-allocated between such sectors in a Melitz type model with Variable Elasticity of Substitution
preferences (see Zhelobodko et al. (2012) for VES preferences exposition) leading to inefficient outcomes that
could be improved. Additionally, Nocco et al. (2014) propose a decentralization scheme to achieve the efficient
outcome via subsidies and lump sum taxes on consumers and firms. While this scheme provides us with useful
insights into the mechanics at play it is hard to imagine its applicability in the real world given the amount of
information that the central authority would need but most importantly, the tax codes of most countries would
have to be scratched entirely. This seems like an impossible task from a practical perspective and thus I decide
to frame the corporate taxes in my model in a way that is closely related to what we observe in most countries.
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specific to each sector.4 The model is first developed in a closed environment as it facilitates
the discussion of the relations between the fiscal instruments and the equilibrium outcomes,
specially: sector productivity and the number of firms producing in each sector. Special focus
is put on the consequences that assuming Pareto distributions exert on the response of these
variables to changes in the fiscal instruments. The following paragraphs define the model and
its equilibrium.
Households
The country is home to L households who inelastically supply one unit of labor to fulfill
demand from firms. The household receives a wage “w" per unit of labor and spends her
income on a continuum of differentiated goods q(ω). Households also derive utility from
consuming a public good qG0 which is provided by the government. The functional form of
utility is quasilinear thus the household maximization problem is:
max
Qs
qG0 +
S
∏
s=1
Qαss
where Qs is the aggregate consumption of sector “s" goods.
Let Ωs represent the collection of available goods in sector “s"; the consumer problem
can be broken into S separated maximization problems given by:
Qs = max
q(ω)
[∫
ω∈Ωs
q(ω)ρs
]1/ρs
(1.2.1)
such that
∫
ω∈Ωs
ps(ω)q(ω)≤ Ys
4 Bauer et al. (2014) provides a similar taxation framework but their model considers only one sector with
heterogeneous firms with no fixed production and/or entry costs.
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where Ys = αsY due to the Cobb-Douglas preferences over sectors. Equation (1.2.1) is a
standard C.E.S utility with elasticity of substitution σs = 1/(1−ρs). As shown in Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), the price index Ps =
[∫
ω∈Ωs ps(ω)
1−σs]1/1−σs is used to express quantities
demanded as:
qs(ω) =
Ys pi(ω)−σs
P1−σss
= Qs
[
ps(ω)
Ps
]−σs
(1.2.2)
Firms
Firms operate in one of the S sectors of the economy which are characterize by monopo-
listic competition and costly entry. After paying the sector-specific entry cost of Fe,s, a firm
randomly draws its productivity (ϕ) from the distribution Zs(ϕ). A firm in sector “s" with
productivity ϕ requires l = q/ϕ + fs units of labor to produce q units of output. The fixed
cost of production fs is the same for all firms in the same sector.
The government sets a statutory corporate profit tax rate (τ), that is common for firms
regardless of sector; and a set of sector-specific depreciation allowance rates (δs), which
allows firms to deduct δs fs from their taxable income. The value of these “fiscal rates" is
known by firms before they make any decision inclusive of entry into a market.
With the above notation, the formulas for taxes paid (ts), after tax profits (pis) and, the
profit maximizing price for a firm with productivity ϕ in sector s are:
ts(ϕ) = τ
(
psqs−wqsϕ −δsw fs
)
(1.2.3)
pis(ϕ) = (1− τ)
(
psqs−wqsϕ −usw fs
)
(1.2.4)
us =
1−δsτ
1− τ (1.2.5)
ps(ϕ) =
(
σs
σs−1
)
w
ϕ
. (1.2.6)
The variable us is the user cost of capital, in the spirit of Hall and Jorgensen (1967), when
5
fixed costs of production fs are interpreted as capital that firms spend in order to produce.5
This capital (in a broad sense) could be any variable costs such as licenses, training, machin-
ery costs, etc. However, the type of model that I use doesn’t distinguish between labor and
capital (in the neoclassical way), which makes the interpretation of δs less straightforward
than a depreciation allowance on capital. Here, δs is a policy instrument to shift the effec-
tive tax rate for firms in sector “s". Holding τ fixed, increasing δs implies that the taxable
income for firms in sector “s” is reduced and consequently their effective tax rates decrease;
decreases in δs have the opposite effect.
1.2.1 Equilibrium
As is well known, in this type of model, the aggregate variables are functions of the
average productivity of firms’ that find it profitable to produce, ϕ˜s :
ϕ˜s(ϕ∗s ) =
[
1
1−Zs(ϕ∗s )
∫ ∞
ϕ∗s
ϕσs−1z(ϕs)dϕ
]1/σs−1
(1.2.7)
where ϕ∗s is the productivity of the marginal firm in sector “s" i.e, the firm that makes zero
after tax profit. Let Ms represent equilibrium number of firms producing in sector “s" then
aggregation across firms in sector “s” yields the following sector-level economic variable
5 An implicit assumption in the above equations is a physical depreciation rate of capital of 100 %. However,
if the real depreciation rate of capital for sector “s” is ds, the model solution is exactly the same if we modify
the user cost of capital to:
us =
ds−δsτ
1− τ
Furthermore, the solutions for the optimal tax problem remain valid by scaling the depreciation allowance rate
and the fixed cost of production by the appropriate physical depreciation rate of capital.
δˆs =
δs
ds
fˆs = ds fs
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Ps = M
1/1−σs
s ps(ϕ˜s)
Qs = M
1/ρs
s qs(ϕ˜s)
Rs = Msrs(ϕ˜s)
Πs = Mspis(ϕ˜s)
Ts = Msts(ϕ˜s)
where zs(ϕ˜s) is the average value of zs whereas Zs is the sector aggregate value.
Given (τ, {δs}Ss=1,qG0 ), an equilibrium is defined by a collection of sets {Ωs}Ss=1, a vector
of productivity cut-offs {ϕ∗s }Ss=1, a vector of number of firms {Ms}Ss=1 and, the consumption
and price vectors qs and ps (each of size |Ωs|). These vectors solve the utility maximization
problem (1.2.1) and the profit maximization problem of each firm. The equations that solve
q and p have already been provided in the household and firms subsections.
The productivity cutoff ϕ∗s is found by equating two conditions on average after tax prof-
its. The first condition is derived from the marginal firm which makes zero after tax profit:
p¯is = (1−δsτ)w fs
{[
ϕ˜s(ϕ∗s )
ϕ∗s
]σs−1
−1
}
. (ZPC)
Since the number of potential entrants into the market is unbounded, the average expected
value of a firm equates the cost of entry Fe,s. The expected value of a firm is the max {0;pis(ϕs)/ψ},
where ψ is the probability that a firm goes out of business at the end of the period. Thus, the
free entry condition is:
p¯is =
ψ
1−Z(ϕ∗s )
wFe,s . (FEC)
In equilibrium, the (ZPC) and (FEC) conditions hold in every sector determining the equilib-
rium cutoff productivities. Figure 1.1 shows the graphical representation of the equilibrium
ϕ∗s .6
The economy-wide labor supply L is allocated to firms in the monopolistic competition
sectors and, a “firm” that produces the public good for the government and sells it at marginal
6 An equilibrium in which all sectors are producing only exists if δsτ ≤ 1 for all sectors.
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium productivity cutoﬀ using the FEC and ZPC curves
ψFe,s
p¯is
ϕ∗s
ZPC: (1− δsτ)wfs(hσs−1 − 1)
FE:
ψFe,s
1−Zs(ϕ)
ϕ
cost. A firm with productivity ϕ has labor costs equal to r(ϕ)−pi(ϕ)− t(ϕ).
Aggregating the expression across all firms in sector “s" results in total labor used for
production in such sector
wLp,s = Rs−Πs−Ts ∀s ∈ S . (1.2.8)
In equilibrium the number of successful new entrants equates the number of exiting firms,
thus: (1− Zs(ϕ∗s ))Me,s = ψMs. Using this inequality and the FEC condition we find that
labor costs spent in entry (wLe,s) is equal to sector aggregate profit Πs. Thus, total labor cost
for sector “s" is:
wLs = wLp,s+wLe,s = Rs−Ts (1.2.9)
Summing the above across sectors gives the total labor expenditure by firms in the monopo-
listic competition sectors.
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Finally,the firm that produces public goods uses one unit of labor to produce one unit of
qG0 . Adding the labor used for the production of private consumption goods (eq. 1.2.8) plus
that of the public good results in total labor income:
wL =
S
∑
s=1
Rs−
S
∑
s=1
Ts+wqG0 (1.2.10)
By clearing the labor market we have obtained an identity for aggregate revenue which
is used to solve for the number of firms in equilibrium. To achieve this, use the aggregation
identities for Rs and, Rs = αsR which follows from the Cobb-Douglas preferences. Thus,
Ms =
αs
(
wL+∑Si=1 Ti− pG0 qG0
)
σsus fshσ−1s
∀s ∈ S (1.2.11)
where pG0 = w is the price of q
G
0 . For the closed economy I will use the public good as the
nummeraire which implies w = 1.
1.2.2 Fiscal Instruments and their effects on Equilibrium
In the following paragraphs I describe the relation between equilibrium variables and the
“tax instruments": statutory tax rate (τ) and depreciation allowance rates (δs). The main
results are a set of propositions that show the differences between the equilibrium responses
under Pareto and lognormal distributional assumptions for firms’ productivities, and trace
such difference to a transmission channel that is erased when assuming a Pareto distribution.
Before proceeding, I define the following variables to facilitate notation and discussion:
hs =
ϕ˜s(ϕ∗s )
ϕ∗s
ξx,y =
∂X
∂Y
Y
X
where hs is a measure of firm dispersion and ξ sx,y is the elasticity of variable x with respect to
variable y.7
7 hσ−1 is the ratio given by the revenue of the average firm with respect to the marginal firm. An hs
closer to one implies less heterogeneity in sector s in terms of productivities being hs = 1 the model with
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I start by describing the negative relationship between the depreciation allowance rate and
the equilibrium cutoff productivity for the relevant sector. To illustrate, consider an increase
in δs′ which translates into a reduction in the user cost us′ and therefore decreasing the after-
tax fixed costs of production (us′ fs′). These changes imply that the revenue required to make
a zero after tax profit has decreased; consequently, the productivity cutoff for sector s′ falls.
In terms of the equilibrium conditions, the increase in δs′ shifts the ZPC curve downward for
sector s′ since τ is greater than zero as long as there is a positive supply of the public good.
In Figure 1.1, this shift is represented by the dash line which results in a smaller value of ϕ∗s′ .
Next, I explain the ambiguous relationship between τ and the productivity cutoffs which
depends on the sign of the depreciation allowance rate for the sector. An important conse-
quence is that changing τ affects all sectors simultaneously, but the direction of change of ϕ∗
can be different across sectors. Instead of explaining each direction of the relationship, I find
that is more useful to use the table below to show the sign of the changes after an increase in
τ
τ ↑

ϕ∗s ↓ if δs > 0
ϕ∗s ↑ if δs < 0
ϕ∗s = if δs = 0
the above relationships are a consequence of the (1− δτ) factor in the ZPC equation. To
understand this relationship, we must remember that a firm increases their operating profit by
τδw fs. When δ > 0, an increase in τ increases operating profit which reduces the threshold
productivity for the marginal firm; the case in which δ < 0 has the exact opposite implication
as the operating profits decrease for any level of productivity.
Now that the links between the tax instruments and the cutoff productivities have been
determined I show that the change in average productivity has a special property under the
Pareto assumption. Of course an increase in ϕ∗s is positive for ϕ˜s regardless of distribution,
but the relation is stronger under Pareto:
one representative firm in sector s or homogeneous firms
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Figure 1.2: Log-normal distributions with parameters m = 6.88 and v = 1. Pareto
distribution parameters selected to match the mode and mean of the lognormal dis-
tribution
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Proposition 1.2.1. For any random distribution Z(ϕ) the value of ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ is strictly positive.
If Z ∼ logN then ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ < 1. If the random distribution is Pareto this elasticity is constant
along the support of ϕ and ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ ≡ 1
Proof. Appendix 1.C.1
The property in proposition 1.2.1 is key since changes in τ,δ lead to alterations in h
when the distribution is lognormal, while a Pareto distribution implies a constant value of
h. Simply put, the assumption of a Pareto distribution of productivity precludes a sector
recomposition that results in a wider/narrower disparity between the marginal and average
firm. Furthermore, the constant versus variable h has consequences for the determination of
the equilibrium as this variable appears in the ZPC equation.
The value ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ is determinant to the response in the number of firms to changes in the
tax rates. To illustrate, the elasticities of the number of firms with respect to the statutory tax
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rate and the depreciation allowance rate are:
ξMs,δs′ =
∑Si=1
∂Ti
∂δs′
δs′
wL+∑Si=1 Ti− pgqG0
−
[ −τδs
(1−δsτ) +(σs−1)
(
ξϕ∗s ,δs′
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s −1
])]
if s=s’
ξ sMs,τ =
∑Si=1
∂Ti
∂τ
τ
wL+∑Si=1 Ti− pgqG0
−
[
(1−δs)τ
(1− τ)(1−δsτ) +(σs−1)
(
ξϕ∗,τ
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s −1
])]
Using proposition 1.2.1, we can clearly see that the Pareto distributions annihilate the last
term inside the square bracket of the above elasticities. This erased term captures the change
in the dispersion of the firms, which is a measure of the new competition landscape for the
sector.
Building upon the previous results I provide ordinal statements regarding ξM under the
two distributional assumptions of productivity.
Proposition 1.2.2. Assume that the government runs a balanced budget. Let ξP be the elas-
ticities implied from assuming a Pareto distribution and ξ log be the elasticities obtained under
a lognormal distribution of productivity.
• Let s 6= s′, then ξ logMs,δs′ = ξ
P
Ms,δs′
= 0
• Let s = s′ then ξ logMs,δs′ < ξ
P
Ms,δs′
. Furthermore if δ > (≤)0 then ξPMs,δs′ > (≤)0
Proof. See Appendix 1.C.2
The above proposition says that ξ logMs′ ,δs′ is always lower than its Pareto counterpart, but
its sign is not always determined. When δs′ ≤ 0 the magnitude of change in the number of
firms under lognormal distribution is greater; however, it is not possible to sign ξ logMs′ ,δ′ when
δs′ > 0. The last case is intriguing since it opens the possibility that the direction of change
for Ms′ , following changes to δs′ , will have different signs for each distributional assumption
of productivities.
Turning to the statutory corporate tax rate:
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Proposition 1.2.3. Assume ∑Si=1 Ti = pgqG0 . Let ξ
P be the elasticities implied from assuming
a Pareto distribution and ξ log be the elasticities obtained under a lognormal distribution of
productivity.
• If δs ≤ 1 then ξ logMs,τ < ξPMs,τ ≤ 0.
• If δs > 1 then ξ logMs,τ < ξ
P
Ms,τ Furthermore, ξ
P
Ms,τ is positive but ξ
log
Ms,τ can’t be signed.
Proof. See Appendix 1.C.3
Interpretation and consequences of proposition 1.2.3 are similar to those of proposition
1.2.2 so they are skipped.
1.3 Optimal Fiscal Policy in the Closed Economy
This section describes and solves the optimal corporate tax rate under a fiscal framework
designed to capture the important features of the corporate tax codes observed in the real
world.
The government problem is to choose the optimal effective corporate tax rates that raise
tax revenue sufficient to finance government expenditure pgqG0 , while maximizing national
welfare. Let E(τ,{δs}S1) be the set of optimal consumption and price vectors for given τ and
{δs}S1. The government problem is:
max
τ,{δs}S1
LqG0 +L
S
∏
s=1
Qαss (1.3.1)
such that
S
∑
s=1
Ts ≥ pgqG0 (1.3.2)
(q∗, p∗) ∈ E(τ,{δs}S1) (1.3.3)
0 < τ ≤ 1 δs < 1/τ ∀s ∈ S
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Note that the fiscal authority must raise tax revenue using two instruments: a statutory
corporate tax rate and depreciation allowance rates. In one hand, changing τ affects the
equilibrium productivity in all sectors, and consequently the price indexes which determine
welfare. On the other hand, it can affect a specific sector by modifying the relevant deprecia-
tion allowance rate, thereby enhancing or mitigating the effects of τ in the sector equilibrium
productivity and number producing firms. Thus, the government can use cross sector hetero-
geneity to impose “differentiated" effective tax rates between the sectors.
The F.O.C of the government problem for δs and τ , respectively, can be written in terms
of elasticities as follows:
S
∑
i=1
αi
(
1
1−σiξMi,δs′ −Ii=s′
(
ξϕ˜i,ϕ∗i ξϕ∗,δs′
))
≤ δs′ λ˜
S
∑
i=1
∂Ti
∂δs′
∀s′ ∈ S (1.3.4)
S
∑
i=1
αi
(
1
1−σiξMi,τ −ξϕ˜i,ϕ
∗
i
ξϕ∗,τ
)
= τλ˜
S
∑
i=1
∂Ti
∂τ
(1.3.5)
λ
(
qG0 −
S
∑
i=1
Ti
)
= 0 (1.3.6)
λ˜ =
Pλ +1
Y
(1.3.7)
Here λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint, I
is the indicator function and, P is the wide economy price index.8 The second equation holds
with equality since it is assumed that qG0 > 0 and tax revenue can’t be positive unless τ > 0.
Expressing the FOCs iun this way shows the centrality of the distributional assumptions
about productivity for the optimal tax problem as evident in the appearance of the elasticities
of section 1.2.2 in the above FOCs.
Proposition 1.3.1. Assuming that the government budget constraint is binding, the Lagrange
8
P=ΠSi=1
(
Ps
αs
)αs
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multiplier (λ ) is given by:
λ˜ =
∑Si=1
αi
σi−1
wL∑Si=1
αi
σi
− pgqG0
Proof. See Appendix 1.C.4
After establishing the conditions for a binding constraint and the multiplier value as-
sociated with it, I proceed to show the optimal tax/depreciation rates for the two different
distributional assumptions of productivities.9
1.3.1 Optimal tax policy under Pareto
Assume productivities follow a Pareto distribution with CDF Zs(x) = 1−
(ϕmin,s
x
)ks
. The
optimal statutory tax rate and depreciation allowance rates are:
ξϕ∗i ,δi = ξϕ∗i ,τ =
−τδi
ki(1−δiτ) (1.3.8)
1− τ =
[
S
∑
i=1
αi
ki
][
λ˜wL
S
∑
i=1
αiρi
ki
]−1
(1.3.9)
1−δs′τ =
(
S
∑
i=1
αi
ki
/ S
∑
i=1
αiρi
ki
)
ρs′ (1.3.10)
Proposition 1.3.2. The differences between sector depreciation rates are proportional to the
elasticities of substitutions between their sectors. Furthermore, the ratio of usercosts is solely
a function of such elasticities:
us′
us
=
ρs′
ρs
.
The above proposition simply says that in an economy with Pareto distributions, firms
in sectors with higher elasticities of substitutions get smaller depreciation allowance rates
relative to sectors with lower elasticities of substitution. Going a step further, the elasticity of
substitution within each sector is the sole driver for the targeted depreciation allowance rates.
Understanding the mechanics behind this result is useful since there are similar forces
acting in the case of lognormal distributions. Consider two different sectors s′,s with the
9 Derivation of the optimal rates and the solution strategies are found in Appendix 1.A.1.
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same shape parameter k but different elasticities of substitution and without loss of generality
assume that σs′ > σs. The key variable that drives the equilibrium results is hσ−1, which
appears in the ZPC condition and the formulas for Ms (equation 1.2.11). By proposition 1.2.1
we know that hσ−1 is constant, regardless of the equilibrium value of ϕ∗; moreover, this
variable is increasing in σ since in equilibrium hσs−1s =
ks
ks− (σs−1) .
First, the result that h is constant under Pareto implies that changes in the tax instru-
ments only modify the ZPC equation via the factor (1− δτ). Since this factor is multiplied
by (hσ−1− 1), changes in the tax instruments will have a greater effect in the productivity
cutoff in sector s′ relative to s. In subsection 1.2.2 we saw that decreasing δs increases the
productivity cutoff ϕ∗s ; therefore, the government gives the smaller depreciation allowance
rate to sector s′ since it gains the most in terms of equilibrium productivities. The increase in
productivities translates to higher welfare as the price index decreases.
Second, there is a trade off from having a high σ as it’s negatively related to the number
of equilibrium firms, which itself lowers the price indexes.10 The denominator in equation
1.2.11 shows that the government could improve the number of firms by decreasing the user-
cost, i.e increasing the depreciation allowance rate. The government does this for sector s as
it has a higher impact on M relative to sector s′. Hence, the government aims to decrease the
price index for sector s by increasing Ms.
The next proposition contains a surprising and strong result regarding the relation of de-
preciation allowance rates across all sectors.
Proposition 1.3.3. Let the economy consist of S sectors with equal expenditure shares i.e,
αi = α¯ = 1/S. When productivities are Pareto distributed with homogeneous shape parame-
ter k¯, then ∑Si=1 δPi = 0.
Proof. See Appendix
The above result says that regardless of the degree of heterogeneity in the fixed costs
across the sectors, if market shares and Pareto shape parameters are the same, then the de-
10 This is a common feature of monopolistic competition models with CES preferences.
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preciation allowance rates will add up to zero. Notice that there isn’t a condition on the
distribution parameter ϕmin only on the shape parameter k since h is only a function of the
latter.
The next proposition describes how the optimal statutory tax rate reacts to changes in the
shape parameter k. The direction of the change in τ is dependent on whether the increase in
k occurred in an sector with a higher or lower elasticity of substitution relative to all other
sectors. Consider the case in which the change happens in the sector with the highest σ , then
the increase in k implies an increase in h and based on the discussion of proposition 1.3.2,
the result is a significant increase in equilibrium productivity. Since more productive firms
earn higher profits, the government can thereby reduce the statutory tax rate while satisfying
its budget constraint, which in turn generates additional productivity gains across all sectors.
Proposition 1.3.4. Let i′ 6= i ∈ S. Then,
•
∂τ
∂ki′
< 0 if ∑i 6=i′
αi
ki
(ρi− ρi′) < 0. This condition is automatically fulfill if ρi′ is the
maximum of all ρ’s.
•
∂τ
∂ki′
> 0 if ∑i 6=i′
αi
ki
(ρi− ρi′) > 0. This condition is automatically fulfill if ρi′ is the
minimum of all ρ’s.
1.3.2 Optimal tax policy under lognormal
Now, assume productivities follow a distribution Zi ∼ logN (mi,vi). In this economy,
the average productivity in equilibrium can be expressed as:
ϕ˜σ−1i = exp
(
mi(σi−1)+ ((σi−1)vi)
2
2
)
Φ((σi−1)vi−di)
Φ(−di)
= Aigi(ϕ∗i )
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whereΦ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution and di =
log(ϕ∗i )−mi
vi
. The marginal
productivity cutoff has to be solved numerically using:
Aigi(ϕ∗i )
(ϕ∗i )σ−1
=
ψFe,i
(1−δiτ)Φ(−di) fi +1
While the optimal tax rates for this economy don’t have closed form solutions, it is possible
to make some analytical comparisons of these optimal tax rates with those obtained under the
Pareto distribution. First, consider the elasticity of productivity cutoff with respect to τ,δ :
ξϕ∗i ,δi = ξϕ∗i ,τ =
ψFe,i
Xi(1−σi)
(
τδi
1− τδi
)
(1.3.11)
Xi = ψFe,i+(1−δiτ)Φ(−di) fi (1.3.12)
Unlike the case of Pareto distributions, these elasticities are dependent on the fixed cost of
production and entry. Moreover, the elasticities are functions of the current level of ϕ∗, since
h is variable in the lognormal case.
The key difference between the optimal tax policies of government in the lognormal en-
vironment is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3.5. The optimal statutory corporate tax rate under Pareto productivities is
greater than or equal to its counterpart found under lognormal distributions. The inequality
is strict if there is at least one sector that is asymmetric to the rest.
Proof. Appendix 1.C.4
The result of this proposition highlights that the government in the lognormal scenario
has another transmission channel of their policies via alterations of h, which is muted in the
Pareto case. These additional channels allows the government to take full advantage of sector
asymmetries by using δ more heavily than τ as the latter affects all sectors simultaneously.
18
1.3.3 Optimal fiscal tools as functions of selected parameters
I continue by exploring the difference in responses of optimal depreciation and tax rates
to changes in the elasticity of substitution, country size, government spending and fixed costs.
To ease the exposition the economy is restricted to two almost identical sectors whose only
difference lie in their elasticity of substitution σi. The parameters for the model are found in
table 1.1, values are standard except for the productivity parameters which are explain in the
footnote.11
The take away from all these response functions is twofold. First, the productivity distri-
bution assumption is not important when sectors are identical but becomes critical when the
economy is composed of asymmetric sectors. Moreover, the divergence between the optimal
rates implied by each distributional assumption increases with the degree of asymmetry be-
tween sectors, especially when the asymmetry involves the elasticity of substitution. Second,
if an sector experiences changes in fixed cost (production or entry) then each distributional
assumption will result in completely different responses for the depreciation allowances and
the corporate tax rates.
Although a full symmetric case is not used as a baseline, the response functions in Figure
1.4 contain a point (σ2 = 2.5) for which both sectors are completely symmetric. This special
case generates depreciation rates equal to zero for both sectors regardless of distributional as-
sumption. Intuitively, when both sectors are completely symmetrical they can be aggregated
into one sector with the same properties. In this case, the government can’t improve upon the
11 The lognormal distribution parameters (mi,vi) are similar to the average of the LAC region while the Pareto
distribution parameters (ki,ϕmin,i) are found by matching the mean and variance of both distributions. We do
not use the empirical values for ki as they are in the neighborhood of 1 implying values of σ significantly lower
than those used in the literature. By matching the variances we impose that the Pareto distribution variance is
finite, which implies that k is strictly greater than 2. Solving for the Pareto distribution parameters leads to a
quadratic polynomial for k; choosing the non-negative root gives the following formulas:
ki = 1+
√
exp(v2i )
exp(v2i )−1
ϕmin,i = exp(mi+
v2
2
)
ki
ki−1
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free market (“first best") outcome by shifting resources across the sectors. The “first best"
is the productivity equilibrium found in Melitz (2003), which is attained in my model by
setting δ or τ to zero. Since qG0 > 0, the corporate tax rate is strictly positive which implies
depreciation rates are optimally zero.
The requirements to obtain optimal depreciation allowances equal to zero depend on the
distribution of productivity
Proposition 1.3.6. Let qG0 > 0 and λ > 0. The conditions for δi = 0 ∀i are:
1. Pareto distribution: The shape parameter and elasticity of substitution must be equal
across sectors (ki = k¯ ∀i ∈ S, σi = σ ∀i ∈ S ).
2. Log-normal distribution: The sectors in the economy must be symmetric in all respects.
Proof. See Appendix 1.C.4.
The condition placed on the Pareto model is significantly weaker from that of lognormal
model. Part of the condition imposes homogeneous shape parameters across sectors but not
necessarily on the productivity cutoff parameter. Once again, this is a result of h being fully
determined by σ ,k and fixed to a constant value under Pareto. As mentioned previously,
the optimal rates in the Pareto setting don’t depend on the fixed cost of production, hence
there is no need to impose symmetry on them. In contrast, the optimal rates in the lognormal
environment are affected by such costs and thus a stringent condition is needed to obtain all
depreciation allowances set optimally to zero.
I now describe the sensitivity of optimal tax instruments rates and equilibrium responses
as the elasticity of substitution in sector 2 varies between 2 and 3.5 (the substitution elasticity
for sector 1 is fixed at 2.5). In Figure 1.4, the solid lines are values under the lognormal
assumption and the dash lines represent values from assuming a Pareto distribution.
Optimal depreciation rates produced under lognormal productivities exhibit a larger de-
gree of responsiveness to changes in σ2 when compared to their Pareto counterparts; the
divergence between such rates increases as the distance between σ1 and σ2 grows larger.
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This divergence occurs even though the Pareto and lognormal productivity distributions have
the same unconditional mean and variance. Thus, the divergence is mainly a result of the
extra channel of effect (through ξϕ˜,ϕ∗) that the lognormal setting posses.
In contrast to the optimal depreciation allowance rates, the response functions for τ are
more responsive when Pareto distributions are assumed and, as stated in proposition 1.3.5,
τ log < τP. The take away of this analysis is that a policymaker in an environment with Pareto
distributed productivity will optimally distribute the burden of taxation more evenly across
the sectors than the lognormal case. Importantly, the relative small differences in observed
tax and depreciation allowance rates have significant implications for the number of firms in
each sector and the efficiency of the marginal firm.
A common property of the optimal depreciation rates across both productivity distribu-
tion is that the sector with the smallest elasticity of substitution is given the lesser of the
depreciation allowances. In proposition 1.3.2 I explained the mechanics for this property for
the Pareto case. The same applies for the lognormal environment with the addition that the
term hσ−1 is variable for this setting, hence depreciation rates change more drastically in the
lognormal environment.
Next, figure 1.5 shows the response functions for changes in government spending, coun-
try size, entry cost and fixed costs of production. As government expenditure increases, the
budget constraint becomes tighter, which limits the ability of governments to exploit the vari-
ability of productivity distributions; hence, we observe a convergence in the values of δ and
τ of the two distributional assumptions. When L increases, the corporate tax rate decreases as
firms in both sectors earn higher revenues. Since changes in qG0 ,L affect both sectors equally
via λ˜ and the income available to spend, response functions of τ,δ are approximately the
same under both productivity distribution assumptions.
The last two rows show the responses to changes in fixed cost of production and entry in
sector 2. The optimal δ s response functions in a Pareto environment are invariant to changes
in fixed costs while the optimal δ s under lognormal present some response; the optimal
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response of τ exhibits the same property.
1.3.4 Inefficient outcomes from assuming a Pareto distribution
To finalize this section, I study the welfare implications of a government mis-specifying
the productivity distribution when deciding the optimal depreciation and corporate tax rates.
Based on recent theoretical and empirical research, as well as evidence in section 1.6.2, I
posit that countries contain firms that draw their productivities from a lognormal distribution
and conduct the following experiment. First, I compute the optimal δ and τ using the for-
mulas implied by the Pareto setting. I call these the “null" optimal rates and use them used
to compute the equilibrium for the economy.12 Next, the process is repeated but using the
“alternative" formulas for the optimal rates, i.e the formulas under the lognormal assumption.
I then compare the outcomes of the model as well as the ratio of welfare of the “null" model
and the “alternative" model. Welfare under both models is comparable since household in-
come can receive lump sum taxes when the government budget constraint doesn’t hold with
inequality and amount of public good qG0 is the same for the “alternative" and “null" model.
Experiments are conducted under 5 different scenarios and the results of these are reported in
Table 1.1, where the “null" model outcomes are displayed on the top lines while “alternative"
model values are directly underneath.13
The almost symmetric scenario shows that using the simpler Pareto formulas for the opti-
mal δ s and τ carries a 0.14% loss in welfare relative to using the “alternative" formulas. The
“alternative" and “null" models have equilibrium outcomes that are almost identical, except
for the depreciation allowances which are non-symmetric across sectors for the lognormal
case.
12 These rates are not the solution to the government problem and therefore the budget constraint may not
hold with equality, i.e ΣTi 6= pgqG0 . Hence, the number of firms for this equilibrium is found as the solution to
the system of equations:
Ms =
αs(wL+ΣSi=1Ti− pgqG0 )
r¯s
s = 1,2
13 We continue to find the Pareto distribution parameters by matching the mean and variance
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The next two scenarios have sector asymmetries in the fixed cost of production or entry
costs. For these scenarios the penalties in welfare are larger than that of the almost symmetric
case; albeit, the equilibrium variables for both models are almost equal to each other. The
optimal δ , τ under Pareto are the same as those of the almost symmetric scenario, but these
rates differ from the baseline scenario in the lognormal case. The adaption of fiscal rates to
changes in fixed cost drives the improvement in welfare benefits from using the “alternative"
rates.
The next scenario increases the difference between the elasticities of goods substitution
between the sectors. This scenario generates the most significant losses in welfare from using
the “null" rates in the economy whose firms have lognormal distributed productivity. The loss
in welfare is over 2%, which is significantly higher than any of the other losses in the previous
scenarios. Moreover, the equilibrium outcomes of the two models are considerably different
particularly for the number of firms and optimal tax rates. The policies obtained from a log-
normal rely on targeting specific sectors at different rates instead of heavily readjusting τ ,
as is the case with the Pareto assumption. These results, coupled with the evidence in the
variability of σ across sectors, illustrates the importance of computing the optimal depreci-
ation and tax rates using the proper distributional assumption. The analytically convenient
assumption that productivities follow Pareto distribution is not innocuous for welfare in the
context of corporate tax policy.
1.4 Open Economy
This section extends the model into the open economy to study the linkage between export
status and corporate taxation. I find that my model provides a basis for explaining conflicting
empirical results regarding this linkage. In my model, modifications to the statutory corpo-
rate tax rate alone generates an ambiguous change in the probability of becoming an exporter,
with the sign of the change being determined by the value of the depreciation allowance rate.
Expanding on this point, in the next section I show that in a symmetric country setting, the
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probability of exporting is invariant to changes in tax rates when Pareto distribution are as-
sumed. This property fails to hold in the lognormal case, reinforcing the argument that Pareto
distributions eliminate important channels of economic change induced by modifications in
effective corporate tax rates.
Additionally, including corporate taxes can solve an important issue of the multi-sector
Melitz model regarding unilateral liberalization of some sectors.14 The evidence (see Trefler
2004) tells us that following unilateral liberalization there is a stronger rise in productiv-
ity in the liberalized sectors, relative to those that are not liberalized. In theory, Demidova
and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) find that a one sector Melitz model generates such implication;
however, Segerstrom and Sugita (2014) find that such implication doesn’t hold when a multi-
sector Melitz model is considered. In fact, they find that such model generates the reverse
implication under very general conditions. My model can reconcile the theory and empirical
evidence by accounting for changes in corporate tax rates faced by specific sectors, which
offsets/enhance the productivity gains from a unilateral tariff reduction.
The next paragraphs contain only the key elements and results of the model when coun-
tries open to trade and under the assumption that utilities are identical across countries. A
general model derivation with N countries and asymmetric parameters of the utility (α,σ ) is
provided in Appendix 1.B.
1.4.1 Setup, Aggregation and Equilibrium
I assume that household preferences in both nations have the same functional form and
parameters as in section 2, with the exception of sector markets shares α , and no labor migra-
tion across borders is allowed. Since consumers can now buy products from another countries
I use x jis to represent a variable from country j with final market in country i, for sector s.
The timing of decisions by the firm is the same as in the closed economy, but firms
serving the domestic market can choose to serve the foreign country via exports. Thus, after
14Unilateral liberalization refers to a a single country reducing their trade barriers/cost to imports
24
a firm (from sector s) in country j draws its productivity from the distribution Z js (ϕ) they
decide whether to serve country i via exports or remain solely a domestic supplier. Shipping
goods across countries involves an iceberg trade cost θ jis ≥ 1; and exporting firms pay a fixed
investment cost of f jis every period which is subject to the depreciation allowance rate δ js.
Hence, the after tax profit formula for a representative firm in country j is:
pi js(ϕ) = (1− τ j)
(
r j js(ϕ)
σs
−u jsw j f j j +Iexport
(
r jis(ϕ)
σs
−u jsw j f jis
))
(1.4.1)
r jis(ϕ) =
(
p jis(ϕ)
Pis
)(1−σs)
Yis (1.4.2)
Define ϕ∗j j, ϕ∗ji as the cutoff productivity levels for the marginal firm that decides to
serve the domestic market and the productivity level of the marginal firm that chooses to, in
addition, export to country i. Using ϕ˜( ) (equation 1.2.7) define the average productivity of
all firms producing in j (ϕ˜ j j) and the average productivity of firms that export their goods to
i (ϕ˜ ji):
ϕ˜ j j = ϕ˜ j(ϕ∗j j) ϕ˜ ji = ϕ˜
j(ϕ∗ji)
The number of producing firms in sector “s" based in country j is M js with a subset M jis =
κxjisM js serving country i via exports; where κ ji is the conditional probability of becoming
an exporter.15 Hence, the total amount of products available to consumers in country j is
M jtot,s = M js+Mi js.
With the above, the price index for sector s as well as the average productivity of firms
selling in country j sector “s":
ϕ˜ jtot,s =
[
1
M jtot,s
(
M js
(
ϕ˜ j j
)σs−1+Mi js(θˆ−1i js ϕ˜i js)σs−1)
] 1
σs−1
(1.4.3)
P js =
(
M jtot,s
) 1
1−σs p j js(ϕ˜ jtot,s) (1.4.4)
15 κxjis =
1−Z js(ϕ∗jis)
1−Z js(ϕ∗j js)
25
where θˆi js =
wiθi js
w j
measures a combination of shipping costs and wages (input costs in this
model). The total average productivity (ϕ˜tot,s) is the weighted average of mean productivities
of all domestic firms and the firms shipping into the country.
The sector price index formulas are needed to solve for the equilibrium since the new
zero profit condition (ZCP) contains domestic and export productivity cutoffs that have to be
linked through the sector price index. To be more clear, the new ZCP condition is:
p¯i js = (1−δ jsτ j)
w j f j js
( ϕ˜ j js
ϕ∗j js
)σs−1
−1
+κxjisw js f jis
( ϕ˜ jis
ϕ∗jis
)σs−1
−1
 (1.4.5)
and to solve ϕ∗jis it must be expressed as a function of ϕ∗j js:
ϕ∗jis =
[
Mitot,s
M jtot,s
] 1
σs−1 ϕ˜ itot,s
ϕ˜ jtot,s
[
Y js
Yis
f jis
f j js
] 1
σs−1
θˆ jisϕ∗j js (1.4.6)
Notice that the above equation expresses the export productivity cutoff for country j as a
function of other productivity cutoffs, including those of country i. Many papers at this point
invoke a symmetry assumption across the countries making the above sufficient to pin down
the equilibrium productivities. However, in my model even if countries were completely
symmetric in all their parameters but one of their corporate tax rates, it would generate dif-
ferent domestic cutoffs which translate into heterogeneous equilibrium outcomes between the
countries. Borrowing from Segerstrom and Sugita (2015), I use the relationship between the
domestic and import productivity cutoffs:
ϕ∗jis =
(
u jsw j f jis
uiswi fii
) 1
σs−1
θˆ jiϕ∗ii (1.4.7)
to convert equation 1.4.6 into a function of ϕ∗j j only.
Lastly, the number of firms is solved to complete the description of the equilibrium. This
is simple as labor used for production is still given by r(ϕ)−pi(ϕ)− t(ϕ) and we can use the
same procedure as in section 3 to obtain aggregate revenue R= wL+∑T − pgqG0 . Therefore,
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the equilibrium is found by solving a S×2×2 simultaneous system of equations consisting
of the following 2 equations for each sector, for each country:
ZCPs = FEs (1.4.8)
M js =
α js(w jL j +ΣSs′=1Tjs′− pgjqG0 )
σ jsu jsw j
(
f j jsh
σs−1
j js +κ
x
jis f jish
σs−1
jis
) (1.4.9)
where h j j = ϕ˜ j j/ϕ∗j j, h ji = ϕ˜ ji/ϕ∗ji
1.4.2 Tax rates and the decision to export
This subsection provides a detailed account of the relationship between the export pro-
ductivity cutoffs and corporate tax rates. I find that the conditional probability of exporting
κ is negatively related to the depreciation rate (in the source country), but the relationship
with the statutory corporate tax rate is ambiguous. The first part of the result is not surpris-
ing as increasing δ decreases the cost of f ji which incentives more firms to enter the export
markets, all else equal. However, the direction of change for modification in τ is ambigu-
ous as it depends on the level of δ . These properties can possibly explain why Bernini and
Treibich (2013) and Federici and Parisi (2014) find opposite signs for the correlation between
the proportion of exporting firms and corporate tax rates.
The effects of changes in δ ,τ on the probability of exporting (κx) are expressed in terms
of the elasticities of ϕ∗. Let Z js be the productivity distribution in country j sector s, then:
ϒ js(x) =
z js(x)x
1−Z js(x) (1.4.10)
∂κxjis
∂y
y = κxjis
(
ϒ(ϕ∗j js)ξϕ∗j js,y−ϒ(ϕ∗jis)ξϕ∗jis,y
)
for y = τ,δ (1.4.11)
the function ϒ(x) has the following properties:
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• If Z js ∼ Pareto(k js,ϕmin) then ϒ(ϕ) = k js for any ϕ in the support of Z js.
• If Z js ∼ logN (m js,v js) then ϒ(ϕ) is an increasing function.
The above shows once again that distributional assumptions about productivity are important
for the comparative statics of the model. Under the Pareto assumption, the function ϒ is
constant implying that the change in κ is determine by the unweighted difference of the
elasticities across firms that produce for the domestic and export market. In contrast, in the
lognormal case the function ϒ is increasing on its argument implying that a higher weight is
given to the elasticity of the export cutoff over the domestic one.
A graphical representation is helpful to see the relation between tax rates and the prob-
ability of export. Figure 1.3 (below) presents a heat map for the probability of export κ ji1
as a function of τ j and δ j1. These values come from solving the equilibrium for countries
whose parameters are equal to those of the almost symmetric scenario, with τ j,δ j1 varying
to generate the surface of the plot. The left graphs of the panel show that increasing the
depreciation allowance rate (δ1 j) results in a decrease in the propensity to export by firms
in country “j", but the relationship between the statutory tax rate (τ j) and the probability of
export is ambiguous. In the graphs we observe that increasing τ j results in an increase in the
probability of exporting but only when the value of δ j1 is below a certain threshold. On the
other hand, if δ j1 is above such threshold, the probability of export decreases with the statu-
tory corporate tax rate. The reason behind the ambiguous effect goes back to the movement
of the ZPC condition in closed economy, which was positive for δ > 0 but negative for δ < 0.
In the open economy the new ZPC condition also contains the term ϕ∗ji which is determine
by ratio of user costs across countries; thereby, the threshold value for δ at which the relation
between τ and productivity cutoffs change is different than zero.
The relation shown in Figure 1.3 bridges two conflicting empirical findings regarding cor-
porate tax effects on export dynamics. First, Bernini and Treibich (2013) find that corporate
tax rates are negatively correlated with the probability that firms will engage in export activ-
ities. Their results are obtained by exploiting an exogenous variation in the statutory tax rate
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Figure 1.3: Heat Map for the probability of exporting obtained by simultaneously
varying the values of the depreciation allowance rate of sector 1 and the statutory tax
rate at Home.
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charged to small-medium firms in France, which was reduced from 33.33% to 15% for the
years 2001 to 2003, and compare the export outcomes of such firms relative to large firms as
their statutory tax rate was unchanged. As we have seen in Figure 1.3, my model predicts
such relationship but only when the depreciation allowance rate is above a threshold. On the
other hand, Federici and Parisi (2014) use data from Italian firms, for the years 2004 to 2006,
to show that export propensity is positively associated with corporate taxation, which in their
study is a measure of firms’ specific effective tax rate. In my model, this would translate to
a negative relationship between the sector depreciation allowance rate and the probability of
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exporting, which is what we observe in Figure 1.3.16
Adding corporate taxation to a multi-sector Melitz model can also solve the critique of
Segerstrom and Sugita (2014) who find that such model is inconsistent with the data. In the
data, sector productivity increases more strongly in liberalized sectors than in non-liberalized
sectors; however, the multi-sector Melitz model generates the opposite relationship under
fairly general conditions. Using equation 1.4.7, we can observe that the effects of a unilateral
decrease in trade costs (θ ) can be directly offset via corporate tax changes in either country.
Hence, the critique of Segerstrom and Sugita (2014) regarding the implication of a multi-
sector Melitz model can be attenuated.
While the question of interest was on the relationship between exports and the corporate
tax rates I also show that the model is consistent with other standard results. Using equation
1.4.6, we see that liberalization (reduction of θ ) reduces the productivity cutoff to serve coun-
try i via exports. The same equation also provides a relationship between market competition
and the export productivity required to “carve" a space in such market. For example, if there
are many firms operating in country i and/or the productivity of such firms is high (ϕ˜tot,i),
then the required export productivity cutoff will be higher relative to other less competitive
markets.
1.5 Optimal Corporate Tax Rates in the Open Economy
This section will provide the characterization of the optimal corporate tax rates in the open
economy, for a general case; and its solutions, for the special case of symmetric countries.
Without loss of generality assume j 6= i. The following conditions are for country j but
they are analogous for country i.
16 Increasing δs allows firms in sector “s" to increase their reduction in taxable income and thereby reduce
their tax liability. Thus, all else equal, the ratio of taxes paid to profits will decrease i.e their effective tax rate
will decrease.
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max
τ j,{δ js}S1
L jqGj0+L j
S
∏
s=1
Qα jsjs (1.5.1)
(1.5.2)
such that
S
∑
s=1
Tjs ≥ pgjqG0 (1.5.3)
(q∗, p∗) ∈ E(τ j,{δ js}S1) (1.5.4)
0 < τ j ≤ 1 δ js < 1/τ j ∀s ∈ S
Analysis is restricted for the case of a binding constraints leading to the following FOCs:
(
α jsa−1js
σ js−1
)(
ξM js,δ js
ϕ˜1−σj j
+
∂ ϕ˜σ−1j j
∂δ js
δ js+
Mis
M js
θˆ 1−σi js
(
∂κxi js
∂δ js
δ jsϕ˜σ−1i js +κ
x
i js
(
ξMis,δ js
ϕ˜1−σsi js
+
∂ ϕ˜σ−1i j
∂δ js
δ js
)))
=−λ˜M js
(
ξM js,δ js t¯ js+
∂ t¯ js
∂δ js
δ js
)
∀s ∈ S
S
∑
s=1
(
α jsa−1js
σ js−1
)(
ξM js,τ j
ϕ˜1−σj j
+
∂ ϕ˜σ−1j j
∂τ j
τ j +
Mis
M js
θˆ 1−σi js
(
∂κxi js
∂τ j
τ jϕ˜σ−1i js +κ
x
i js
(
ξMis,τ j
ϕ˜1−σsi js
+
∂ ϕ˜σ−1i j
∂τ j
τ j
)))
=−λ˜
S
∑
s=1
M js
(
ξM js,τ j t¯ js+
∂ t¯ js
∂τ j
τ j
)
with
a js = ϕ˜σs−1j js +κ
x
i js
Mis
M js
(
θˆ−1i js ϕ˜i js
)σs−1
t¯ js = τ j
(
w j f j j(u jsh
σs−1
j js −δ js)+w j f jiκxji(u jshσs−1jis −δ js)
)
where t¯ js is the average tax revenue from sector s.
The FOCs tell us that the government faces a similar problem as in the closed economy
section: the left hand side is the benefit/cost to the average productivity of firms and the right
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hand side is the benefit/cost to tax revenue. However, the left hand side now includes a term
for the productivity of importers which is affected by tax policy in j as stated in equations
1.4.6 and 1.4.7. The right hand also includes an additional revenue factor from exporting
products into i, which can be influenced by the fiscal instruments.
To illustrate the effects of Pareto distribution on the determination of the fiscal instrument
rate, I once again present the elasticity of the number of firms with respect to the different tax
rates are the following:
ξM js,δ js = −
 −τ jδ js1− τ jδ js +
f j js
∂hσs−1j js
∂δ js
δ js+ f jis
(
∂hσs−1jis
∂δ js
δ jsκxjis+
∂κxjis
∂δ js
hσs−1jis δ js
)
f j jsh
σs−1
j js +κxjis f jish
σs−1
jis

ξM js,τ j = −
 (1−δ js)τ j(1− τ jδ js)(1− τ j) +
f j js
∂hσs−1j js
∂τ j
τ j + f jis
(
∂hσs−1jis
∂τ j
τ jκxjis+
∂κxjis
∂τ j
hσs−1jis τ j
)
f j jsh
σs−1
j js +κxjis f jish
σs−1
jis

Just like in the closed economy, the response of the equilibrium number of firms with respect
to τ,δ depend upon the distributional assumptions being made. This is clear from the terms
∂hσ−1/∂x which are identical to zero when productivities are assumed to be distributed as
Pareto. For the general distribution, the above elasticities contain an additional term that
captures the changes in the export market. These alterations are a combination of effects on
the productive term or the “intensive" margin; and the change in the ex-ante probability of
entering the export market, the“extensive" margin.
1.5.1 Symmetric countries
The main result of this subsection shows that under the Pareto distribution assumption,
optimal tax rates for the open economy are identical to those of the closed economy. This
odd result is unique to the Pareto environment since it generates ex-ante probabilities of
exporting that are invariant to changes in tax rates. In contrast, the optimal tax rates in the
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open economy under lognormal distribution are different since governments’ power to affect
M,ϕ∗ via tax policy is diminish when the country opens to trade.
In this setting I impose the additional restriction that both countries are completely sym-
metric and both governments set their optimal fiscal policies together. In this case, we can
think of countries having a “harmonization" scheme with respect to their statutory tax rates
and depreciation allowance rates.17 To avoid the nuisances of first-player advantages or in-
centives to deviate from the commonly agreed tax rates, I assume that there is a global planner
that sets the tax rates.
The full symmetric assumption allows for a straightforward relationship between the ex-
port cutoff and the domestic productivity cutoff.
ϕ∗ji =
(
f jis
f j js
) 1
σs−1
θ jisϕ∗j j (1.5.5)
M jtot,s = M js
(
1+ pxjis
)
(1.5.6)
The particular relation of ϕ∗ji with the domestic productivity cutoff has powerful implications
for the optimal tax rates; in particular for the case of Pareto as highlighted in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1.5.1. Let xs = τ,δs, under the symmetric assumption the following holds:
∂κxjis
∂x
x = κxjisξϕ∗j j,x
(
ϒ js(ϕ∗j js)−ϒ js(ϕ∗jis)
)
x = τ,δs (1.5.7)
Furthermore,
• If Z ∼ Pareto then ∂κ
x
jis
∂x
x = 0.
• If Z ∼ logN then ∂κ
x
jis
∂x
x > (<) 0 if ξϕ∗j js,xs < 0 (> 0). This derivative is only equal to
zero when ξϕ∗j js,xs = 0 or as ϕ
∗
j j→ ∞
17 This “harmonization" scheme has been argued as optimal for the case of the Europe Union with Devereux
as one of the main voices supporting this type of framework.
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Lemma 1.5.1 says that under the country symmetry assumption and Pareto productivities
there is no change in the ex-ante probability, of a successful firm , of entering the export
market following changes to corporate tax rates. Thus, a symmetric country model with
Pareto productivities can’t explain the results found by either Bernini and Treibich (2013) or
Federici and Parisi (2014).
In contrast, when lognormal productivities are assumed the modifications to tax rates have
an effect on the export probabilities and hence on the number of exporters in equilibrium. The
intuition for the direction of the change is simple. First, assume that τ,δ have a negative ef-
fect on the domestic productivity cutoff. Since ϕ∗jis is a fixed multiple of the domestic cutoff,
the probability of obtaining a productivity above it – conditional on successful entry to do-
mestic market – increases since the right tail of the lognormal distribution is monotonically
decreasing. A more intuitive explanation: under the symmetry assumption, the foreign mar-
ket has become less competitive due to the reduction in average productivities and making it
easier for domestic firms to serve the foreign market via exports.
The invariability of the number of exporters to modifications in the tax rate, under the
Pareto assumption, has the following implication:
Proposition 1.5.2. Assume productivities are Pareto distributed. The optimal tax rates for
the open economy under the symmetry assumption are exactly equal to those obtained in the
closed economy.
Proof. See Appendix
While proposition 1.5.2 states that the optimal formula for τ,δ have not changed in this
setting, it doesn’t imply that equilibrium outcomes haven’t changed. The model still gen-
erates gains from trade spawn from the increased productivity of the firms following the
opening to trade that enhances competition.
Nonetheless, the implication that optimal taxes remain the same in the opening economy
is striking, and might be judge as an undesirable property generated by the Pareto distribu-
tion. The explanation behind this odd outcome is quite simple. It was shown that the Pareto
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distribution muted a channel of transmission by precluding the rearrangement of the sector
via h, which in this open economy setting is extended to the export market via h ji. Moreover,
the Pareto distribution also erases a channel of effect through the invariability of the num-
ber of exporting firms in equilibrium. Hence, the closed and open economy optimal rates
are the same since the export channels of transmission are also annihilated under the Pareto
distribution assumption.
In contrast, export market channels play a significant role in the determination of the op-
timal tax rates in the lognormal scenario. The transition from autarky to trade cuts the power
of the government to influence equilibrium outcomes as stated in the proposition below:
Proposition 1.5.3. Let εCϕ∗j js,x js , ε
O
ϕ∗j js,x js
be the elasticity of the domestic cutoff productivity
in the closed and open economy respectively. If firms draw productivity from a lognormal
distribution then the following holds:
|εOϕ∗j js,x js|< |ε
C
ϕ∗j js,x js
| ∀s ∈ S and x js = τ j,δ js
Proof. See Appendix
From the discussion of 1.3.2, we saw that governments make a trade off between rais-
ing productivity in some sectors while increasing the number of firms in others. In the open
economy the degree by which governments can influence the equilibrium productivities di-
minishes relative to the closed economy setting. In one hand, this is “bad" for sectors with
high σ as the government loses power to raise equilibrium productivity. On the other hand,
sectors in which government policies were reducing equilibrium productivity are affected to
a lesser degree, a“good" outcome.
The effects of proposition 1.5.3 are passed into the equilibrium number of firms and there-
fore into the aggregate variables. If governments – in an economy with lognormal distributed
productivities – didn’t adapt their corporate tax rates when opening to trade, the policy rec-
ommendation under Pareto distributions, they will experience increases/decreases in their tax
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revenue thereby missing their target spending. Table 1.2 contains the results of an economy
that opens to trade; assuming that governments keep using the optimal tax instrument rates
of the closed economy. Consistent with Head et al. (2014) I find that gains from trade (GFT)
under Pareto are significantly higher than those obtained by assuming lognormal distribution
of productivities. Moreover, the tax revenue in the lognormal environment decreases for all
scenarios which forces the government to tax households in order to meet their expenditure.
This reduction in disposable income has a negative effect in the number of firms; therefore,
this fiscal issue also plays a factor in the GFT differences.
To further illustrate the effects in tax revenue from moving into the open economy without
changing the corporate tax rates, I present its response function in terms of several parameters
in Figure 1.6. In these graphs the dash lines correspond to the Pareto distribution assumption
while the solid lines are for the economy with lognormal distribution of productivities. In
the first panel we see that the wedge between the public spending (qG0 = 0.5) and tax revenue
increases with the degree of asymmetry in the elasticity of substitution across sectors. Just
as in the closed economy, when the sectors are completely symmetric there is no difference
in the optimal tax rates between the Pareto and lognormal distribution assumptions. In term
of the fixed cost of production we observe that the tax revenue increase with f1 but decreases
with f2. This happens because the increase in fixed production cost reduces the number of
firms and in the case of sector 1, which gets a positive depreciation allowance rate, it reduces
the total amount of “subsidy" given to this sector. For sector 2 the explanation is analogous,
but for this sector the depreciation allowance rate is negative.
Lastly, I provide some examples of the welfare loses that government can incur by using
the incorrect policy recommendation for the corporate tax instrument rates. For the open
economy case, the policy recommendation under Pareto is to keep taxes unchanged when
switching from autarky to trade. Thus, the “null" model will use the optimal tax rates found
in the closed economy, for the lognormal assumption, and compute the open economy equi-
librium. These outcomes are compared to the “alternative" model in which the optimal tax
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rates have been updated to their new values. The welfare gains from using the correct taxes
are found in the last row of Table 1.2. Governments can gain an additional 0.12% to 0.32% in
welfare by adjusting their corporate tax rates and, once more, the gains from using the correct
tax rates increase with the degree of asymmetry across the sectors.
1.6 Empirical Evidence for using lognormal distributions
To finalize this paper I present some basic empirical findings that suggest lognormal dis-
tributions are a better fit for the empirical distribution of productivities for developing coun-
tries. This adds to the evidence first found by Sun et al. (2011) for Chinese firms, and Head
et al. (2014) for French and Spanish firms.
I test the fitness of the Pareto distribution using multiple estimation methods on two dif-
ferent measure of productivity. The first measure is direct estimation of productivities under
the assumption that the productive technology of firms is Cobb-Douglass. Under this ap-
proach I follow Del Gatto et al. (2006) as this paper has been cited multiple times to justify
the validity of the Pareto assumption for European firms. Thus, I replicate their studies using
data for developing countries. Nonetheless, there are many issues involving the direct esti-
mation of productivity which can be reduced if I were to use Olley-Pakes method; however,
the data available isn’t a proper panel which precludes me from using such method. There-
fore, the second approach I use involves using direct sales data for the firms. In this case
the assumption isn’t on the firms’ technology but on the characteristic of the sector which is
assumed to be monopolistic competitive with firms pricing their products at a markup.
Regardless of which measure of firm productivity is used, the results strongly point in
the direction of a lognormal distribution over a Pareto distribution for firm level productivity.
Moreover, for most empirical distributions the estimated parameters for the Pareto distribu-
tion violate the equilibrium conditions for the Melitz model, rendering it inapplicable.
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1.6.1 Data
The necessary firm level data comes from the Enterprise Surveys database, which is pro-
vided by the World Bank. The survey is given to firms with 5 or more full time employees in
136 countries and contains a rich set of variables that provide a detailed picture of the firms’
performance as well as the environment in which they operate. To ensure that data is compa-
rable across countries, we make use of the standardized surveys for the period 2006 to 2013.
These surveys were designed to be representative of the economy of each country, including
its sector composition, with sample sizes chosen to ensure robust statistical inferences.
I restrict the database to manufacturing firms that have completed the manufacturing
questionnaire.18 Observations are dropped if they are missing any of the following variables:
total sales, net book value of machinery and equipment and, number of full time employees.
Monetary variables in the survey are reported in local currency units (LCU) in nominal terms
which are transformed into real values expressed in international 2010 dollars. The transfor-
mation is accomplished using GDP deflators and PPP exchanges obtained from the World
Bank financial database. Labour input is measured by the number of full time permanent
workers that the firm employed during the fiscal year. A permanent full time employee is a
full time paid worker that has been in the firm for a year or more and/or full time workers that
have been there for less than a year but have a renewal offer.19
The ISIC codes of the firms are used to classify them into 18 sectors. Table 1.3 shows the
distribution of observations across these sectors and geographical regions. The Middle East
18There are 3 types of questionnaires in the survey: core, manufacturing and service. The last two question-
naires contain the same questions as the core plus a set of extra questions related to manufacturing or service
sectors. The manufacturing questionnaire is the only one that asks for the net book value of current machinery
and equipment, which is our fixed capital variable.
19A second measure that takes into account the temporary full time workers was also considered. The impor-
tance of including the temporary workers stems from the vast differences in labor markets of the countries in the
sample. Regulations, unions, internship requirement, etc are quite different across countries/regions and thus
the firms’ composition of permanent and temporary full time workers will differ greatly depending on location.
We calculate the modified labor measure by computing the median (across firms in a particular country)of the
average months a temporary worker is employed; the median is then divided by 12 and the resulting number is
multiplied by the number of temporary full time workers the firm employed. This last number is added to the
full time permanent workers to generate the modified labor measure.
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region (MNA) is substantially underrepresented compared to other regions and it’s dropped
due to an insufficient number of observations. The “Petroleum and Coal" sector is omitted
for the same reason.
1.6.2 Testing the fitness of distributions: productivity as the residual of the production func-
tion
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production, the productivity of a firm j in sector i is estimated
by exp(ci+ εi):
log(sales j) = ci+ailog(K j)+bilog(N j)+ ε j,i (1.6.1)
This regression is computed separately for each sector/region pair and summary statistics are
presented in table 1.5. Eastern Europe and Central Asia region comes atop with an average
(across sectors) of 222.62 while Africa stands last among all regions studied, with an alarming
low 4.78. A minor surprise is Latin America ranking second, right above the Asia Pacific
region.
Sectors inside each region are remarkably different reinforcing that such cross-sector het-
erogeneity should be explicitly consider in my corporate taxation model. “Electric machin-
ery" and “professional and scientific equipment" are the two sectors that exhibit some of the
best performance in all regions; however, no common worst performing sectors across re-
gions were found. Nonetheless, the worst performing sector in ECA (wearing apparel) is 4
to 6 times better than the worst performer in the other regions, excluding Africa. If the paper
product sector is not included then the top performer of ECA is less than twice as productive
as the top performers of other regions, including Africa.
Pareto
Now that productivities have been estimated I test if their distribution can be properly
fitted by a Pareto distribution. The functional form of the Pareto distribution implies that for
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a region r and sector s, the shape parameter ks can be estimated by:
log(1−F(xs,r)) = cons− kslog(xs,r)+ εs,r, (1.6.2)
This estimation approach is used in Del Gatto et al. (2006) with the difference that I include
fixed year effect in the OLS regression. Estimation results are found in Tables 1.6-1.10 under
the OLS headings.
It will be shown below that estimates for ks using OLS are unreliable but they are reported
for the sake of comparison with the values for Western Europe in Del Gatto et al. (2006). Most
of the estimated ks are below one which could present a problem, since the shape parameter
(ks) has to be greater than the elasticity of substitution minus one, for the existence of an
equilibrium in the Melitz model. Even though there is no consensus among economist about
the exact value of the Armington elasticity of substitution, the range is usually between 1
to 4.6; though there are estimates as high as 12 and as low as 0.51.20 The estimated ks
under OLS are consistent with the model if the elasticities are in the lower range of what is
commonly assumed in trade models. Thus, the elasticities bounds imply by the estimated ks
are plausible but not likely.
An alternative estimator for ks has to be employed since the OLS estimator is biased,
which is clear once 1.6.2 is re-written into:
log(1−F(xs,r)) = ks,rlog(xmin,s,r)− kslog(xs,r)+ εs,r,
the constant term in the previous regression is a function of the shape parameter and the lower
bound of the support of F(x). Due to the unreliability of the estimators of ks using simple
regression I use a maximimum likelihood estimator instead; where I assume xmin,s,r is equal
to the minimum productivity observed in sector s in region r. 21
20The most recent estimation of Armington elasticities can be found in Feenstra et al. (2014)
21 As a robustness check, the same estimation is carried assuming that xmin,s,r is equal across all sectors in
the same region, and its value is given by the smallest productivity observed in such region. Results of both
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Estimation using MLE generates a very different picture from what was obtained under
OLS. First, the estimated shape parameters are smaller for all cases, which highlights the bias
of the OLS estimator. A detail description of results under this estimation is not provided
since the estimated distributions are not good approximations of the empirical distributions.
These goodness of fit conclusions are derived using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with the
associated p−values reported in the same tables.22 Using a threshold of p> 0.05, there is no
case but one in which the estimated Pareto distributions fit the data well. The “Professional
and Scientific equipment” in the SAR region is the only case that passes the KS test; however,
the number of observations is 19, which is below the n= 50 sample size requirement to ensure
the asymptotic properties.23
I continue by testing if the Pareto distributions fit only a part of the empirical distribu-
tions for productivity. Income distribution was believed to follow a Pareto distribution until
Clementi and Gallegati (2005) , Brzezinski (2014) showed that such was not the case when
the considering distribution of all incomes. The latter paper goes further and applies method-
ology developed in Clauset et al. (2009) to show that the right tails of the distribution are
nicely fitted by a Pareto distribution. Following this insight, I employ the same methods to
test the Pareto distributions one last time. The estimation procedure is simple. First, MLE
estimation is perform in all observations and the KS statistics is computed, then the smallest
observation is dropped and the estimation is re-run. This process continues until one of these
happens: the KS statistic is below the threshold to pass or the next iteration would generate a
bias that is greater than 0.10.
Surprisingly, no dramatic improvement was found with regards to the goodness of fit
criteria as only two more cases passed the p-value threshold. Nonetheless, these cases are now
estimations are almost the same. Furthermore, it can be shown that the MLE estimator for xmin is the minimum
observed value from the sample.
22 Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests the null hypothesis that the estimated distribution and the empirical distribution
are statistically no different.
23This case was re-estimated using a finite sample bias correction, which produced estimators not signifi-
cantly different from the one reported in table 1.10
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a good fit without discarding a significant amount of the empirical data.24 What is clear, is
that the shape parameters under these estimations are consistenlty greater than those obtained
by setting xmin equal to the lowest value observed in the full sample of the sector-region
pair. The values for ks are closer to those found in Del Gatto et al. (2006) and other studies
conducted in developed countries. Furthermore, if the upper bound for xˆmin is removed then
Pareto distributions are a decent approximation for the reduced data. This is a similar result
to Head et al. (2014), which finds that only the right tails of productivity distributions can be
approximated by a Pareto distribution.
Alternative Distribution: Log-Normal
I continue by testing if lognormal distributions perform better at describing the empirical
data than the Pareto distributions. The pdf of the lognormal distribution is given by:
f (x) =
(
1
x
√
2piv
)
exp
(
−(ln(x)−m)
2
2v2
)
in which m,v are the scale and variance parameters. MLE is used to estimate the parameters
and the results are reported in Tables 1.6-1.10.
The goodness of fit are a dramatic improvement over the Pareto distribution as attested
by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Using the same p−value threshold of 0.05, the estimated
lognormal distributions are a good fit for 72 out of 85 possible cases. Africa is the region
with the least sectors (9) that are satisfactory fitted while the rest of regions exhibit empirical
productivity distributions that are well approximated for most, if not all, sectors.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests strongly suggest that the data is well described by the
lognormal distribution, but I perform an additional robustness check to confirm/reject these
initial conclusions. Ross (2013) gives a thorough exposition of the advantages of using Monte
Carlo simulations to obtain reliable p−values that take into account the possibility that initial
24Paper product in EAP region discard 16% of observation while Electric Machinery in LAC discards only
7%
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results were the product of chance. Synthetic data is generated for each sector/region pair by
drawing values from the estimated distribution that best fitted it, where the number of draws
is equal to the amount of observations used in the initial estimation. Then, the parameters to
best fit the synthetic data are estimated and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic computed. The
whole procedure is repeated 10000 times (for each sector-region pair) to obtain a precision
of ε = 0.005.25 The p− value based on the Monte Carlo simulation is the fraction of KS
statistics larger than the value obtained for the empirical data. In this case, higher p− values
are “good” in the sense that they imply a lower probability that the results from the KS test
was just an outcome of chance.
Using a p− value threshold of p > 0.05 (p > 0.10) only 44 (38) sector-region pairs pass
the Monte-Carlo simulation confirmation. This number of successful fits is lower than the
amount obtained by using the KS test criteria (72 cases) for which the estimated and empiri-
cal distribution were not statistically significantly different from each other. Nonetheless, the
rejections/acceptance of fits based on the Monte Carlo simulations are in line with observa-
tions of the quantile-on-quantile plots.
1.6.3 Testing the fitness of distribution: sales data
The previous estimation using estimated values of firms’ productivities is prone to many
critics, specially regarding endogeneity issues between revenues and the amount of labor
employed. Methods to solve this problem (such as Olley-Packes and its derivatives) require
a proper panel data which is not available in these surveys.
Therefore, I perform an alternative analysis that uses revenues for firms to infer the pro-
ductivity parameter consistent with the model presented in this paper. The Melitz model
25For computational considerations, the procedure is only carried for sector-region pairs that have passed the
initial K.S test (p > 0.05).
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implies that a firm with productivity ϕ has revenue:
r(ϕ) = p(ϕ)1−σ
Income
P1−σ
p(ϕ) =
w
ρ
ϕ−1
Thus, revenues under this model have the same distributional form as ϕ since the transfor-
mation Y = ϕσ−1 preserves the shape of the distribution of ϕ . Specifically:
• If ϕ came from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k, then ϕσ−1 ∼ Pareto(k˜),
where k˜ =
k
σ −1
• If ϕ ∼ logN (m,v) then ϕσ−1 ∼ logN ((σ −1)m,(σ −1)v)
The analysis using firms’ revenues has additional advantages: it expands the number of
non-missing observations significantly, and it can be used to test if the estimated parame-
ters for the Pareto distribution satisfy the equilibrium conditions of the model. Previously,
observations missing input for capital equipment had to be deleted since it was a necessary
input to estimate the residual from the production function; however, for the current estima-
tion method this is not necessary and thus valid observations are increased by approximately
8000. The distribution of valid observations across the sector and regions is found in Table
1.4.26
Pareto or lognormal?
Before proceeding to the more rigorous testing, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics,
it is useful to analyze the histograms for the distribution of the logarithm of revenues. The
distribution of the log of sales is expected to be: exponential if sales were Pareto distributed;
26 The analysis presented in the main body uses the full sample of firms. Nonetheless, concerns may arise
since the sample has a mix of firms that sell only domestically with others that also engage in export. Therefore,
separate analysis using: (i) firms whose revenues are fully realized from the domestic market, (ii) firms whose
national sales account for 90 % or more of their revenue. The results are not significantly different from using
the full sample. In fact, when the sample consist of firms that only sell on the domestic market the conclusion
in favor of using lognormal distributions to approximate the empirical distribution of productivity is stronger.
44
and normal if the sales follow a lognormal distribution. Figures 1.7 to 1.11 contain the his-
tograms for log sales and several of them favor the lognormal as the underlying distribution
for sales. In particular, Latin America region and Eastern Europe have the most consistent
patterns supporting the hypothesis of lognormal distributions.
Next, I conduct the same analysis as in section 1.6.2 and obtain similar findings for the
fit of the Pareto distribution. Estimation results are found in Tables 1.11 to 1.15 with the first
columns containing the estimated parameters for a Pareto distribution. Similarly to results
using estimated productivities, the KS statistics for most sectors in each region are unfavor-
able to the hypothesis that revenues are Pareto distributed. Only 2 cases, out of a possible 85,
pass the KS test with a threshold p− value of 0.05. The modified MLE, in which the cut-
off parameter is free to move, doesn’t provide significant improvements except for “Electric
Machinery" in LAC region which now passes the KS test by dropping only 7% of the lower
observations.
Furthermore, the MLE results in values of k˜ that are below unity for all cases which
is problematic. The condition for the existence of an equilibrium in the Melitz model is
k > σ − 1 =⇒ k˜ > 1, therefore the estimated parameters using the Pareto distribution are
inconsistent with this model. The modified MLE estimation barely improves the problem as
it results in estimates of k˜ that are above one in most case but not by a significant amount. In
fact, for Africa the average k˜ still remains below one and the averages for the other regions
are at most 1.66.
Finally, the estimated lognormal distributions perform remarkably well (and strongly out-
perform the Pareto distribution) in fitting the sales data, corroborating the first impressions
from looking at the histograms of the logarithm of revenues. The lognormal distributions
pass the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 70 sector-region pairs, out of a possible 85 cases, a
dramatic improvement over the performance of the Pareto distribution. Once again, Monte
Carlo simulations were performed (10 000 repetitions) to confirm the initial conclusions of
the KS test. Using a p-value of 0.10 (0.05) the KS test is confirmed for 35 (42) cases, which
45
is half of the cases that passed the KS test.
1.7 Conclusion
The question of the implication of assuming productivities that are Pareto distributed in
a Melitz model has largely been neglected until recently when Head et al. (2014) showed
their effects in equilibrium outcomes and how this assumption enhances the gains from trade
relative to using a model with lognormal distributed productivities. However, the implications
for policy of this de facto assumption have not been explored; specifically, the question of the
difference between optimal corporate tax rates derived under the Pareto distribution and the
lognormal distribution.
Using an enhanced Melitz model with heterogeneous sectors and corporate taxation under
a framework that resembles those observed in the real world, I have demonstrated that using
the Pareto distribution assumption mutes a transmission channel between the corporate tax
rates and the equilibrium outcomes. Thus, I find not only quantitative differences between
the optimal tax rates derived under the Pareto and lognormal distribution assumptions, but
also qualitative implications for the optimal corporate tax rates. Optimal rates derived under
both distributional assumptions share many properties, especially the attribute that firms in
sectors with higher elasticities of substitution get smaller depreciation allowance rates on
their fixed cost of productions. Quantitatively, the differences between the optimal rates
derived under both distributions become more prominent with the degree of cross sector
heterogeneity. There are also many qualitative differences with one of the most important
regarding the explicit inclusion of fixed production and entry costs in the determination of
the statutory corporate tax rate and the sector specific depreciation allowance rate. Under
the Pareto distribution assumption the optimal rates are not functions of these fixed costs;
hence, the optimal rates formulas derived under the lognormal assumption exploit sector
heterogeneity along all dimensions. This issue is particularly important given that changes in
fixed cost of sectors occur, and such changes can be quite significant as in the case of entry
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costs following regulations targeting the competitiveness of the sector. Another example is
the evolution of fixed production costs that sectors experience through their life cycle, from
infancy to maturity.
Additionally, incorporating the corporate tax framework into the Melitz model allows me
to provide the theoretical basis to explain conflicting empirical results regarding the relation-
ship between corporate taxes and export dynamics. My model shows that decreasing the
statutory corporate tax rate can increase or decrease the probability of becoming an exporter,
the sign of this relationship depends on the level of the depreciation allowance rate on fixed
costs. Nonetheless, increasing the depreciation allowance rate decreases the probability of
exporting for all levels of the statutory corporate tax rate since this increase reduces the equi-
librium productivity cutoff of domestic firms which makes them less competitive relative to
firms in the other country.
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Table 1.1: Parameters and results for the diﬀerent scenarios used to compute the ineﬃciencies from using the incorrect
distribution for productivities. For outcomes with two values, the top comes from the null" model while the value for the
alternative" model is directly underneath
Scenario Almost Symmetric
Different Entry
Cost
Different Cost of
Production
More asymmetric
Elasticities
Different Variance
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2
Parameters
Wage 1 1 1 1 1
Labor Size 5 5 5 5 5
qG0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
ψ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Elasticity of Subs. 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 1.5 3 2.5 3
Share (α) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Fixed cost
Production
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Entry cost 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
mi 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 6
vi 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7
ki 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.12 2.61
ϕmin 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 317.69
Results
Number Firms
4.72 2.19 4.73 2.55 4.72 1.18 12.56 1.57 4.72 1.61
4.76 2.16 4.76 2.53 4.76 1.17 12.82 1.48 4.76 1.59
Sector Price Index
3.69 5.20 3.69 3.82 3.69 5.97 0.18 5.73 3.70 0.06
3.68 5.21 3.67 3.82 3.67 5.97 0.17 5.75 3.68 0.06
Depreciation Rate
(%)
28.32 -28.32 28.32 -28.32 28.32 -28.32 90.57 -90.57 30.11 -25.11
29.70 -35.50 28.17 -36.11 29.02 -35.62 94.56 -120.54 32.45 -31.51
Corporate Tax (%)
30.71 30.71 30.71 40.15 31.25
30.31 29.91 30.13 35.85 31.06
∑Talternative 0.5049 0.5083 0.5065 0.5696 0.5044
Wnull/Walternative 0.9986 0.9977 0.9982 0.9766 0.9987
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Table 1.2: Results for the open economy equilibrium with symmetric countries using the Pareto distribution recommend policy:
the optimal" corporate tax rates are the same as in the closed economy. The welfare gain from changing the corporate tax rates
to their optimal value is given by Walternative/Wnull
Scenario Almost Symmetric
Different Entry
Cost
More asymmetric
Elasticities
Different Variance
Pareto Log-Normal Pareto Log-Normal Pareto Log-Normal Pareto Log-Normal
Sector 1
%∆ϕ j j 16.436 9.567 16.436 9.550 8.349 10.283 16.436 9.599
ϕ˜ 20.267 17.162 20.267 17.181 9.297 11.265 20.216 17.127
M 2.453 3.245 2.453 3.245 10.248 9.314 2.453 3.243
ϕex 16.283 15.883 16.283 15.906 10.392 11.683 16.243 15.840
ϕ˜ex 25.175 20.374 25.175 20.398 14.726 15.533 25.112 20.329
Mex 1.245 1.498 1.245 1.496 2.433 3.339 1.245 1.500
GFT(%∆ϕ˜tot) 21.607 9.801 21.607 9.794 16.824 12.671 21.607 9.815
% decrease in Prices 16.436 9.555 16.436 9.531 8.349 9.674 16.436 9.579
Sector 2
%∆ϕ j j 18.703 8.510 18.704 6.379 18.704 7.987 24.595 12.585
ϕ˜ 42.955 21.059 71.879 26.645 46.187 22.148 217.370 38.734
M 0.534 1.467 0.534 1.766 0.367 1.006 0.105 1.043
ϕex 26.716 18.931 44.704 25.240 28.726 20.173 71.630 31.110
ϕ˜ex 50.825 24.115 85.048 30.792 54.649 25.422 257.196 44.296
Mex 0.315 0.718 0.315 0.729 0.217 0.475 0.068 0.598
GFT(%∆ϕ˜tot) 22.155 8.003 22.155 6.934 22.155 7.789 28.415 11.193
% decrease in Prices 18.703 8.503 18.704 6.368 18.704 7.868 24.595 12.573
Country
Tax Collected 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.486 0.500 0.499
Welfare 77.430 64.804 99.428 74.543 305.773 275.690 125.039 82.248
Gains from Trade 16.901 8.632 17.048 7.624 13.284 8.383 19.956 10.665
% (Walt/Wnull−1) 0.12 0.163 0.327 0.154
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Table 1.3: Distribution of observations across sectors and regions
Region
AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAR Total
Food beverages and tobacco 1,532 402 1,130 2,195 211 549 6,019
Textiles 185 326 287 872 7 484 2,161
Wearing apparel except footwear 971 345 611 1,260 33 452 3,672
Leather products and footwear 111 42 59 263 3 357 835
Wood products except furniture 232 61 244 145 15 66 763
Paper products 70 38 68 62 6 40 284
Printing and Publishing 226 56 214 194 10 68 768
Petroleum and Coal 5 7 6 8 6 2 34
Chemicals 336 276 286 1,323 40 283 2,544
Rubber and plastic 177 314 195 546 40 109 1,381
Other non-metallic products 207 374 324 391 172 94 1,562
Metallic products 89 101 55 126 6 85 462
Fabricated metal products 499 248 604 895 47 75 2,368
Machinery except electrical 112 173 431 622 9 78 1,425
Electric machinery 61 159 165 144 6 70 605
Professional and scientific equipment 19 82 107 73 2 15 298
Transport equipment 48 128 64 134 2 33 409
other manufacturing 717 106 327 453 39 143 1,785
Total 5,597 3,238 5,177 9,706 654 3,003 27,375
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Table 1.4: Distribution of non-missing observations, across sectors and regions, for
the analysis using ﬁrms' revenues.
Region
AFR EAP ECA LAC SAR Total
Food beverages and tobacco 1,936 553 1,684 2,793 706 7,672
Textiles 272 418 387 1,120 639 2,836
Wearing apparel except footwear 1,199 458 899 1,645 506 4,707
Leather products and footwear 143 55 81 306 386 971
Wood products except furniture 324 97 360 186 103 1,070
Paper products 88 56 95 96 70 405
Printing and Publishing 318 71 347 261 77 1,074
Chemicals 418 380 413 1,582 333 3,126
Rubber and plastic 213 418 326 651 141 1,749
Other non-metallic products 284 522 591 540 133 2,070
Metallic products 125 125 90 156 159 655
Fabricated metal products 654 287 850 1,083 88 2,962
Machinery except electrical 142 188 698 748 112 1,888
Electric machinery 73 215 257 175 71 791
Professional and scientific equipment 21 109 180 81 15 406
Transport equipment 64 158 93 167 55 537
other manufacturing 1,032 148 504 575 195 2,454
Total 7,306 4,258 7,855 12,165 3,789 35,373
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics for the estimate productivities. The means are in hundreds of 2010 International Dollars
AFR EAP ECA LAC SAR
Mean σ Obs. Mean σ Obs. Mean σ Obs. Mean σ Obs. Mean σ Obs.
Food beverages and
tobacco 1.55 5.23 1623 5.95 9.42 403 122.5 203.11 1112 23.4 28.56 2172 15.3 38.48 542
Textiles 3.71 10.93 187 5.76 6.62 329 55.32 87.72 284 43.57 42.81 872 17.53 23.24 481
Wearing apparel
except footwear 0.66 1.29 1008 20.79 29.24 343 31.96 51.02 601 37.13 41.8 1251 15.29 18.54 448
Leather products and
footwear 3.87 7.57 112 21.89 22.83 42 129.24 859.62 59 7.61 6.68 268 12.36 15.48 352
Wood products
except furniture 4.23 19.74 240 7.75 11.54 63 105.21 156.87 240 26.93 47.4 143 26.35 43.91 66
Paper products 16.04 39.23 72 8.93 6.74 38 8803.15 47086.7 68 56.6 54.26 62 24.75 33.99 40
Printing and
Publishing 0.45 0.8 234 28.07 46.6 56 36.41 75.76 210 184.31 251.72 192 6.89 9.76 68
Chemicals 9.82 31.81 343 18.6 37.73 272 202.89 325.77 284 73.7 86.32 1306 11.97 18.44 279
Rubber and plastic 4.38 13.21 187 66.52 97.62 311 49.36 57.97 193 54.71 39.86 537 5.68 8.1 108
Other non-metallic
products 4.94 27.06 215 11.61 19.31 372 74.92 97.92 320 17.42 34.29 388 213.41 362.35 95
Metallic products 16.53 40.68 91 17.62 25.01 99 161.27 534.39 55 17.52 35.56 125 55.78 72.53 85
Fabricated metal
products 0.95 2.61 530 32.44 87.44 246 50.73 66.67 594 53.18 55.13 885 14.24 23.62 76
Machinery except
electrical 5.83 24.95 124 23.39 38.69 171 267.15 489.27 423 45.49 47.66 620 24.93 38.71 78
Electric machinery 22.76 115.08 63 110.05 165.49 157 115.01 149.2 163 23.05 20.09 142 21.81 80 70
Professional and
scientific equip 195.21 277.3 19 55.36 77 82 305.64 412.9 106 144.52 135.2 73 194.1 179.31 15
Transport equip 26.87 33.11 48 58.56 52.58 126 86.75 127.47 64 13.07 31.25 138 21.09 84.54 34
other manufacturing 9.16 45.94 765 12.19 14.42 104 78.03 142.34 324 7.19 8.73 463 56.93 57.57 142
Total 4.78 31.28 5861 27.68 64.97 3214 222.62 5494.41 5100 42.43 67.06 9637 25.63 82.84 2979
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Table 1.6: Africa: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal distributions. Empirical distribution
of productivities based on estimation of the residual from a Cobb-Douglas production technology
OLS MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks R2 ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 1623 0.63 0.9 0.26 0.89 0.00 0.96 98.75 0.00 0.74 3.66 1.49 0.00
Textiles 187 0.76 0.93 0.37 8.31 0.00 1.04 145.54 0.00 0.57 4.83 1.24 0.39 0.052
Wearing apparel
except footwear 1008 0.71 0.88 0.34 1.32 0.00 0.96 31.85 0.00 0.58 3.25 1.31 0.04
Leather products and
footwear 112 0.6 0.84 0.27 3.50 0.00 0.79 97.97 0.00 0.42 4.89 1.47 0.81 0.439
Wood products
except furniture 240 0.58 0.91 0.25 1.25 0.00 0.77 174.50 0.00 0.78 4.16 1.62 0.05 0.000
Paper products 72 0.67 0.9 0.30 17.78 0.00 0.88 646.76 0.00 0.65 6.23 1.35 0.27 0.017
Printing and
Publishing 234 0.73 0.9 0.36 1.18 0.00 0.95 18.73 0.00 0.52 2.92 1.26 0.36 0.044
Chemicals 343 0.65 0.95 0.31 8.91 0.00 0.72 128.87 0.00 0.40 5.38 1.48 0.01
Rubber and plastic 187 0.65 0.95 0.33 4.63 0.00 0.72 54.36 0.00 0.37 4.61 1.47 0.00
Other non-metallic
products 215 0.62 0.94 0.29 1.90 0.00 0.70 25.96 0.00 0.25 4.14 1.54 0.03
Metallic products 91 0.55 0.75 0.15 0.63 0.00 0.89 352.68 0.00 0.33 6.29 1.49 0.29 0.024
Fabricated metal
products 530 0.66 0.9 0.30 1.00 0.00 0.86 37.15 0.00 0.62 3.33 1.43 0.14 0.003
Machinery except
electrical 124 0.55 0.93 0.28 2.24 0.00 0.61 28.09 0.00 0.24 4.39 1.70 0.02
Electric machinery 63 0.5 0.86 0.17 0.44 0.00 0.64 48.07 0.01 0.17 4.96 1.85 0.22 0.012
Professional and
scientific equip. 19 0.58 0.78 0.35 534.23 0.04 1.17 10564.04 0.00 0.47 9.12 1.31 0.99 0.955
Transport equip. 48 0.86 0.89 0.47 186.02 0.00 0.89 695.75 0.01 0.19 7.36 1.02 0.87 0.553
Other manufacturing 765 0.58 0.91 0.20 0.78 0.00 0.69 82.49 0.00 0.42 4.86 1.64 0.00
Average 0.64 0.89 0.29 45.59 0.84 778.33 4.96 1.45
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Table 1.7: East Asia Paciﬁc: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal distributions. Empirical
distribution of productivities based on estimation of the residual from a Cobb-Douglas production technology
OLS MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks R2 ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 403 0.87 0.88 0.27 7.84 0.00 1.29 412.73 0.00 0.61 5.76 1.06 0.46 0.092
Textiles 329 0.96 0.82 0.37 25.57 0.00 1.44 353.29 0.00 0.46 5.93 0.92 0.26 0.017
Wearing apparel
except footwear 343 0.97 0.86 0.36 79.90 0.00 1.47 1360.27 0.00 0.53 7.15 0.93 0.11 0.002
Leather products and
footwear 42 1.16 0.87 0.60 301.09 0.00 1.37 1036.87 0.00 0.26 7.37 0.76 0.80 0.426
Wood products
except furniture 63 0.77 0.79 0.35 25.47 0.00 1.33 367.45 0.00 0.37 6.06 1.08 0.33 0.029
Paper products 38 1.29 0.86 0.67 161.08 0.00 1.47 430.78 0.13 0.16 6.57 0.66 0.77 0.377
Printing and
Publishing 56 0.9 0.91 0.47 181.12 0.00 1.35 1621.48 0.00 0.52 7.33 1.01 0.82 0.461
Chemicals 272 0.91 0.87 0.42 89.79 0.00 1.60 2001.69 0.00 0.76 6.90 1.02 0.55 0.148
Rubber and plastic 311 0.92 0.87 0.38 286.16 0.00 1.39 5351.66 0.00 0.66 8.26 0.99 0.45 0.076
Other non-metallic
products 372 0.96 0.87 0.35 39.35 0.00 1.22 550.88 0.00 0.42 6.52 0.96 0.22 0.010
Metallic products 99 1.04 0.92 0.62 219.95 0.00 1.52 1513.42 0.00 0.66 7.00 0.89 0.81 0.451
Fabricated metal
products 246 0.96 0.9 0.44 173.30 0.00 1.24 1480.11 0.00 0.47 7.41 0.98 0.19 0.007
Machinery except
electrical 171 0.96 0.92 0.50 176.33 0.00 1.21 1164.73 0.00 0.48 7.17 0.98 0.45 0.081
Electric machinery 157 0.87 0.87 0.32 276.31 0.00 1.31 5890.42 0.00 0.47 8.71 1.03 0.14 0.003
Professional and
scientific equipment 82 0.86 0.88 0.44 313.63 0.00 1.21 2802.60 0.00 0.44 8.04 1.04 0.49 0.100
Transport equipment 126 1.12 0.85 0.52 630.69 0.00 1.49 3914.81 0.00 0.46 8.36 0.79 0.65 0.228
other manufacturing 104 0.92 0.84 0.48 97.41 0.00 1.44 818.60 0.00 0.50 6.65 0.95 0.94 0.738
Average 0.97 0.87 0.45 181.47 1.37 1827.75 7.13 0.94
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Table 1.8: East Europe & Central Asia: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal distributions.
Empirical distribution of productivities based on estimation of the residual from a Cobb-Douglas production technology
OLS MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks R2 ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 1112 0.78 0.85 0.33 278.38 0.00 1.17 8683.76 0.00 0.65 8.69 1.17 0.19 0.007
Textiles 284 0.79 0.82 0.35 170.75 0.00 1.38 3966.73 0.00 0.58 7.99 1.12 0.78 0.403
Wearing apparel
except footwear 601 0.95 0.9 0.42 169.76 0.00 1.31 2574.45 0.00 0.68 7.49 0.99 0.09 0.001
Leather products and
footwear 59 0.88 0.95 0.45 110.01 0.00 0.94 460.45 0.01 0.19 6.91 1.30 0.02
Wood products
except furniture 240 0.87 0.9 0.44 563.66 0.00 0.99 3510.19 0.00 0.34 8.62 1.07 0.16 0.004
Paper products 68 0.67 0.8 0.26 3438.73 0.00 1.00 116026.90 0.00 0.38 11.94 1.38 0.26 0.016
Printing and
Publishing 210 0.88 0.88 0.40 154.65 0.00 1.36 2775.91 0.00 0.67 7.54 1.04 0.62 0.194
Chemicals 284 0.79 0.81 0.29 330.44 0.00 1.44 14939.70 0.00 0.60 9.29 1.11 0.64 0.213
Rubber and plastic 193 0.9 0.78 0.34 161.90 0.00 1.43 3045.54 0.00 0.45 8.07 0.95 0.63 0.208
Other non-metallic
products 320 0.76 0.81 0.31 155.42 0.00 1.33 5973.27 0.00 0.62 8.29 1.15 0.99 0.929
Metallic products 55 0.65 0.92 0.31 144.95 0.00 0.78 2364.67 0.00 0.38 8.23 1.44 0.19 0.006
Fabricated metal
products 594 0.94 0.85 0.32 139.47 0.00 1.36 3627.29 0.00 0.59 8.03 0.97 0.12 0.002
Machinery except
electrical 423 0.89 0.86 0.38 1070.20 0.00 1.49 33762.05 0.00 0.81 9.58 1.03 0.35 0.044
Electric machinery 163 0.88 0.84 0.36 426.96 0.00 1.39 8455.83 0.00 0.60 8.83 1.00 0.81 0.452
Professional and
scientific equipment 106 0.81 0.86 0.41 1435.32 0.00 1.41 25665.57 0.00 0.63 9.71 1.10 0.66 0.236
Transport equipment 64 0.83 0.74 0.36 317.55 0.00 1.57 5243.98 0.00 0.42 8.57 0.98 0.74 0.336
other manufacturing 324 0.82 0.89 0.35 220.82 0.00 1.05 3104.72 0.00 0.44 8.22 1.13 0.14 0.002
Average 0.83 0.85 0.36 546.41 1.26 14363.59 8.59 1.11
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Table 1.9: Latin America and the Caribbean: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal distribu-
tions. Empirical distribution of productivities based on estimation of the residual from a Cobb-Douglas production technology
OLS MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks R2 ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 2172 0.98 0.83 0.32 63.62 0.00 1.81 3743.14 0.00 0.85 7.32 0.92 0.05
Textiles 872 0.91 0.74 0.27 74.84 0.00 1.84 4770.79 0.00 0.70 7.99 0.94 0.04
Wearing apparel
except footwear 1251 0.95 0.81 0.33 121.37 0.00 1.69 4004.55 0.00 0.72 7.79 0.93 0.43 0.071
Leather products and
footwear 268 0.92 0.7 0.25 10.31 0.00 1.91 704.29 0.00 0.59 6.30 0.88 0.15 0.005
Wood products
except furniture 143 1.03 0.87 0.46 186.39 0.00 1.66 2017.19 0.00 0.57 7.41 0.89 0.73 0.332
Paper products 62 1 0.71 0.43 405.45 0.00 1.22 2326.14 0.02 0.16 8.34 0.80 0.74 0.329
Printing and
Publishing 192 1.29 0.8 0.38 988.92 0.00 2.06 12703.50 0.00 0.41 9.53 0.70 0.06 0.002
Chemicals 1306 1.01 0.82 0.31 194.52 0.00 2.01 11126.73 0.00 0.82 8.50 0.89 0.27 0.021
Rubber and plastic 537 1.24 0.79 0.46 481.08 0.00 2.35 5880.26 0.00 0.65 8.37 0.70 0.80 0.434
Other non-metallic
products 388 0.97 0.88 0.37 65.87 0.00 1.34 884.71 0.00 0.45 6.89 0.95 0.14 0.003
Metallic products 125 0.89 0.82 0.37 63.97 0.00 1.27 931.45 0.00 0.46 6.88 1.00 0.98 0.898
Fabricated metal
products 885 1.11 0.84 0.37 260.83 0.00 1.65 4216.79 0.00 0.56 8.24 0.81 0.37 0.045
Machinery except
electrical 620 0.97 0.78 0.32 138.30 0.00 2.02 5270.53 0.00 0.72 8.04 0.89 0.54 0.132
Electric machinery 142 1.12 0.85 0.46 188.51 0.00 0.99 680.91 0.28 0.07 7.43 0.79 0.18 0.006
Professional and
scientific equipment 73 1.08 0.85 0.53 1543.51 0.00 1.27 5755.48 0.03 0.15 9.25 0.80 0.09 0.001
Transport equipment 138 0.67 0.64 0.21 6.04 0.00 1.26 525.59 0.00 0.33 6.51 1.17 0.03
other manufacturing 463 0.83 0.76 0.24 6.90 0.00 1.84 988.21 0.00 0.79 6.09 1.03 0.31 0.032
Average 0.99 0.79 0.36 282.38 1.66 3913.54 7.70 0.89
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Table 1.10: South Asia: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal distributions. Empirical
distribution of productivities based on estimation of the residual from a Cobb-Douglas production technology
OLS MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks R2 ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 542 0.77 0.91 0.38 43.79 0.00 1.24 1569.81 0.00 0.78 6.42 1.21 0.10 0.001
Textiles 481 0.94 0.87 0.45 113.92 0.00 1.67 2221.36 0.00 0.77 6.97 0.97 0.37 0.045
Wearing apparel
except footwear 448 1.04 0.88 0.49 128.15 0.00 1.80 2190.74 0.00 0.81 6.90 0.89 0.55 0.142
Leather products and
footwear 352 0.86 0.83 0.37 50.71 0.00 1.71 1529.58 0.00 0.75 6.59 1.03 0.98 0.871
Wood products
except furniture 66 0.97 0.83 0.55 259.30 0.00 1.18 1248.29 0.00 0.41 7.37 0.92 0.65 0.224
Paper products 40 0.76 0.91 0.43 121.32 0.00 0.91 728.25 0.00 0.33 7.13 1.13 0.47 0.082
Printing and
Publishing 68 1.22 0.89 0.48 59.13 0.00 1.59 394.49 0.00 0.40 6.16 0.77 0.62 0.200
Chemicals 279 0.96 0.85 0.47 85.67 0.00 1.67 1212.45 0.00 0.70 6.59 0.95 0.93 0.709
Rubber and plastic 108 0.74 0.85 0.39 21.90 0.00 0.69 93.68 0.00 0.17 5.65 1.18 0.86 0.543
Other non-metallic
products 95 0.72 0.74 0.19 53.87 0.00 1.38 16824.12 0.00 0.63 9.33 1.15 0.88 0.589
Metallic products 85 0.86 0.87 0.46 361.42 0.00 1.12 2496.12 0.00 0.39 8.07 1.03 0.93 0.730
Fabricated metal
products 76 0.89 0.83 0.45 86.49 0.00 1.51 959.18 0.00 0.58 6.70 0.98 0.49 0.102
Machinery except
electrical 78 1.08 0.83 0.46 183.44 0.00 1.21 988.14 0.00 0.23 7.41 0.83 0.95 0.775
Electric machinery 70 0.9 0.92 0.52 113.83 0.00 0.84 313.88 0.01 0.19 6.65 1.10 0.20 0.008
Professional and
scientific equipment 15 1.08 0.9 1.06 5494.80 0.83 1.06 5494.80 0.83 0.00 9.56 0.77 0.83 0.473
Transport equipment 34 0.7 0.9 0.46 41.97 0.07 1.11 485.10 0.00 0.53 5.92 1.41 0.78 0.399
other manufacturing 142 0.95 0.82 0.41 323.44 0.00 1.06 1977.84 0.00 0.18 8.24 0.91 0.81 0.435
Average 0.91 0.86 0.47 443.71 1.28 2395.76 7.16 1.01
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Table 1.11: Africa: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal distributions. Empirical distribution
of productivities using a transformation on ﬁrms' revenues.
MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 1623 0.26 0.89 0.00 0.96 98.75 0.00 0.74 3.66 1.49 0.00
Textiles 187 0.37 8.31 0.00 1.04 145.54 0.00 0.57 4.83 1.24 0.39 0.541
Wearing apparel
except footwear 1008 0.34 1.32 0.00 0.96 31.85 0.00 0.58 3.25 1.31 0.04
Leather products and
footwear 112 0.27 3.50 0.00 0.79 97.97 0.00 0.42 4.89 1.47 0.81 0.081
Wood products
except furniture 240 0.25 1.25 0.00 0.77 174.50 0.00 0.78 4.16 1.62 0.05 0.003
Paper products 72 0.30 17.78 0.00 0.88 646.76 0.00 0.65 6.23 1.35 0.27 0.097
Printing and
Publishing 234 0.36 1.18 0.00 0.95 18.73 0.00 0.52 2.92 1.26 0.36 0.005
Chemicals 343 0.31 8.91 0.00 0.72 128.87 0.00 0.40 5.38 1.48 0.01 0.038
Rubber and plastic 187 0.33 4.63 0.00 0.72 54.36 0.00 0.37 4.61 1.47 0.00 0.167
Other non-metallic
products 215 0.29 1.90 0.00 0.70 25.96 0.00 0.25 4.14 1.54 0.03 0.021
Metallic products 91 0.15 0.63 0.00 0.89 352.68 0.00 0.33 6.29 1.49 0.29 0.017
Fabricated metal
products 530 0.30 1.00 0.00 0.86 37.15 0.00 0.62 3.33 1.43 0.14 0.002
Machinery except
electrical 124 0.28 2.24 0.00 0.61 28.09 0.00 0.24 4.39 1.70 0.02 0.114
Electric machinery 63 0.17 0.44 0.00 0.64 48.07 0.01 0.17 4.96 1.85 0.22 0.775
Professional and
scientific equip. 19 0.35 534.23 0.04 1.17 10564.04 0.00 0.47 9.12 1.31 0.99 0.323
Transport equip. 48 0.47 186.02 0.00 0.89 695.75 0.01 0.19 7.36 1.02 0.87 0.852
Other manufacturing 765 0.20 0.78 0.00 0.69 82.49 0.00 0.42 4.86 1.64 0.00
Average 0.29 45.59 0.84 778.33 0.45 4.96 1.45
Notes. The values for xmin have been divided by 1000
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Table 1.12: East Asia Paciﬁc: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal distributions. Empirical
distribution of productivities using a transformation on ﬁrms' revenues.
MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 403 0.27 7.84 0.00 1.29 412.73 0.00 0.61 5.76 1.06 0.46 0.029
Textiles 329 0.37 25.57 0.00 1.44 353.29 0.00 0.46 5.93 0.92 0.26
Wearing apparel
except footwear 343 0.36 79.90 0.00 1.47 1360.27 0.00 0.53 7.15 0.93 0.11 0.001
Leather products and
footwear 42 0.60 301.09 0.00 1.37 1036.87 0.00 0.26 7.37 0.76 0.80 0.078
Wood products
except furniture 63 0.35 25.47 0.00 1.33 367.45 0.00 0.37 6.06 1.08 0.33 0.035
Paper products 38 0.67 161.08 0.00 1.47 430.78 0.13 0.16 6.57 0.66 0.77 0.239
Printing and
Publishing 56 0.47 181.12 0.00 1.35 1621.48 0.00 0.52 7.33 1.01 0.82 0.003
Chemicals 272 0.42 89.79 0.00 1.60 2001.69 0.00 0.76 6.90 1.02 0.55
Rubber and plastic 311 0.38 286.16 0.00 1.39 5351.66 0.00 0.66 8.26 0.99 0.45
Other non-metallic
products 372 0.35 39.35 0.00 1.22 550.88 0.00 0.42 6.52 0.96 0.22 0.001
Metallic products 99 0.62 219.95 0.00 1.52 1513.42 0.00 0.66 7.00 0.89 0.81 0.507
Fabricated metal
products 246 0.44 173.30 0.00 1.24 1480.11 0.00 0.47 7.41 0.98 0.19 0.002
Machinery except
electrical 171 0.50 176.33 0.00 1.21 1164.73 0.00 0.48 7.17 0.98 0.45 0.323
Electric machinery 157 0.32 276.31 0.00 1.31 5890.42 0.00 0.47 8.71 1.03 0.14 0.381
Professional and
scientific equipment 82 0.44 313.63 0.00 1.21 2802.60 0.00 0.44 8.04 1.04 0.49 0.160
Transport equipment 126 0.52 630.69 0.00 1.49 3914.81 0.00 0.46 8.36 0.79 0.65 0.034
other manufacturing 104 0.48 97.41 0.00 1.44 818.60 0.00 0.50 6.65 0.95 0.94 0.135
Average 0.45 181.47 1.37 1827.75 7.13 0.94
Notes. The values for xmin have been divided by 1000
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Table 1.13: Eastern Europe & Central Asia region: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal
distributions. Empirical distribution of productivities using a transformation on ﬁrms' revenues.
MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 1112 0.33 278.38 0.00 1.17 8683.76 0.00 0.65 8.69 1.17 0.19
Textiles 284 0.35 170.75 0.00 1.38 3966.73 0.00 0.58 7.99 1.12 0.78
Wearing apparel
except footwear 601 0.42 169.76 0.00 1.31 2574.45 0.00 0.68 7.49 0.99 0.09 0.414
Leather products and
footwear 59 0.45 110.01 0.00 0.94 460.45 0.01 0.19 6.91 1.30 0.02 0.574
Wood products
except furniture 240 0.44 563.66 0.00 0.99 3510.19 0.00 0.34 8.62 1.07 0.16 0.460
Paper products 68 0.26 3438.73 0.00 1.00 116026.90 0.00 0.38 11.94 1.38 0.26 0.895
Printing and
Publishing 210 0.40 154.65 0.00 1.36 2775.91 0.00 0.67 7.54 1.04 0.62 0.239
Chemicals 284 0.29 330.44 0.00 1.44 14939.70 0.00 0.60 9.29 1.11 0.64 0.048
Rubber and plastic 193 0.34 161.90 0.00 1.43 3045.54 0.00 0.45 8.07 0.95 0.63 0.011
Other non-metallic
products 320 0.31 155.42 0.00 1.33 5973.27 0.00 0.62 8.29 1.15 0.99 0.310
Metallic products 55 0.31 144.95 0.00 0.78 2364.67 0.00 0.38 8.23 1.44 0.19 0.096
Fabricated metal
products 594 0.32 139.47 0.00 1.36 3627.29 0.00 0.59 8.03 0.97 0.12 0.180
Machinery except
electrical 423 0.38 1070.20 0.00 1.49 33762.05 0.00 0.81 9.58 1.03 0.35 0.041
Electric machinery 163 0.36 426.96 0.00 1.39 8455.83 0.00 0.60 8.83 1.00 0.81 0.001
Professional and
scientific equipment 106 0.41 1435.32 0.00 1.41 25665.57 0.00 0.63 9.71 1.10 0.66 0.302
Transport equipment 64 0.36 317.55 0.00 1.57 5243.98 0.00 0.42 8.57 0.98 0.74 0.596
other manufacturing 324 0.35 220.82 0.00 1.05 3104.72 0.00 0.44 8.22 1.13 0.14 0.065
Average 0.36 546.41 1.26 14363.59 8.59 1.11
Notes. The values for xmin have been divided by 1000
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Table 1.14: Latin America and the Caribbean: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal
distributions. Empirical distribution of productivities using a transformation on ﬁrms' revenues.
MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 2172 0.32 63.62 0.00 1.81 3743.14 0.00 0.85 7.32 0.92 0.05
Textiles 872 0.27 74.84 0.00 1.84 4770.79 0.00 0.70 7.99 0.94 0.04 0.057
Wearing apparel
except footwear 1251 0.33 121.37 0.00 1.69 4004.55 0.00 0.72 7.79 0.93 0.43 0.046
Leather products and
footwear 268 0.25 10.31 0.00 1.91 704.29 0.00 0.59 6.30 0.88 0.15 0.342
Wood products
except furniture 143 0.46 186.39 0.00 1.66 2017.19 0.00 0.57 7.41 0.89 0.73 0.473
Paper products 62 0.43 405.45 0.00 1.22 2326.14 0.02 0.16 8.34 0.80 0.74 0.006
Printing and
Publishing 192 0.38 988.92 0.00 2.06 12703.50 0.00 0.41 9.53 0.70 0.06 0.025
Chemicals 1306 0.31 194.52 0.00 2.01 11126.73 0.00 0.82 8.50 0.89 0.27
Rubber and plastic 537 0.46 481.08 0.00 2.35 5880.26 0.00 0.65 8.37 0.70 0.80 0.000
Other non-metallic
products 388 0.37 65.87 0.00 1.34 884.71 0.00 0.45 6.89 0.95 0.14 0.000
Metallic products 125 0.37 63.97 0.00 1.27 931.45 0.00 0.46 6.88 1.00 0.98 0.149
Fabricated metal
products 885 0.37 260.83 0.00 1.65 4216.79 0.00 0.56 8.24 0.81 0.37 0.004
Machinery except
electrical 620 0.32 138.30 0.00 2.02 5270.53 0.00 0.72 8.04 0.89 0.54 0.151
Electric machinery 142 0.46 188.51 0.00 0.99 680.91 0.28 0.07 7.43 0.79 0.18 0.125
Professional and
scientific equipment 73 0.53 1543.51 0.00 1.27 5755.48 0.03 0.15 9.25 0.80 0.09 0.009
Transport equipment 138 0.21 6.04 0.00 1.26 525.59 0.00 0.33 6.51 1.17 0.03 0.555
other manufacturing 463 0.24 6.90 0.00 1.84 988.21 0.00 0.79 6.09 1.03 0.31 0.151
Average 0.36 282.38 1.66 3913.54 7.70 0.89
Notes. The values for xmin have been divided by 1000
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Table 1.15: South Asia Region: Parameter estimation and goodness of ﬁt for the Pareto and lognormal distributions. Empirical
distribution of productivities using a transformation on ﬁrms' revenues.
MLE MLE mod Log-normal
Obs. ks xmin
K.S p-
value ks xmin
K.S p-
value
ratio of
x < xmin
m v
K.S p-
value
Monte Carlo
p-value
Food beverages and
tobacco 542 0.38 43.79 0.00 1.24 1569.81 0.00 0.78 6.42 1.21 0.10
Textiles 481 0.45 113.92 0.00 1.67 2221.36 0.00 0.77 6.97 0.97 0.37
Wearing apparel
except footwear 448 0.49 128.15 0.00 1.80 2190.74 0.00 0.81 6.90 0.89 0.55
Leather products and
footwear 352 0.37 50.71 0.00 1.71 1529.58 0.00 0.75 6.59 1.03 0.98
Wood products
except furniture 66 0.55 259.30 0.00 1.18 1248.29 0.00 0.41 7.37 0.92 0.65 0.014
Paper products 40 0.43 121.32 0.00 0.91 728.25 0.00 0.33 7.13 1.13 0.47 0.424
Printing and
Publishing 68 0.48 59.13 0.00 1.59 394.49 0.00 0.40 6.16 0.77 0.62 0.106
Chemicals 279 0.47 85.67 0.00 1.67 1212.45 0.00 0.70 6.59 0.95 0.93 0.027
Rubber and plastic 108 0.39 21.90 0.00 0.69 93.68 0.00 0.17 5.65 1.18 0.86 0.034
Other non-metallic
products 95 0.19 53.87 0.00 1.38 16824.12 0.00 0.63 9.33 1.15 0.88 0.041
Metallic products 85 0.46 361.42 0.00 1.12 2496.12 0.00 0.39 8.07 1.03 0.93 0.622
Fabricated metal
products 76 0.45 86.49 0.00 1.51 959.18 0.00 0.58 6.70 0.98 0.49 0.894
Machinery except
electrical 78 0.46 183.44 0.00 1.21 988.14 0.00 0.23 7.41 0.83 0.95 0.112
Electric machinery 70 0.52 113.83 0.00 0.84 313.88 0.01 0.19 6.65 1.10 0.20 0.684
Professional and
scientific equipment 15 1.06 5494.80 0.83 1.06 5494.80 0.83 0.00 9.56 0.77 0.83 0.954
Transport equipment 34 0.46 41.97 0.07 1.11 485.10 0.00 0.53 5.92 1.41 0.78
other manufacturing 142 0.41 323.44 0.00 1.06 1977.84 0.00 0.18 8.24 0.91 0.81 0.081
Average 0.47 443.71 1.28 2395.75 7.16 1.01
Notes. The values for xmin have been divided by 1000
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Figure 1.4: Eﬀects of Changes in the Elasticity of Substitution for sector 2
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Figure 1.5: Depreciation and tax rates as functions of diﬀerent variables
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Figure 1.6: Tax revenue and gains from trade using the optimal corporate tax rates
based in the closed economy formulas
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of log sales of ﬁrms for 17 sectors in the Africa region
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of log sales of ﬁrms for 17 sectors in the East and Paciﬁc Asia region
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Figure 1.9: Distribution of log sales of ﬁrms for 17 sectors in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region
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Figure 1.10: Distribution of log sales of ﬁrms for 17 sectors in the Latin America region
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Figure 1.11: Distribution of log sales of ﬁrms for 17 sectors in the South Asia region
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Appendix
1.A Closed Economy
Useful Formulas
r¯s = r(ϕ˜s) = σus fshσs−1s (1.A.1)
t¯s = ts(ϕ˜s) = τ
(
us fshσs−1s −δsw fs
)
(1.A.2)
∂us
∂τ
=
(1−δs)
(1− τ)2 R 0 (1.A.3)
∂us
∂δs′
= − τ
1− τ < 0 if s=s’, otherwise 0(1.A.4)
∂ r¯s
∂δs
= σs fs
(
hσs−1s
∂us
∂δs
+us
∂hσs−1s
∂δs
)
if s=s’, otherwise 0 (1.A.5)
∂ r¯s
∂τ
= σs fs
(
hσs−1s
∂us
∂τ
+us
∂hσs−1s
∂τ
)
(1.A.6)
∂hσs−1s
∂x
= (σs−1)hσs−1s
[
∂ϕ∗s
∂x
1
ϕ∗s
[
ξ sϕ˜s,ϕ∗s −1
]]
(1.A.7)
To get ∂ ϕ˜∂ϕ∗ apply Leibniz rule to the average productivity equation. The simplified result is:
∂ ϕ˜s
∂ϕ∗s
=
z(ϕ∗s )ϕ˜s
(σ −1)(1−Zs(ϕ∗s ))
[
1−h1−σs
]
(1.A.8)
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Elasticities
As mentioned in the paper, let ξ sx,y be the elasticity of variable x with respect to y for
sector s.
ξ sϕ˜s,ϕ∗ =
z(ϕ∗s )ϕ∗s
(σ −1)(1−Z(ϕ∗s )
[
1−h1−σs
]
(1.A.9)
ξ sMs,δs′ =
∑Si=1
∂Ti
∂δs′
δs′(
wL+∑Si=1 Ti−qG0
) −[ −τδs
(1−δsτ) +(σ −1)
(
ξϕ∗s ,δs′
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s −1
])]
(1.A.10)
ξ sMs,δs′ =
∑Si=1
∂Ti
∂δs′
δs′(
wL+∑Si=1 Ti−qG0
) if s 6= s’ (1.A.11)
ξ sMs,τ =
∑Si=1
∂Ti
∂τ
τ(
wL+∑Si=1 Ti−qG0
) −[ (1−δs)τ
(1− τ)(1−δsτ) +(σ −1)
(
ξϕ∗,τ
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s −1
])]
(1.A.12)
1.A.1 Optimal Taxes in the Closed Model
The FOCs for δi and τ are rewritten into:
αi
[
τδi
(1−δiτ)(1−σi) −ξϕ
∗
i ,δi
]
= λ˜Miτδi fi
[ −w
1−δiτ +(σi−1)ξϕ
∗
i ,δi(ξϕ˜i,ϕ∗i −1)w
]
(1.A.13)
S
∑
i=1
αi
( −(1−δi)τ
(1− τ)(1−δiτ)(1−σi) −ξϕ
∗
s′ ,τ
)
=
λ˜
S
∑
i=1
[
Miτw fi
(
(σi−1)ξϕ∗i ,τ(ξϕ˜i,ϕ∗i −1)δi+uih
σi−1
i −δi
(
1−2τ+δiτ2
(1− τ)(1−δiτ)
))]
(1.A.14)
Pareto Distribution
Assuming productivities follow a Pareto distribution, i.e:
Zi(ϕ) = 1−
(
ϕmin,i
ϕ
)ki
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Under this distribution, the variables needed to solve the model can be found:
ϕ˜i =
(
ki
ki− (σi−1)
) 1
σi−1
ϕ∗i (1.A.15)
ϕ∗i =
[(
σi−1
ki− (σi−1)
)(
fi(1−δiτ)
ψ fe,i
)]1/ki
ϕmin,i (1.A.16)
ξϕ∗i ,δi =
−τδi
ki(1−δiτ) = ξϕ
∗
i ,τ (1.A.17)
Using these values we use equation 1.A.13 to find δi as a function of τ and parameters.
1−δiτ = λ˜ (1− τ)ρiwL
Such relation is used to find the optimal tax rate through equation 1.A.14, leading to:
1− τ =
[
S
∑
i=1
αi
ki
][
λ˜wL
S
∑
i=1
αiρi
ki
]−1
(1.A.18)
This equation implied
Log-normal Distribution
Under this distribution, the variables needed to solve the model must be found through
numerical methods. To solve for ϕ˜i define:
di =
(log(ϕ∗i )−mi)
vi
(1.A.19)
Φ(x) =
∫ x
−∞
1√
2pi
exp(−1
2
x2) (1.A.20)
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where mi,vi are the parameters for the lognormal distribution of productivities for sector i.
The function Φ(x) is the CDF for the standard normal distribution. Using, these variables:
ϕ˜σi−1i =
1
1−Zi(ϕ∗i )
∫ ∞
ϕ∗i
ϕσi−1z(ϕ)dϕ (1.A.21)
= exp
(
mi(σi−1)+ ((σi−1)vi)
2
2
)
Φ((σi−1)vi−di)
Φ(−di) (1.A.22)
= Aig(ϕ∗i ) (1.A.23)
Equation 1.A.22 is obtained through various substitutions in the integral, as well as using the
symmetry of the normal distribution.27 The productivity cutoff ϕ∗s is found by solving:
Aigi(ϕ∗i )
(ϕ∗i )σ−1
=
ψ fe,i
(1−δiτ)Φ(−di) fi +1 (1.A.24)
In order to solve for the optimal rates we must find a formula for ξϕ∗i ,δi . This is accomplish
by using 1.A.7,1.A.9 and the ZP and FE conditions.
ξϕ∗i ,δi =
ψ fe,i
Xi(1−σi)
(
τδi
1− τδi
)
(1.A.25)
Xi = ψ fe,i+(1−δiτ)Φ(−di) fi (1.A.26)
Using the above formula, equations 1.A.13 result in the following relationship:
1
(1− τ)ρiλwL =
ψ fe,i+Φ(−di) fi
Xi
− ψ fe,iφ(−di)
XiΦ(−di)vi ξϕ
∗
i ,δi (1.A.27)
while equation 1.A.14 can be simplified to:
S
∑
i=1
αi
σi−1
(
τ
(1− τ)Xi
)
(ψ fe,i+(1−δi)Φ(−di) fi)
= λ˜ τ
S
∑
i=1
Miw fi
[
δi
(
−(ψ fe,i+Φ(−di) fi)
Xi
+
τ
1− τ +
ψ fe,iφ(−di)
XiΦ(−di)vi ξϕ
∗
i ,δi
)
+uihσ−1i
]
27The step by step derivation can be provided upon request
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which simplifies to:
1− τ =
[
S
∑
i=1
αi
σi−1
][
λ˜wL
S
∑
i=1
αi
σi
(
ψ fe,i+Φ(−di) fi
Xi
)]−1
(1.A.28)
Thus the solution to the problem is found by solving the system of S+1 equations given by
1.A.27 and 1.A.28.
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1.B Open Model Equilibrium with Asymmetric Countries
The world consists of N countries whose households have the same utility function form
but the parameters (σ ,α) are allowed to vary across countries. Firms can export their prod-
ucts by paying an iceberg trade cost θ i js in which i is the destination country and j is the
source country and. s is the industry. Will keep this notation for the remaining variables in
which there is a need to specify the flows. Companies in j that want to export to country i
have to pay a fixed cost f i jex,s. We assume that wages across countries are the same which is
justified by using a homogeneous good that is freely traded and use this as the numeraire.
Since elasticities of substitutions can be heterogeneous across countries, it implies that the
markup charged by firms is different in each country leading to the pricing decision rule:
pi js (ϕ) = θ
i j
s
w
ρ isϕ
Let pi jd,s(ϕ) be the domestic profit of firms in j selling domestically and pi
i j
ex,s(ϕ) repre-
sents the profits of the firm from exporting into i.
pi jd,s(ϕ) = (1− τ j)
(
r jd,s(ϕ)
σ js
−u jsw f js
)
pi i jd,s(ϕ) = (1− τ j)
(
ri jex,s(ϕ)
σ is
−u jsw f i jex,s
)
1.B.1 Equiibrium and Aggregation
Let ϕ jd,s be the cutoff productivity to enter the j domestic market while ϕ
i j
ex,s is the cutoff
productivity of the marginal firm that decides to serve the market in country i. Unlike many
Melitz type models, the export cutoff productivity is different depending on the destination
country. Furthermore, if a country decides to serve a particular market it does not necessarily
imply that it will serve all the other markets. Nonetheless, conditions will be imposed to
ensure that ϕ i jex > ϕ jd,s ∀i 6= j. Using ϕ˜() (equation 1.2.7) we can define the average pro-
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ductivity of all firms producing and selling in j as ϕ˜ jd = ϕ˜
j(ϕ jd) and, the productivity of the
firms exporting by ϕ˜ i jex = ϕ˜ i(ϕ i jex)
Let i 6= j then the number of firms (in sector s) that produce in country j be M js and the
amount of firms that export into i is represented by Mi jex,s. Thus, the total number of varieties
in industry s available to consumers in country j is given by M jtot =M j+∑i 6= j M
ji
ex. Thus, the
average total productivity in j and the price index is :
ϕ˜ js =
[
1
M jtot,s
(
M js
(
ϕ˜ js
)σ js−1+∑
i6= j
((
θ jis
)−1 ϕ˜ jiex,s)σ js−1
)]
P js =
[
1
1−Z js (ϕ jd,s)
∫ ∞
ϕ jd,s
ps(ϕ)1−σ
j
s M js z
j
s(ϕ)+∑
i 6= j
1
1−Zis(ϕ jiex,s)
∫ ∞
ϕ jiex,s
p jiex,s(ϕ)
1−σ js M jiex,sz
i
s(ϕ)
] 1
1−σ js
P js =
(
M jtot,s
) 1
1−σ js ps(ϕ˜ jtot,s)
Now, the aggregate and average functions for firm revenues and profits are given by:
R js = M
j
s r
j
d,s(ϕ˜
j
d,s)+∑
i 6= j
Mi jex,sr
i j
ex,s(ϕ˜
i j
ex,s)
Π js = M
j
spi
j
d,s(ϕ˜
j
d,s)+∑
i 6= j
Mi jex,spi
i j
ex,s(ϕ˜
i j
ex,s)
r¯ js = r
j
d,s(ϕ˜
j
d,s)+∑
i 6= j
pi jex,sr
i j
ex,s(ϕ˜
i j
ex,s)
p¯i js = pi
j
d,s(ϕ˜
j
d,s)+∑
i 6= j
pi jex,spi
i j
ex,s(ϕ˜
i j
ex,s)
in which pi jex =
1−Z js (ϕ i jex,s)
1−Z js (ϕ jd,s)
is the conditional probability of a firm drawing a productivity
that allows them to serve market i from country j. Also, pi jexM
j
s = M
i j
ex,s. The above formulas
are used to find the average profit as a function of ϕ jd,s (productivity that generates zero profit
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from domestic operations) and ϕ i jex,s (productivity that generates zero profit of exporting to i).
p¯i js = (1−δ js τ j)w
 f js
( ϕ˜ jd,s
ϕ jd,s
)σ js−1
−1
+∑
i6= j
pi jex f
i j
ex,s
( ϕ˜ i jex,s
ϕ i jex
)σ is−1
−1

 (1.B.1)
to solve or ϕ jd,s the export cutoffs must be expressed as functions of such variable:
ϕ i jex,s =
[(
σ is f
i j
ex,s
σ js f js
)
Y js
Y is
Mitot,s
M jtot,s
] 1
σ is−1
(
ϕ jd,s
ϕ˜ jtot,s
)σ js −1
σ is−1
ϕ˜ itot,sθ
i j
s (1.B.2)
where Ys = αs(wL+∑Πτi ) is the income spend in sector s by consumers, in which we assume
that taxes collected by the government are redistributed to their citizens. Plugging this for-
mula into equation 1.B.1 gives rise to zero profit condition for the open economy asymmetric
model. The fixed entry (equation FEC) remains the same. The export cutoff formula depends
on the total number of firms in the destination country as well as the country where the firms
is located. The number of firms for sector s in country j is:
M js =
α js (wL j +∑Ss=1Π
τ, j
s )
σ js
(
p¯i js
1− τ j +u
j
s f
j
s
)
+wu js∑i 6= j p
i j
ex,s f
i j
ex,s
(
σ js +(σ is−σ js )
ϕ˜ i jex,s
ϕ i jex,s
) (1.B.3)
Thus, for each sector, in each country, we solve 2 equations ZPC = FE and 1.B.3 with
N auxiliary equations (1.B.2). This leads to a system of N× S× (N + 2) equations that are
solved simultaneously to give rise to the equilibrium of the model. In the case of Pareto
distributions, the system of equations can be reduced to N × S× 2 as the ratio ϕ˜ex/ϕex is
constant.
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1.C Proposition Proofs
1.C.1 Proof of Proposition 1.2.1
For any non-degenerate distribution the mean of the random variable is greater than the
minimum value of the support. Thus ϕ˜ > ϕ∗ which implies h> 1 =⇒ h−1 < 1. Raising both
sides of the inequality by the positive number σ − 1 is use to show that 1− h1−σ is greater
than zero. Thus equation 1.A.9 consist of positive factors and hence greater than zero.
For the second part, assume that productivities follow a Pareto distribution with xmin,s =
ϕmin,s and shape parameter ks.Then
ϕ˜s =
[
ks
ks− (σs−1)
] 1
σs−1
ϕ∗s
∂ ϕ˜s
∂ϕ∗s
=
[
ks
ks− (σs−1)
] 1
σs−1
Using the above equations it is clear that ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ is exactly one.
1.C.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2.2
Assume the government budget constraint is binding and therefore the number of firms
in equilibrium is: Ms =
wL
σsus fshσs−1s
. Let s 6= s′, then the binding budget assumption implies
that equation 1.A.11 is equal to zero for any distribution of productivities.
Now assume that s = s′ for some s′ ∈ S. For a any productivity distribution, equation 1.A.10
simplifies to:
ξMs,δs′ =−
[ −τδs
(1−δsτ) +(σs−1)
(
ξϕ∗s ,δs′
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s −1
])]
Proposition 1.2.1 says that ξPϕ˜,ϕ∗ ≡ 1, therefore:
ξMs,δs′ −ξPMs,δs′ =−(σs−1)
(
ξϕ∗s ,δs′
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s −1
])
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The term (σ − 1)ξϕ∗
s′ ,δs′
is less than zero since the productivity cutoff is negatively related
to the depreciation rate for its sector. Using the appropriate assumptions on ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s gives the
inequalities between both elasticities.
It remains to show that the elasticity spawn from a Pareto distribution is greater than zero.
The formula for such elasticity is:
ξPMs′ ,δs′ =
τδs′
1−δs′τ
by assumption, δsτ < 1 for all sectors, and hence ξPMs,δs is positive.
1.C.3 Proof of Proposition 1.2.3
Only the first bullet point is proved as the second one follows a similar argument. Under
a binding government constraint, equation 1.A.12 simplifies to:
ξMs,τ = −
(1−δs)τ
(1− τ)(1−δsτ) − (σs−1)
(
ξϕ∗,τ
[
ξϕ˜s,ϕ∗s −1
])
ξPMs,τ = −
(1−δs)τ
(1− τ)(1−δsτ)
If δs ≤ 1, then clearly ξPMs,τ ≤ 0, with strict inequality if δs < 1. Since ξϕs′ ,δs′ = ξϕs′ ,τ (this
is shown in the next proof), I use a similar argument for the proof of proposition 1.2.2 to
establish the inequalities between ξM and ξPM. Assuming ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ < 1 and proposition 1.2.2, the
following equality is obtained:
ξMs,τ < ξ
P
Ms,τ ≤ 0
On the other hand, if ξϕ˜,ϕ∗ < 1 then ξMs,τ > ξPMs,τ ; and therefore the sign of the elasticity of
firms to taxes under a distribution that is not Pareto is indeterminate. The exception being
δ = 1, which then implies such elasticity to be positive since ξPM,τ = 0
80
1.C.4 Proof of Proposition 1.3.1
The first step is to show the following equality between elasticities
Claim: ξϕ∗i ,δi = ξϕ∗i ,τ
Proof. The ZPC and FEC conditions imply that the equilibrium ϕ∗s must solve the equation:
hσ−1s =
ψFe,s
(1−Zs(ϕ∗s ))(1−δsτ) fs
+1
Take the derivative with respect to τ as well as δs. The ratio of such derivatives is:
∂hσ−1s
∂τ
∂hσ−1s
∂δs
=
zs(ϕ∗s )
∂ϕ∗
∂τ (1−δsτ)+(1−Zs(ϕ∗s ))δs
zs(ϕ∗s )
∂ϕ∗
∂δs (1−δsτ)+(1−Zs(ϕ∗s ))τ
By equation 1.A.7:
∂hσ−1s
∂τ
∂hσ−1s
∂δs
=
(
∂ϕ∗s
∂τ
)(
∂ϕ∗s
∂δs
)−1
Set the last two equation equal to each other and rearrange to obtain:
τ
(
∂ϕ∗s
∂τ
)
= δs
(
∂ϕ∗s
∂δs
)
ξϕ∗s ,τ = ξϕ∗s ,δs
After proving the above claim, the FOCs (eq. 1.3.4 and 1.3.5) are re-written into:
αs′
(
τδs′
(1−δs′τ)(1−σi)
−ξϕ∗
s′ ,δs′
)
= λ˜Ms′
(
ξMs′ ,δs′ t¯s′+
∂ t¯s′
∂δs′
δs′
)
(1.C.1)
S
∑
i=1
αi
( −(1−δi)τ
(1− τ)(1−δiτ)(1−σi) −ξϕ
∗
s′ ,τ
)
= λ˜
[
S
∑
i=1
Mi
(
ξMi,τ t¯i+
∂ t¯i′
∂τ
τ
)]
(1.C.2)
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Adding equation 1.C.1 across all sectors and using the equality of the claim results in:
S
∑
i=1
αi
(
τ(1−δiτ)
(1−δiτ)(1− τ)(1−σi)
)
= λ˜
S
∑
i=1
Mi
[(
ξMi,δi−ξMi,τ
)
t¯i+
(
∂ t¯i
∂δi
δi− ∂ t¯i∂τ τ
)]
S
∑
i=1
αiτ
(1− τ)(1−σi) = λ˜
S
∑
i=1
Mi
[(
τ
1− τ t¯i
)
+
(
∂ t¯i
∂δi
δi− ∂ t¯i∂τ τ
)]
(1.C.3)
Next, the remainder derivatives are computed:
∂ t¯i
∂δi
δi = τδiw fi
(
∂ui
∂δi
hσi−1i +
∂hσi−1i
∂δi
ui−1
)
∂ t¯i
∂τ
τ = τw fi
[(
∂ui
∂τ
hσi−1i +
∂hσi−1i
∂τ
ui
)
τ+uihσi−1i −δi
]
∂ t¯i
∂δi
δi− ∂ t¯i∂τ τ = τw fi
[
hσi−1i
(
∂ui
∂δi
δi− uiτ τ
)
+ui
(
∂hσi−1i
∂δi
δi− ∂h
σi−1
i
∂τ
τ
)
−uihσi−1i
]
= τw fi
[
hσ−1i ui
( −τ
1− τ
)
+0−uihσi−1i
]
= τw fi
(
hσi−1i ui
−1
1− τ
)
Replacing terms in equation 1.C.3 gives the formula for λ
S
∑
i=1
αi
σi−1 = λ˜
[
S
∑
i=1
−Mit¯i+ αi(wL)σi
]
λ˜ =
∑Si=1
αi
σi−1
wL∑Si=1
αi
σi
− pG0 qG0
(1.C.4)
Proof of Proposition 1.3.6
1. Pareto Economy: Assume ki = k¯,σi = σ¯ i ∈ S, then 1− τ =
(
λ˜wLρ¯
)−1
. From the
optimality equation for δ :
δi =
1− λ˜ ρ¯wL(1− τ)
τ
=
0
τ
= 0 ∀i
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The equation above is valid since τ > 0.
2. Log-normal Economy: Assume sectors are completely symmetric, hence no sector
subscript will be needed for the model parameters. Equation 1.A.28 implies:
1− τ = 1
ρλ˜wLA
A =
ψFe+Φ(−d) f
X
Replacing (1− τ) in equation 1.A.27, leads to:
1
A
= A− ψFeφ(−d)
XΦ(−d)v ξϕ˜∗,δ = A−B
There are 3 possible case for δ , with each determining is A if above, below, or equal to
1. We show that cases of δ 6= 0 produce a contradiction.
Case 1: Assume δ > 0. This implies A > 1 and 1/A < 1. Using the formula for the
elasticity, we can see that B < 0. Hence, the equality can’t hold as the LHS is less than
one, while the RHS is greater than 1.
Case 2: Assume δ < 0. Just as the above case, the equality can’t hold since A <
1,1/A > 1 and B > 0.
Case 3: Assume δ = 0. In this case, A = 1 =⇒ 1/A = 1. Since δ = 0, the elasticity
ξϕ˜∗,δ is equal to 0. Hence, the equality holds as 1 = 1. Therefore, the only solution to
the optimal tax rate problem is δ = 0 for all sectors.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.5
Dividing 1.A.28 and 1.A.14:
1− τ log
1− τP =
∑
αi
σi−1
∑
αi
ki
×[( S∑
i=1
αi
σi
σi−1
ki
)
÷
S
∑
i=1
αi
σi
(
ψ fe,i+Φ(−di) fi
Xi
)]
(1.C.5)
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The first factor of the above equation is greater than one since k > σ −1 for all sectors. The
second factor is also greater than one since δτ < 1. Therefore τ log < τP.
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Chapter 2
David versus Goliath: Who Bears the Burdens of Corporate Tax? with Nam Vu
2.1 Introduction
The welfare effects of corporate taxes have been a central issue in economic debate. Rais-
ing corporate taxes provides governments with the financial flexibility they need to build and
maintain basic components of the economy. But doing so may impose significant welfare
costs on the economy. This long-enduring schism poses a dilemma for governments seeking
to raise corporate taxes to meet their budgets. That massive increase in income inequality in
the past three decades, particularly during the Great Recession, has refueled an interest in the
effects of corporate taxes on income inequality.1
How do corporate taxes affect income inequality in this increasingly integrated world?
The paper presented here seeks to provide further insight into the short-run effects of cor-
porate taxation while maintaining the long-run properties consistent with salient features of
economic data. To this purpose we study a dynamic open economy framework that contains
financial frictions across countries, trade costs, and corporate taxation. In particular, we pro-
pose a two-country model in which a representative household worker provides labor and
consumes goods from both countries. The second agent is a representative capitalist who
provides capital to firms across the globe for a claim in their after tax profits. Unlike standard
real business cycle models, firms in our model engage in monopolistic competition which al-
lows them to charge consumers a mark-up over the marginal cost; hence the positive profits,
which are subject to a corporate tax at source that is used to finance government expendi-
tures. We adopt the Ramsey framework in which the government expenditure is exogenously
determined. Furthermore, we assume that such expenditure has no direct effect on the utility
of the agents in the economy. Trade between countries and capital transfers across borders
1See, for example, Maloney and Schumer (2010) for a congressional report on the issue.
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are costly relative to their domestic equivalents.
The literature on the welfare effects of corporate taxes has been rather divided. One
strand of literature (started by Harberger (1962)) has argued, theoretically, that we should
expect the burden of an increase in corporate taxes to fall on investors, who own the firms’
assets. However, recent empirical studies such as Arulampalam et al. (2007), Felix (2007),
and to a larger extent Desai et al. (2007)), have shown that workers bear the lion’s share of
the burden from increases in corporate income tax. More recent theoretical literature has
attempted to reconcile such a dichotomy between past theory and empirics by introducing
more realistic assumptions to the model (Harberger (2008)), an example of which is the use
of open economy frameworks to study the effects of corporate taxes changes.
Our source of novelty hinges on several aspects. The model not only generates the dy-
namics and long run effects that are in line with some previous theories, but also exhibits
properties consistent with empirical studies. Increases in corporate taxes reduce output and
capital stock in the country that raises the tax while output and capital stock follow the oppo-
site path in the other country. While output decreases only in one country, the capitalists in
both countries suffer from the impacts of an unexpected tax increase. These spillover effects
become more pronounced as countries become more integrated.
The setup of the model results in another contribution in terms of providing a theoretical
foundation for the idea that raising corporate taxes affects individuals asymmetrically. In
particular, we show that an increase in corporate taxes result in distinctively different effects
on individuals whose income depends solely on wages and those whose income does not.
Individuals who claim ownership in firms recover far quicker than individuals who depend
solely on wages as their main sources of income.
Workers’ wages in the long run are negatively related to international finance costs; that
is, long run wages increase when its openness to foreign investment increases. While our
result is quite striking for an inverse relationship is usually expected, it is well-supported by
the empirical evidence in the literature. For example, Chari et al. (2012), using Mexican data,
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find that manufacturing wages increase by a fifth, three years following the liberalization to
foreign capital inflows. Corporate taxes negatively affect the wages of workers at source in
the long run as well as the short run. In the short run, wages decrease because a portion of
the financial burden of the firm owners, also called the capitalists in our model, is shifted
to workers; moreover, another part of this burden is also exported to workers in the other
country.2
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature of corporate taxation, more specifically, to the lit-
erature analyzing the allocation of the burdens of corporate taxes. A widely used theoretical
framework for this literature is the seminal paper by Harberger (1962), which used a closed
economy setting. Subsequent papers based on Harberger (1962) have extended such an en-
vironment into a more realistic open economy setting (Harberger (1995, 2008), Randolph
(2006), Gravelle and Smetters (2006) among others). Most of these papers agree that the
open economy is necessary for generating the implication that corporate tax burden falls more
heavily on workers; though, as argued by Harberger (1995), this result can also be obtained
under certain parameters on his closed economy model. Our paper deviates from this large
literature by assuming incomplete capital mobility across borders in an open dynamic setting.
The empirical evidence supporting this assumption on incomplete market is overwhelming
(see, for example, Kollmann et al. (2014), or Hall (2011)).
Recent empirical studies have shown that workers bear a lion’s share of the corporate
tax burdens (for example, Arulampalam et al. (2007), Felix (2007), and to a larger extent
Desai et al. (2007)). Yet the mechanism for this result is unclear. Specifically, Clausing
(2013) conducts a VAR analysis of OECD countries, showing no robust linkages between
wages and corporate income taxes; this result implies no conclusive evidence that corporate
2This burden transfer property can also be found in Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) and Harberger (1995);
while Gravelle and Smetters (2001) argue that in the long run the burden either falls on domestic capital, or is
exported.
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taxes have a negative impact on workers welfare. A source of their contrasting results lies
in the dynamic nature of their analysis while most of the earlier studies (both empirical and
theoretical) have based their conclusions on long-run properties. To this purpose, our model
provides a structural model in a dynamic setting that can be used for analysis along both
the long-run and the short-run dimensions. Specifically, both the long-run and the short-run
implications of our model are not only consistent with empirical studies, but also dovetail
nicely with salient features in other aspects of the trade economic literature.
Our paper is also related to the vast literature on the international business cycle (for
example, Backus et al. (1992) and Baxter and Crucini (1995)). In particular, the model
presented here deviates from this literature by allowing for cross-border frictions and the
asymmetry in the types of agents; that is, ones that hold assets and ones that do not. Therefore,
another source of novelty in our approach lies in its application of an extension of a well-
established type of dynamic model to the study of the asymmetric effects of corporate taxes.
The paper is also related to the literature on law of one price deviations in the sense that
it provides a theoretical foundation to support the plethora of empirical evidence in the liter-
ature on deviations from the law of one price, or the lack thereof. In particular, propositions
2.3.4 and 2.3.5 show that it is difficult to sustain the law of one price under plausible model
restrictions, a conclusion that dovetails nicely with the current empirical literature on the law
of one price.3
We proceed as follows. Section 2.2 describes the baseline set-up of the model, in which
we also discuss the features that set ours apart from other two-country models in the literature.
Section 2.3 examines the properties of the steady-states conditions of the model, evaluating
the link between these properties and the current policy debate on the role of financial in-
tegration and corporate taxes policy on income inequality. Section 2.4 studies the short-run
dynamics of the model. Specifically, we examine the properties of the impulse responses
of selected macroeconomic aggregates to random shocks to corporate tax rates and financial
3See, for example, Crucini and Shintani (2008) for a detailed discussion on the topic.
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frictions. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
Our model assumes two types of households in each country: one household provides
labor to firms and has access to basic financial instruments (bonds) and a capitalist who
does not provide physical labor but relies in its capital investments to generate income. The
capitalist has access to a worldwide financial market in which she can invest in the producing
firms of any country; such an investment grants her a claim into a share of after tax profits for
the next period that is proportional to her ownership of the firm.
Workers
A lifetime utility maximizing laborer lives in each country. He gets positive utility from
consuming a composite good M, which is an Armington aggregation of the two available
goods in this economy: one good produced by the firm in country H (the home good) and
another good produced by the firm in country F (the foreign good). To afford his consumption
he provides labor to the firm in the country where he resides; in exchange for his services he
receives a wage ωt . We assume labor is immobile, thus households born in H (F) can only
offer their services to the home (foreign) firm at a market-prevailing wage rate ωHt (ωFt ). The
household worker can choose to save part of his income by holding bonds which pay him a
default free interest rate r jb,t , where j is the country of residence of the worker. The household
workers problem is to maximize
maxE
∞
∑
t=1
β t
[
M jt + log(N
j
t )
]
(2.2.1)
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subject to
N
∑
i=1
p ji,tm
j
i,t +b
j
w,t+1 = ω
j
t L
j
t +(1+ r
j
b,t)bw,t +T
j
t (2.2.2)
1 = L jt +N
j
t (2.2.3)
M jt =
[
N
∑
i=1
(
m ji
)ε]1/ε
(2.2.4)
Here b jw,t+1 is the amount of bonds purchased by the worker in country j at time t. Bonds
mature after one period and yield interest income of r jb,tb
j
w,t to the worker at time t +1. The
term T jt is a lump sum transfer that the worker receives (gives) from (to) the government. The
amount of the transfer is equal to the difference between the tax revenue from corporate taxes
and government spending for the period (G jt ).4 Lastly, p
j
i,t is the price of a good produced in
country i and sold in country j; the notation for the quantity of goods m ji is define in a similar
manner.
Let P j be the implied price index of the preferences in country j, then the optimal con-
sumption of each good can be written as:
m ji,t =
(
p ji,t
P jt
)−σ
M jt ∀i (2.2.5)
P jt =
[
∑
i=H,F
(
p ji
)1−σ] 11−σ
(2.2.6)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between the goods.5
4The transfer can be either or positive thus it some periods it can be a wealth transfer from the capitalist to
the workers and in other periods it will be a lump sum tax to the worker. The baseline specification of the model
is calibrated such that T jt is positive for all t and for both countries.
5 σ =
1
1− ε
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Capitalist
Another infinitely lived type of household lives in each country. While different from
the worker type in terms of sources of income, her utility function is similar to that of the
worker type household in the sense that their consumption indices both admit an Armington
aggregation formula of goods produced at home and abroad. Instead of providing labor to
firms, the capitalist provides the capital needed for production of the consumption goods. The
return for her investment is a share of after-tax profits from the firms in which she invested.
The timing of the capitalist problem can be summarized as follows. Take the capitalist in
the Home country as an example. First, she determines the levels of consumption of home
cHH and foreign c
H
F goods, as well as the levels of investment in firms in both home I
H
H and
foreign IFH countries. Her income comes from the return of investment made in the previous
period, which depends on their level of ownership, that is determined by their corresponding
share of capital in the home sHH and in the foreign s
F
H firms. It is helpful to recall that, in terms
of notation, here we use superscript to denote the destination and under-script to denote the
origin; for example, sFH reads the share of capital at foreign firms that are owned by capitalists
from the home country.
Investment across border carries a cost of η ij > 1 for i 6= j and it is identical to unity for
investments originating and ending in the same country. In our model, the investment costs
affect capital flows in the following way:
k ji,t+1 =
1
η ji
I ji,t +(1−δ )k ji,t (2.2.7)
The international investment costs η ji from country i to country j are designed to capture
all costs associate with investing overseas. For example, investors from the U.S. have to pay
additional fees to buy stocks in exchanges from other countries.6 These fees lead to increases
in the price of the same capital unit for the U.S. investors while investing abroad. Direct
6 The investor is likely to incur monitoring costs of their international investments. Such costs are better
modeled as costs on the capital stock and not the flow; a feature that our model currently abstracts from.
91
estimation of these cost is difficult as they encompass variables that are both quantitative
(additional fees) and qualitative in nature (accessibility and ease of investment). Bribery may
also increase the cost of investment abroad, especially in the case of emerging economies
which tend to have higher rates of corruption; this is not to say that developed countries are
free of this problem as lobbying could be considered a form of corruption.
The proportion of after-tax profits that belong to each capitalist depends on the proportion
of its investment (net of cross country investment costs), with respect to the total capital
provided to the firm from all sources for that period. This proportion is denoted by the
variable sij,t ≤ 1 and the exact formula is given in equations 2.2.11 below. In what follows,
we proceed by expressing the capitalist problem as well as the capital evolution equations.
maxE
∞
∑
t=1
β tC jt (2.2.8)
such that
N
∑
i=1
p ji,tc
j
i,t +
N
∑
i=1
Iij,t =
N
∑
i=1
sij,t(1− τ it )pi it (2.2.9)
C jt =
[
N
∑
i=1
(
c ji,t
)ε]1/ε
(2.2.10)
Here the budget constraint, that is, equation 2.2.9, implies that the capitalist type agents do not
work, but rather finance their consumption and investment decision using incomes from the
investment in home and foreign firms in the last period. One key insight from this equation
is that, the income of the capitalists depend on both the share of ownership realized at time t
(which is a state variable at time t)
sij =
kij,t
Kit
(2.2.11)
K jt =
N
∑
i=1
k ji,t (2.2.12)
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and the firms’ profits realized at time t.
2.2.1 Firms and Government
There is a representative firm in each country that is responsible for the production of
a consumption good. The technology for the firm follows a Cobb-Douglas form with labor
and capital as inputs. The firm sells its product in the Home market as well as the Foreign
market. Both countries possess markets characterized by monopolistic competition. The
representative firm of each country maximizes profits by choosing the optimal price after the
cost minimization problem
max ptYt−ωtLt− rtKt (2.2.13)
Yt = At (Kt)
α (Nt)
1−α (2.2.14)
where Yt is the quantity supplied at t; ωt and rt denote wages and rental rates of capital.
Here we omit the country subscripts for notational convenience. Profit maximization (under
monopolistic competition) along with the cost minimization implies that the firm in country
j charges an optimal price to residents of j of:
p jt =
1
ε
Ω jt (2.2.15)
Ω jt =
1
A jt
(
ω jt
1−α
)1−α(
r jt
α
)α
, (2.2.16)
in which Ω jt denotes the marginal costs of firms in country j at time t. A firm in country j
pays an iceberg trade cost of θ ij > 1 for j 6= i to ship to residents in country i. Thus prices as
specified in the household section are given by:
pij,t = θ
i
j,t p
j
j,t (2.2.17)
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We use the Ramsey approach and assume that governments consumes an exogenous given
amount G jt of the domestically produced good. This expenditure is financed by corporate tax
revenue and any left over money is transfer to the workers. If the tax revenues is lower than
governments expenditures at time t, then the government imposes a lump sum tax on workers
to cover the deficit. Therefore the following equation holds in all periods
T jt = τ
j
t pi
j
t −G jt p jt , (2.2.18)
and the rate of growth of government spending is exogenously driven by the following pro-
cess:
∆ logG jt = logG
j
t − logG jt−1 (2.2.19)
∆ logG jt = (1−ρg)∆ log G¯+ρg∆ logG jt + v jt (2.2.20)
τ jt = (1−ρτ)τ¯+ρττ jt + v jt (2.2.21)
Here v jt ∼ N(0,σ2G) denotes the innovations to fiscal policy in country j = H,F at time t,
∆ logG jt denotes the rate of growth of government spending as in equation (2.2.21). Turning
to the details on the production process for intermediate goods firms, here we assume that
productivity is exogenously driven in the following manner:
logA jt = ρ logA
j
t−1+u
j
t , (2.2.22)
∀ j = 1, . . . ,N
where the innovation term u jt is assumed to follow N(0,σ2A).
2.2.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a collection of prices and allocations of consumptions and output, such
that
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1. The problems for workers equations (2.2.2), (2.2.4), and (2.2.5) are satisfied.
2. The problems for capitalists as in equations (2.2.9), (2.2.11), (2.2.7), (2.2.12), and
(2.2.10) are satisfied.
3. The profit maximizing problem for firms is satisfied; that is equations (2.2.15), (2.2.16),
and (2.2.17).
4. Government’s budget is balanced; that is, equations (2.2.18), (2.2.20), (2.2.19) and
(2.2.21) are satisfied.
Additionally, the relative size of the economies is fixed in the steady state and is subject to a
global macroeconomic shock. This condition ensures that the model reaches the steady state
through one path; thus avoiding a sunspot solution.
Y H
Y F
= Ξ+ εt (2.2.23)
2.3 Steady State Analysis
We continue our discussion by examining some key insights of the model presented in
section 2.2 by studying its steady state. In particular, we put an emphasis on the capital
allocation across countries and wages given a particular set of financial costs, trade costs and
taxes for each country. We provide proofs to the propositions presented in the appendix.
Proposition 2.3.1. Let i 6= j then:
• An increase in τ j increases r j but has no effect on ri.
• r j does not depend on η ij.
• Increasing the financial cost of investing abroad raises the interest rate at the target
country. Thus if ηFH was to increase then rF would also increase.
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• The derivative of r j w.r.t the country’s corporate tax is greater than the derivative of
such interest rate w.r.t the cross country investment cost (η ji ).
The first proposition concerns properties of the rental rates on capital. In particular, the
long run properties of interest rates depend solely in variables decided at the country where
the interest rate is paid.7 Higher taxes along with higher cross border investment costs reduce
the available capital in the economy which leads to higher interest rates and a lower optimal
capital stock for the firm. This observation builds upon and results in a salient feature of
the model in which financial integration is beneficial over the long term for interest rates. In
particular, lowering financial transaction costs results in lower interest rates, a key channel
in which the economy can expand and recover quickly upon a recession. Not only can a
lower interest rate induce domestic production but also encourages investment from abroad.
Further expanding this argument, the last bullet point shows the interaction between taxes and
financial integration and show that these elements are important in order to correctly forecast
the effects of government policies on key variables, such as the interest rate.
Next, we present and interpret the distribution of ownership of firms which are given by:
sHH =
ηHF
1+ηHF
sHF =
1
1+ηHF
sFF =
ηFH
1+ηFH
sFH =
1
1+ηFH
Interpreting these ownership shares becomes easier by noting that η jj = 1. In terms of nota-
tion, the numerator in all proportions represent the net cost to invest into the target country
from the perspective of the other investor, while the denominator is the sum of the net costs for
both investors. When the cost of investing into a country increases, the ownership of the firm
shifts toward the domestic capitalist. Such effect occurs for two reasons. First, an increase
in η ji decreases the net returns to investment made by capitalist at i, hence a reduction in
their investments. Second, an increase in the interest rates reduces profits and thus gives less
7Is quite likely that the financial costs to investing abroad are functions of variables from the source as well
as the recipient country.
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incentives to invest in the firm for all investors alike. This second channel is complemented
by the subsequent proposition:
Proposition 2.3.2. Increases in financial cost of investment into a country raises the owner-
ship of domestic investors in the firm while reducing the foreign ownership.
Increases in ownership are driven by a reduction in the total K that firms required in
equilibrium. This reduction in capital demand is a consequence of higher rental rates of
capital resulting from a higher η . One natural implication from this result is that, when the
international financial market is more integrated as a result of low financial costs, domestic
firms can better position themselves in terms of attracting foreign investors. This increase in
foreign flow of investment can further reduce the interest rates and enhance the effects that
we have previously seen in proposition 2.3.1.
We next turn our attention to some propositions on the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP),
which in the case of our model, boils down to the ratio of price indexes PF/PH . For notational
convenience, we denote such a ratio as Q which, in the steady state, depends on all exogenous
parameters of the model. The range of possible values for Q is pin down by the trade costs as
illustrated in proposition 2.3.3. We begin our analysis of PPP and the law of one price by first
establishing this theoretical range of possible values of the steady state equilibrium value(s)
of Q in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3.3. Let θFH ,θHF be strictly greater than one. Then Q is bounded below by
1
θHF
and bounded above by θFH .
The theoretical bounds on Q in proposition 2.3.3 suggest that higher trade costs can lead
to greater divergence and variability in the aggregate price ratio across the two countries.
Intuitively, increasing the cost of importing into the foreign country increases the upper limit
for the solution of Q. Given the preferences of the consumers (in the case of no home bias
in taste), the price index at the foreign country will increase relative to that of H, therefore a
greater Q is a possible solution to the model, all else equal. On the other hand, increasing θHF
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makes foreign goods at the home country more expensive, which raises PH , ceteris paribus.
In this case, PF is less likely to increase and this result translates in to a decrease in the lower
bound of Q.
It is important to note that this property holds given the assumption that consumers do
not prefer (in a home-bias sense) domestic goods over foreign ones (or vice-versa). The
range of the solution for a general case with asymmetric countries is plotted in figure 2.1
while figure 2.2 presents the case for symmetric countries. This last figure suggests that
cross-country price equality (Q= 1) can be achieved achieved when countries are completely
symmetric. In stark contrast, a large portion of the literature points to trade costs as the cause
for PPP inequality. We present an alternative proposition in which PPP is possible even in
the presence of trade costs.
Proposition 2.3.4. If H and F are symmetric with respect to τ < 1, η ≥ 1, and θ ; then Q= 1
is the solution to the equilibrium problem. Furthermore, the result is independent of trade
cost being equal or larger than one.
Specifically, proposition 2.3.4 implies that even in a world economy with no perfect trade
in goods, PPP equalization is possible if all other parameters are symmetric, including ship-
ping cost. This result is not surprising since it implies that countries are mirrors of each other
and thus there is no reason to expect any price differential.
Proposition 2.3.5. If trade cost are symmetric and greater than one and the two countries
are asymmetrical with respect to taxes and international finance cost then Q 6= 1.
Proposition 2.3.5 implies that a world with perfect trade in goods does not lead to PPP
equalization. This proposition along with 2.3.4 imply that disparities in PPP are not a sole
consequence of trade costs. In short, perfect trade in goods is neither a necessary nor suf-
ficient condition for equal PPP across countries. This result provides an implicit theoretical
foundation for a long-established empirical result in the international micro-price literature
that the law of one price is rarely obeyed.
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Figure 2.1: Purchasing Power Parity:
A General Case
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Figure 2.2: Purchasing Power Parity
Obeyed
Note: This ﬁgure plots the value for the cross-country relative price ratio Q in the steady state.
Figure 2.1 uses the baseline calibration, the details of which are summarized in table 2.2. Figure
2.2 represents the case of complete symmetry; that is, the iceberg trade costs and the international
ﬁnance costs to and from the two countries are identical. The horizontal axis denotes the values of
the steady state terms of trade Q and the vertical axis denotes the absolute diﬀerence between left
and right hand sides of the non-linear equation that we use to numerically calculate the steady state
value of Q. The details of such an equation are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 2.3.6. An increase in the real exchange rate Q leads to an increase in the ratio
between Home and Foreign gross profits.
In the context of our model, one natural question remains to what extent do these implica-
tions on the relative price ratio Q affect profit in each firm, one of the key channel that affects
capitalists’ incomes. Proposition 2.3.6 implies that the profit of the home country must in-
crease relative to that of the Foreign firm when there is an increase in the cross-country price
ratio Q = PF/PH . Intuitively, when the prices in the foreign country become more expen-
sive relative to home, the ratio of the nominal profit between the home and the foreign firms
increase.
2.4 Main Result: Asymmetry in Consumption Responses to Corporate Tax Increases
We continue our discussion of the properties of the steady states with a focus on the
interaction between an increase in corporate taxes and other macroeconomic aggregates. To
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do so, we first present our choice of reasonable parameters for the model with connection to
some empirical data on corporate taxation in the U.S. and Germany in section 2.4.1. We next
study the long-run implications of an asymmetric increase in corporate tax income in section
2.4.2. Turning to the short-run implications in section 2.4.3, we pay special attention to the
properties of the impulse responses of aggregate variables, conditional on an asymmetric
increase in the innovation to corporate income taxes.
2.4.1 Calibration
We select the target tax rate τ¯ j for home and foreign countries such that they match the
effective corporate tax rates from Germany (lowest effective corporate tax in our panel) and
the US (high effective tax relative to Germany).8 These countries are chosen for two reasons.
First, they are large economies in the sense that a change in one country’s policy will most
likely influence the world economy. Second, having a low and a high tax country allows us to
study the differences in impulse reactions under these two extremes. The literature does not
provide any consensus for the values of ηHF and ηFH , thus for this particular exercise we chose
a value of 1.2 for the baseline specification. In other words, it is ≈ 20% more costly to invest
broad than into one’s own country.9 Similarly, we consider symmetric ice-berg trade costs
θHF = θFH and set their value to 1.1; that is, for every unit of good sold abroad the producer
must ship 1.1 units of the good.
Turning to the remaining parameters, we follow the standard literature. In particular, the
discount rate is β = 0.96 for both countries; the share of capital in the production function
α is 0.33; the depreciation rate is δ = 0.025; the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign variety of one good σ is equal to 3, implying a mark-up 1/ε = 3/2.10 Table 2.2
8Table 3.1 summarizes the effective tax rates for selected economies from 1990-2011.
9As mentioned earlier, the "cost" could be monitoring cost and not necessarily just costs on the flow of
investment. Here we do not consider a completely symmetric case because this case is trivial and has been
well-studied in the literature and thus is not the focus of the study presented here.
10σ =
1
1− ε . The value for the elasticity of substitution across goods ranges from 1.4 to 4.5 in the literature;
see Nevo (1997) or Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) for details.
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summarizes the values for the baseline specification.
Upon obtaining the policy function using the method developed by Uhlig, we simulate the
model for 2,000 periods and discard the first 200. We set the standard errors of the innovations
to tax rate at 0.01; thus, we can interpret all the impulses as responses to one percent increase
in the level of tax rates from home or foreign authority, depending on the figure. Since our
focus is on the dynamic responses of effective tax rates, we pay special attention to studying
the impulse responses of orthogonal innovations to tax rate from home and foreign countries.
In particular, we first generate the dynamic responses of selected variables under the baseline
specification as presented in table 2.2.
2.4.2 Asymmetry in Welfare in the Long Run: Some Steady State Implications
Figure 2.1a plots the level of welfare, defined as the post-transfer level of the aggregate
consumption basket for workers and capitalists, under the baseline specification in table 2.2.
One key take-away from the figure is that both capitalists and workers tend to suffer when
there is an increase in corporate taxes. This result dovetails nicely with the recent empirical
literature on the effects of corporate taxes (for example, Arulampalam et al. (2007), Felix
(2007), and to a larger extent Desai et al. (2007)) in the sense that a large share of the welfare
costs of corporate taxes falls on workers.
Another insight from figure 2.1a is that workers tend to experience a higher welfare loss
than the capitalists type. One key mechanism of this decrease in workers’ welfare is illus-
trated in figure 2.1b, in which an increase in corporate taxes leads to an increase in the relative
labor costs in the long run and hence, a decrease in employment. Because the only source of
incomes for workers come from wages, such a decrease in labor tends to imply a decrease in
workers income (as in figure 2.1d). It is helpful to note that while these workers do receive
transfers from corporate tax revenues, the size of this transfer decreases with the level of
corporate taxes. The overall effect, which tends to kick in when corporate tax is sufficiently
high to offset transfers, is that workers are left with lower disposable income to spend on
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Figure 2.1: Asymmetry in Welfare: Varying Corporate Taxes
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consumption and hence, a sharp decrease in the level of welfare (as seen in figure 2.1a).
Turning to issues on the labor market, we note the following implication:
Remark 2.4.1. The steady state ratio of wages ωF/ωH increases with τF and decreases with
τH . Moreover, wages and international financial cost (into the country) posses a negative
relationship in the long run.
Remark 2.4.1 states that, in the long run, wages increase as a result of more financial
integration; that is, when ηHF is smaller. This result provides a theoretical basis for some
empirical findings in the literature (see, for example, Chari et al. (2012)). In particular, under
baseline case in which the two countries are more financially integrated, an orthogonal shock
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Figure 2.2: Wage: Sensitivity to Tax Level
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to both tax rates and exchange rate creates a more pronounced increase in wages than in the
case of high financial costs. We illustrate the properties stated by remark 2.4.1 in figure 2.2a
and figure 2.2b. In particular, we solve for wages in the foreign country as a function of taxes
in the foreign country and (2.2a) financial costs from the home to the foreign country and
(2.2b) financial costs from the foreign to the home country. Here we assume that financial
costs of investing across domestic and foreign market are asymmetric. The intuition behind
such an assumption is that investment costs tend to vary greatly across countries.
Figure 2.3 plots the ratio of equilibrium wages in foreign over home countries against
the level of tax rates at foreign and home, respectively. This ratio can be interpreted as the
relative costs of labor between foreign and home countries. One key insight from the figure
is that the relative costs of labor at the foreign country (ωF/ωH) is monotonically increasing
in the level of corporate taxes in the foreign country (τF ) and is decreasing with respect to
the level of tax at the home country (τH). In other words, an increase in tax level tends to
make labor more costly, relative to the labor cost in the other country.
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Figure 2.3: Wage Ratio ωF/ωH : Sensitivity to Tax Level
Note: This ﬁgure plots the wage in the foreign country over wage in the home country with respect to
corporate taxes. Here we solve for the steady state equilibrium, conditional on the level of corporate
tax at home and foreign countries. Other parameters are calibrated to the baseline speciﬁcations.
2.4.3 The Effects of Corporate Taxes in the Short Run: an Impulse Response Analysis
Figure 2.4 shows that when there is an increase in corporate tax, agents who hold assets,
that is, capitalists, tend to be better off than agents who do not hold assets, that is, workers.
Consumption by capitalists slightly decreases with a delay upon an increase in the innovation
to corporate tax rates. This behavior is in stark contrast with the impulses responses of
consumption by workers. Specifically, an one standard deviation increase in corporate tax
rates (roughly 1 percent) leads to a 0.5 percent decrease in consumption for capitalists and this
deviation quickly returns to its long-term mean thereafter. In stark contrast, the consumption
by workers decreases by more than two percent and the effects tends to last more than 10
quarters. One natural question thus arises in terms of what mechanism may have caused this
dichotomy between the two types of workers.
The mechanism for the results in figure 2.4 is illustrated in figure 2.5a, which plots the
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Figure 2.4: Asymmetry in Consumption Responses
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Note: Impulse responses of Workers and Capitalists consumption to innovations to foreign tax
rates. Under baseline speciﬁcation. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation from the
steady states.
impulse responses of equity share by foreign investor to home and foreign countries. One
key take-away from this figure is that the foreign investors tend to decrease their ownership
in their domestic market; that is, in the foreign firms. At the same time, they ramp up their
ownership share in the home firms, thereby diverting their risk from the domestic market to
the international market. This behavior is consistent with the mechanisms we have seen in
the static analysis, in which capitalists tend to divert their ownerships share from the econ-
omy that has relatively high level of cross-border financial friction. Naturally, the magnitude
of this shift depends on the relative level of corporate taxes across countries when such an
increase in tax rate is initiated.
Another channel through which capitalists are affected by an increase in corporate taxes
is through the reduction in after-tax profits. Figure 2.5b shows that net profit at home tends to
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses to Increase in Tax Rates
(a) Asymmetry in Equity Shares Responses
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(b) Responses of After-tax Net Proﬁt
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Note: [Left] Impulse responses of equity shares in Home and Foreign companies by Foreign Capi-
talists to an increase in foreign tax rates. Under baseline speciﬁcation. The vertical axis denotes the
percentage deviation from the steady states. [Right] Impulse responses of net proﬁts to an increase
in foreign tax rates. Under baseline speciﬁcation. The vertical axis denotes the percentage deviation
from the steady states.
suffer less from an increase in corporate taxes than net profit at the foreign firms does. These
effects are more pronounced for country F due to τF > τH at the baseline specification.
One most striking feature from the impulse response functions is the co-movement across
countries of rental rates and wages (figure 2.6). While this result contrasts the proposition
that of the previous section in which steady state interest rates were found to be an increasing
function of taxes at source, in the dynamic setting, the spillover effects are presented on the
interest rates.
This spillover effect is an implication of the FOCs for the capitalists with respect to cap-
ital allocation. Investing abroad or domestically is discounted at the same stochastic rate
λt+1/λt , which is a function of both tax rates and other exogenous variables. Hence a shock
to τF changes this stochastic rate which changes the stochastic discount rate used to decide
kHH and k
H
F . A more intuitive explanation goes as follows: investors realize an unexpected
increase in corporate profit tax rate that effectively reduces their incomes; since both firms
compete for capital in the world market, they pay higher interest since the capitalist now has
fewer resources as well as lower expected returns. On the other hand, the movements of the
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses to Increase in Tax Rates
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aggregate capital stocks KH and KF are in line with the properties of the steady states in the
sense that higher taxes reduced the level of capital stock in that country. Since our model
abstracts from investment adjustment costs, the corresponding impulse responses tend to be
less persistent.
The impulses responses of capital and labor in figure 2.6d and 2.6c confirm the convention
that an increase in corporate tax rates can cause a significant decrease in employment and
capital investment; a salient, yet undesirable, implication of which is a large decrease in real
consumption in the country that initiates such a change in corporate tax, as evidenced in
figure 2.4.
2.5 Conclusion
The recent Great Recession reminds us that financial integration can have a profound
impact on trade patterns and outputs across countries. We re-evaluated this link, extending
an otherwise standard two-country model to include cross-border financial frictions and cor-
porate taxes. We found that the benefits of financial integration are not symmetric across
different types of agents, which imply that financial integration may not necessarily lead to
a preferable outcome for workers whose primary source of income is wages. This result is
also deeply rooted in the debates whether financial openness is truly beneficial to developing
countries, where most workers earn the majority of their incomes through salaried work.
Another contribution of the paper is to provide a theoretical foundation to support the
empirical evidence that raising corporate taxes can result in distinctively different effects on
individuals whose incomes depend solely on salaries and those who do not. In particular,
we examined the properties of the model in both static and dynamic settings, showing that
an orthogonalized increase in the innovation in corporate tax can result in a larger loss for
capitalists in absolute value. However, these individuals who also claim ownership in firms
tend to recover far quicker than individuals of the worker type.
One key feature of the recent Great Recession beginning in 2008 is that while investors
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lose money quickly, they also tend to recover much faster than do salaried workers. If an
increase in corporate taxes can be considered equivalent to a shock in firm’s profit, the the-
oretical results presented in our model can provide an alternative explanation to the varying
degrees to which a shock to financial system can negatively affect individuals of different
levels of dependence on salaries as their sole income. The message is thus that, while finan-
cial integration can help stimulate trade and financial flows across countries, such a perk does
come at an unfortunate cost of potentially increasing the inequality between individuals who
hold substantial capital and those who do not.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Statutory Tax Rate τ and Two Diﬀerent EATRs
Means Std. Deviation Correlation
τ τanop τagop τanop τagop ρn,g ρs,g
Austria 32.06 17.41 9.31 2.51 1.36 0.97 0.19
Australia 33.05 32.99 21.01 5.19 3.60 0.97 -0.45
Belgium 37.52 24.92 12.92 6.19 2.56 0.98 -0.12
Canada 35.02 19.40 13.00 3.13 2.15 0.98 -0.21
Finland 28.64 22.09 12.42 8.68 4.43 0.66 0.09
France 35.57 26.84 14.71 5.66 2.94 0.95 0.33
Great Britain 30.73 21.24 14.01 3.53 2.53 0.92 -0.36
Germany 45.70 11.06 6.74 2.36 1.45 0.95 0.19
Italy 41.91 23.93 14.75 3.84 2.18 0.90 0.46
Japan 44.41 37.74 17.61 8.38 4.41 0.86 0.81
Netherlands 32.35 21.58 13.65 4.10 2.50 0.98 0.64
Norway 30.07 32.00 22.10 6.77 7.10 0.98 -0.39
Poland 28.65 30.92 16.04 16.86 6.68 0.96 0.90
Portugal 33.43 26.68 14.82 2.97 1.72 0.91 -0.15
Spain 33.98 24.80 14.33 9.35 4.96 0.99 0.30
Sweden 28.81 23.70 13.81 4.42 2.30 0.89 -0.49
Switzerland 30.15 21.02 10.25 4.39 1.82 0.89 -0.60
United States 39.36 25.71 15.04 3.01 2.19 0.97 -0.08
Overall(Panel) 34.55 24.73 14.36 8.72 5.02 0.84 -0.01
Note: Eﬀective corporate tax rates computed under Mendoza et al. (1994a) methodology. τGOP
uses gross operating surplus while τNOP used net operating surplus. Data is restricted to 1990-2011
to ensure comparability. Data comes from the OECD National Accounting Tables.
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Table 2.2: Calibration under Baseline Speciﬁcation
Parameters Value Notes Description
α 0.33 Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe (1992) Capital Share
β 0.98 Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe (1992) Discount rates for annual data
δ 0.025 Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe (1992) Depreciation rates for capitals
φ 3 Nakamura and Steisson (2007) Labor dis-utility
θHF 1.1 Our calibration Ice-berg trade costs from Foreign to Home
θFH 1.1 Our calibration Ice-berg trade costs from Home to Foreign
ηHF 1.2 Our calibration Cross-country capital mark-ups from Foreign to Home
ηFH 1.2 Our calibration Cross-country capital mark-ups from Home to Foreign
τ¯H 0.06 German effective tax Steady-state corporate taxes rate at Home
τ¯F 0.15 USA effective tax Steady-state corporate taxes rate at Foreign
σ 3 Nakamura and Steisson (2007) Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods
ρH 0.7 Our calibration Persistence of productivity process for Home
ρF 0.7 Our calibration Persistence of productivity process for Foreign
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Appendix
2.A Summary of Equations
2.A.1 For Workers
We consider the following utility function
E
∞
∑
t=1
β t
[
M jt + log(Nt)
]
(2.A.1)
subject to
N
∑
i=1
p ji m
j
i +b
j
w,t+1 = ω
j
t L
j
t +(1+ r
j
b,t)(bw,t)+T
H
t (2.A.2)
M jt =
[
N
∑
i=1
(
m ji
)ε]1/ε
(2.A.3)
1 = Lt +Nt (2.A.4)
The set of variables for country j = H,F for the worker type includes
1. Five (5) choice variables from the first orders condition; namely, {λw,mH ,mF ,bw,L}.
[
N
∑
i=1
(
m ji,t
)ε]1/ε−1(
m ji,t
)ε−1
= λ jw,t p
j
i,t ∀i = j (2.A.5)[
N
∑
i=1
(
m ji,t
)ε]1/ε−1(
m ji,t
)ε−1
= λ jw,t p
j
i,t ∀i 6= j (2.A.6)
λ jw,tω
j
t = N
−1
t (2.A.7)
λ jw,t+1β (1+ r
j
b,t+1) = λ
j
w,t (2.A.8)
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The budget constraint is
N
∑
i=1
p ji m
j
i +bw,t+1 = (1− τL,t)ω jt L jt +(1+ r jb,t)(bw,t)+T Ht (2.A.9)
2. Two (2) auxiliary variables; namely, {M,Xw}.
M jt =
[
N
∑
i=1
(
m ji
)ε]1/ε
(2.A.10)
X jw,t = (1− τHL )ω jt L jt +(1+ r jb,t)b jt −b jt+1+T Ht (2.A.11)
2.A.2 For Capitalists
Utility:
E
∞
∑
t=1
β t
[
C jt
]
(2.A.12)
such that
C
∑
i=1
p ji,tc
j
i,t +bt+1+
C
∑
i=1
Iij,t =
C
∑
i=1
sij,t(1− τ it )pi it +(1+ r jb,t)bt (2.A.13)
sij =
kij,t
K jt
∀i 6= j (2.A.14)
K jt =
C
∑
i=1
k ji,t (2.A.15)
C jt =
[
C
∑
i=1
(
c ji
)ε]1/ε
(2.A.16)
Since cross-border capital investment requires additional costs, the capital evolution process
can be written as follows:
1
η ji
I ji,t = k
j
i,t+1− (1−δ )k ji,t (2.A.17)
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Where the financial costs of holding capital overseas η ij > 1 if i 6= j and identical to one when
i = j The set of variables for the capitalists include:
1. Six (6) choice variables; namely, {nH ,nF ,λc,kH ,kF ,bc,}. It is helpful to note that since
the conditions for workers imply the aggregate price index (which does not need to be
in the system of equation), only one of the two first order conditions for capitalists and
the CES aggregator for capitalist consumption are sufficient.
λ jc,t p
j
i,t =
[
C
∑
i=1
(
c ji,t
)ε]1/ε−1(
c ji,t
)ε−1 ∀i = j (2.A.18)
λ jc,t p
j
i,t =
[
C
∑
i=1
(
c ji,t
)ε]1/ε−1(
c ji,t
)ε−1 ∀i 6= j (2.A.19)
λ jc,t = β E
[
λ jc,t+1(1+ r
j
b,t+1)
]
(2.A.20)
∀i = H 1 = β E
{
λ jc,t+1
λ jc,t
[
(1− sij,t+1)
η ijK
i
t+1
(1− τ it )pi it +(1−δ )
]}
(2.A.21)
∀i = F 1 = β E
{
λ jc,t+1
λ jc,t
[
(1− sij,t+1)
η ijK
i
t+1
(1− τ it )pi it +(1−δ )
]}
(2.A.22)
C
∑
i=1
p ji,tc
j
i,t +bt +
C
∑
i=1
Iij,t =
C
∑
i=1
sij,t−1(1− τ it−1)pi it−1+(1+ r jb,t)bt−1 (2.A.23)
2. Six (6) auxiliary variables; namely, {Xc,sH ,sF , IH , IF ,C}.
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Xc,t =
C
∑
i=1
p ji,tn
j
i,t (2.A.24)
sij =
kij,t
Kit
∀i 6= j (2.A.25)
sij =
kij,t
Kit
∀i = j (2.A.26)
kij,t+1 =
1
η ij
Iij,t +(1−δ )kij,t ∀i 6= j (2.A.27)
kij,t+1 =
1
η ij
Iij,t +(1−δ )kij,t ∀i = j (2.A.28)
C jt =
[
C
∑
i=1
(
n ji
)ε]1/ε
(2.A.29)
(2.A.30)
2.A.3 For Firms
The set of variables for firms include:
1. Three (3) choice variables; namely, {pHt ,K jt ,ω jt }.
p jt =
1
ε
Ω jt (2.A.31)
w jt = Ω
j
t A
j
t (1−α)
[
K jt
L jt
]α
(2.A.32)
r jt = Ω
j
t A
j
t α
[
L jt
K jt
]1−α
(2.A.33)
2. Four (4) auxiliary variables; namely, {pij,Ω j,pi j,Y j}.
Y jt = A
j
t (K
H)α(LH)1−α (2.A.34)
pij,t = θ
i
j,t p
j
j,t (2.A.35)
pi jt =
1
σ −1Ω
j
t A
j
t
(
w jt
r jt
α
1−α
)α
L jt (2.A.36)
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2.A.4 National Variables
The set of national variables include (5) variables; namely {P j,B j,w j,r j,r jb}.
B jt = b
j
w,t +b
j
c,t (2.A.37)
K jt =
N
∑
i=1
k ji,t (2.A.38)
P jt =
[
N
∑
i=1
(
p ji
)1−σ] 11−σ
(2.A.39)
2.A.5 Government and Productivity Variables
Four (05) exogenous/government variables; that is, {A,T,G,∆G,τ}
T jt = τ
j
t pi
j
t − p jjG jt (2.A.40)
b jw,t +b
j
c,t = 0 (2.A.41)
logA jt = ρA logA
j
t−1+u
j
t (2.A.42)
∆ logG jt = logG
j
t − logG jt−1 (2.A.43)
∆ logG jt = ρg∆ logG
j
t + v
j
t (2.A.44)
τ jt = (1−ρτ)τ¯+ρττ jt + v jt (2.A.45)
2.B Solutions to the steady states
From the budget constraint for capitalists, it follows that:
sHH =
ηHF
1+ηHF
sHF =
1
1+ηHF
(2.B.1)
sFF =
ηFH
1+ηFH
sFH =
1
1+ηFH
(2.B.2)
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From the market clearing condition for capital, it follows that
c =
rF
rH
(2.B.3)
rF =
[1−β (1−δ )][1+ηFH](σ −1)α
β (1− τF) (2.B.4)
rH =
[1−β (1−δ )][1+ηHF ](σ −1)α
β (1− τH) (2.B.5)
KF
KH
=
(
1− τF
1− τH
) (
1+ηHF
1+ηFH
) (
ωFLF
ωHLH
)
(2.B.6)
pi i =
(
1
σ −1
) (
ω iLi
1−α
)
(2.B.7)
KH =
(
1− τH
1+ηHF
) (
β
1−β (1−δ )
) (
ωHLH
(σ −1)(1−α)
)
(2.B.8)
KF =
(
1− τF
1+ηFH
) (
β
1−β (1−δ )
) (
ωFLF
(σ −1)(1−α)
)
(2.B.9)
kHH =
(
1− τH
(1+ηHF )2
) (
βηHF
1−β (1−δ )
) (
ωHLH
(σ −1)(1−α)
)
(2.B.10)
kHF =
(
1− τH
(1+ηHF )2
) (
β
1−β (1−δ )
) (
ωHLH
(σ −1)(1−α)
)
(2.B.11)
kFF =
(
1− τF
(1+ηFH)2
) (
βηFH
1−β (1−δ )
) (
ωFLF
(σ −1)(1−α)
)
(2.B.12)
kFH =
(
1− τF
(1+ηFH)2
) (
β
1−β (1−δ )
) (
ωFLF
(σ −1)(1−α)
)
(2.B.13)
Given the formula for the price indices, it follows that
pFF = p
H
H
(
(θFH )1−σ −Q1−σ
(QθHF )1−σ −1
)1/(1−σ)
(2.B.14)
PH
pHH
=
[(
θHF θFH
)1−σ −1(
QθHF
)1−σ −1
]1/(1−σ)
(2.B.15)
pFF
PF
=
1
Q
[(
θFH
)1−σ −Q1−σ(
θHF θFH
)1−σ −1
]1/(1−σ)
(2.B.16)
PF = QPH (2.B.17)
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Steady states capitalist consumption income, outputs and total consumption are:
XHc = a1ω
HLH +a2ωFLF + rHb b
H
c (2.B.18)
XFc = b1ω
FLF +b2ωHLH + rFb b
F
c (2.B.19)
Y H =
(
LH
1−LH
) (
1
ε(1−α)
) [(
θHF θFH
)1−σ −1(
QθHF
)1−σ −1
]1/(1−σ)
(2.B.20)
Y F =
(
LF
1−LF
) (
Q
ε(1−α)
) [ (
θHF θFH
)1−σ −1(
θFH
)1−σ −Q1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
(2.B.21)
Y H =
[(
1− τH
1+ηHF
) (
β
1−β (1−δ )
) (
PH
(1−LH)(σ −1)(1−α)
)]α
AHLH(2.B.22)
Y F =
[(
1− τF
1+ηFH
) (
β
1−β (1−δ )
) (
PF
(1−LF)(σ −1)(1−α)
)]α
AFLF(2.B.23)
in which,
a1 = sHH
(
(1− τH)
(σ −1)(1−α)
)(
1− δβ
(1+ηHF )(1−β (1−δ ))
)
(2.B.24)
a2 = sFH
(
(1− τF)
(σ −1)(1−α)
)(
1− η
F
Hδβ
(1+ηFH)(1−β (1−δ ))
)
(2.B.25)
b1 = sFF
(
(1− τF)
(σ −1)(1−α)
)(
1− δβ
(1+ηFH)(1−β (1−δ ))
)
(2.B.26)
b2 = sHF
(
(1− τH)
(σ −1)(1−α)
)(
1− η
H
F δβ
(1+ηHF )(1−β (1−δ ))
)
(2.B.27)
Alternative equations for Y Use Y = C+ I +G+Nx and the first two equation for Y
from above. Also define: β˜ =
β
1−β (1−δ ) and σ˜ = (σ −1)(1−α).
[(
1− τH
1+ηHF
)
β˜ωH
σ˜
]α
LH = GH +δkHH +η
F
Hk
F
H +
(pHH)
−σ
(PH)1−σ
{
ωHLH
(
1+
τH
σ˜
+a1
)
− pHHGH ...
+a2ωFLF +
(
θFH
Q
)1−σ [
ωFLF
(
1+
τF
σ˜
+b1
)
− pFFGF +b2ωHLH
]}
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[(
1− τF
1+ηFH
)
β˜ωF
σ˜
]α
LF = GF +δkFF +η
H
F k
H
F +
(pFF)
−σ
(PF)1−σ
{
ωFLF
(
1+
τF
σ˜
+b1
)
− pFFGF ...
+b2ωHLH +
(
θHF Q
)1−σ [ωHLH(1+ τH
σ˜
+a1
)
− pHHGH +a2ωFLF
]}
To find Q we employ two more equations. First we fix ωH to be unity, which allows us to
express the equilibrium labor of both countries by the following formulas:
1−LH =
(
1
ε(1−α)
)[
(θHF θFH )1−σ −1
(QθHF )1−σ −1
] 1
1−σ
[(
1− τH
1+ηHF
)
β˜ωH
(σ −1)(1−α)
]−α
(2.B.28)
1−LF =
(
Q
ε(1−α)
)[
(θHF θFH )1−σ −1
(θFH )1−σ −Q1−σ
] 1
1−σ
[(
1− τF
1+ηFH
)
β˜ωF
(σ −1)(1−α)
]−α
(2.B.29)
The ratio of the previous two equations paired with the labor supply conditions yield the
following relation between the foreign wage and the real exchange rate:
(
ωF
ωH
)1−α
=
[
(1− τF)(1+ηHF )
(1− τH)(1+ηFH)
]α [
(QθHF )1−σ −1
(θFH )1−σ −Q1−σ
]1/(σ−1)
(2.B.30)
The above equation uses the relationship
1−LF
1−LH = Q
ωH
ωF
(2.B.31)
We notice that
PF
PH
= Q =
[
(ΩH)1−σ +(θHF ΩF)1−σ
(ΩF)1−σ +(θFHΩH)1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
(2.B.32)
noting that the marginal cost can be written as a function of wages, labor, and Q.
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Pinning down the unique steady state
There are five equations that help us pin down the unique steady state. The first equation
is the feasibility condition for home country; that is,
[(
1− τH
1+ηHF
)
β˜ωH
σ˜
]α
LH = GH +δkHH +η
F
Hk
F
H +
(pHH)
−σ
(PH)1−σ
{
ωHLH
(
1+
τH
σ˜
+a1
)
− pHHGH ...
+a2ωFLF +
(
θFH
Q
)1−σ [
ωFLF
(
1+
τF
σ˜
+b1
)
− pFFGF +b2ωHLH
]}
The second equation governs the relative sizes of the two economies, in which case the
feasibility condition for the foreign economy is implicitly implied. This equation writes
[(
1− τH
1+ηHF
)
β˜ωH
σ˜
]α
LH[(
1− τF
1+ηFH
)
β˜ωF
σ˜
]α
LF
= Ξ
in which Ξ denotes the relative size of the home economy w.r.t. the foreign economy. The
third and fourth equations use the conditions that labor market must be clear at each of the
country because labor is immobile by assumption.
1−LH =
(
1
ε(1−α)
)[
(θHF θFH )1−σ −1
(QθHF )1−σ −1
] 1
1−σ
[(
1− τH
1+ηHF
)
β˜ωH
(σ −1)(1−α)
]−α
1−LF =
(
Q
ε(1−α)
)[
(θHF θFH )1−σ −1
(θFH )1−σ −Q1−σ
] 1
1−σ
[(
1− τF
1+ηFH
)
β˜ωF
(σ −1)(1−α)
]−α
The fifth equation comes from the definition of Q itself; that is, an alternative to the balance
trade condition, we notice that
PF
PH
= Q =
[
(ΩH)1−σ +(θHF ΩF)1−σ
(ΩF)1−σ +(θFHΩH)1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
(2.B.33)
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noting that the marginal cost can be written as a function of wages, labor, and Q. All in all,
this system of five equations solves for the steady state values of {ωH ,ωF ,LH ,LF ,Q}.
2.C Proof of Steady State Properties
Proof of 2.3.1
Proof. Let j 6= i. Taking the derivatives of the capital rental rate for home and foreign with
respect to foreign corporate taxes yields
∂ r j
∂τ j
=
[1−β (1−δ )]
[
1+η ji
]
(σ −1)α
β (1− τ j)2
> 0
∂ r j
∂η ji
=
[1−β (1−δ )] (σ −1)α
β (1− τ j) > 0
The strict inequalities hold since we assume that 0 ≤ τ j < 1 for j = H,F and η ij is strictly
greater than one. The above equations prove the first two bullet points of the proposition.
Given that both values are strictly greater than zero we take their ratio and get (1+η ji )/(1+
τ j) which is always greater than one.
Proof of 2.3.2
Proof.
∂ s jj
∂η ji
=− ∂ s
j
i
∂η ji
=
1
(1+η ji )2
> 0
Proof of proposition 2.3.3
Proof. The steady state solution appendix shows that the formula for foreign wage is
(
ωF
ωH
)1−α
=
[
(1− τF)(1+ηHF )
(1− τH)(1+ηFH)
]α [
(QθHF )1−σ −1
(θFH )1−σ −Q1−σ
]1/(σ−1)
(2.C.1)
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To ensure that ωF ∈ R+ we must restrict the second bracket of the above equation to be
strictly positive. Such restriction is fulfill with two different cases:
• Case 1: Q < θFH and Q > 1/θHF
• Case 2: Q > θFH and Q < 1/θHF
However case 2 is not possible in our model. Given that θ ≥ 1, case 2 implies that Q is
greater than one and also strictly less than one, a contradiction. Therefore, wages are positive
real numbers only when Q ∈ (1/θHF ; θFH )
Proof of proposition 2.3.4
Proof. Assume countries are symmetric in θ ,η ,τ then the ratio of marginal costs is:
ΩF
ΩH
=
(
ωF
ωH
)1−α
=
[
(Qθ)1−σ −1
(θ)1−σ −Q1−σ
]1/(σ−1)
Multiply and divide equation 2.B.33 by ΩH and use the above ratio to obtain:
Q =
1
Q1−σ
Thus, if σ 6= 1 then Q = 1 is the steady state solution to the ration of prices indexes.
Proof of proposition 2.3.6
Proof. Take the ratio of Home and Foreign outputs combined with the formulas for profit to
obtain:
Y H
Y F
=
piH
piF
[(
θFH
)1−σ −Q1−σ(
QθHF
)1−σ −1
] 1
1−σ
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Since the ratio of outputs is constant then the total derivative of the expression above is given
by:
0 =
∂
(
piH/piF
)
∂Q
[(
θFH
)1−σ −Q1−σ(
QθHF
)1−σ −1
] 1
1−σ
dQ+
(1−σ)
(
1− (θFHθHF )1−σ)((
QθHF
)1−σ −1)2
piH
piF
dQ
Using the bounds of Q as well as θ ≥ 1 it can be easily shown that
(1−σ)
(
1− (θFHθHF )1−σ)((
QθHF
)1−σ −1)2 <
0. Thus, if dQ is positive, i.e the prices in the foreign country become more expensive relative
to those of Home, then
∂
(
piH/piF
)
∂Q
must be positive in order to balance the equation i.e, the
profit of the home country firm must increase relative to that of the Foreign firm.
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Chapter 3
Do large companies pay lower taxes? Evidence using harmonized balance sheets from
companies in 11 European countries
3.1 Introduction
Comparing corporate taxes across the world is a difficult endeavor due to: (i) lack of a
standard metric that assesses the true tax burden, (ii) different accounting standards across
nations. The choice of metric to measure corporate tax is critical since each metric provides
us with different pictures of the same issue. For example, the latest report by the non-partisan
think thank “Tax Foundation" ranks the U.S at the top of corporate tax rates in the world with
an statutory corporate tax rate of 39 %, a significant 14 % higher than the OECD average. In
contrast, a contemporary report by the General Accounting Office of the U.S finds that the
average U.S large firm has an effective tax rate of 12.6% on their profits, a staggering less than
one third of the rate stated in the tax code. Effective corporate tax rates are a simple concept
(taxes paid over a measure of profit) that relies on using firms’ balance sheet information that
is prepared using the accounting standards required by the country of operation; therefore,
the items used to compute the effective tax rate might not be measuring the same variables
across countries. This issue is especially problematic as the source of most discrepancies is
found in the computation of amortization of capital for the company, which in turn is one of
the main drivers for the differences between effective and statutory corporate tax rates.
In this paper I estimate effective average corporate tax rates (EATR), that are comparable
across a small set of European countries, and answer the question of whether large firms get
preferential tax treatment relative to small firms. I find that at the national level there is some
evidence for differences between effective tax rates faced by large and small firms; however,
analysis by economic sectors does result in stronger evidence for preferential tax treatment
of larger firms. Additionally, effective tax rates are substantially different between sectors
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and across countries. This stylized fact helps to support the idea that governments might be
engage in an optimization problem in which they decide the rates of their tax instruments in
a way that exploits the characteristics of their economic sectors.
I also present the most important differences and advantages of using effective tax rates
obtained from firm level data and: the statutory corporate tax rate and, another measure of
EATR that is popular in the literature. For illustration purposes, Figure 3.1 shows a clear
downward pattern for the statutory tax rates of multiple developed countries.1 This strong
downward pattern isn’t observed in the time series of the EATRs obtained in the BACH
database and neither in those computed using the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994b),
hereby referred as MRT. At the national level, the EATRs from the BACH database and
those computed under MRT exhibit similar patterns but significant difference at the levels.
Moreover, because the MRT rates use national account data, it isn’t possible to analyze the
question regarding the preferential treatment of larger firms with respect to taxes.
3.2 Effective Average Tax Rates from National Accounts
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) is the pioneer paper to formulated a set of metrics to
estimate actual tax burdens on economic agents using readily available aggregate macroe-
conomic data; and their method has been widely used in academic and policy environments
due to its simplicity and data availability.2 Their formula follows the principles outlined for
their calculation of capital taxes at the household level, which in the case of corporations is
reduced to the simple ratio of taxes paid on profits and net operating profit.
The reliance of MRT in national account data, while convenient, has an often overlooked
problem rooted in changes and differences in accounting standards across time and countries.
The main problem generated by the lack of accounting harmonization is comparability across
time and/or countries. For example, subsequent updates and studies (including this one) to
1 The data for the statutory tax rates is taken from KPMG annual tax reports and supplemented with data
from the International Fiscal Studies Center.
2 Devereux et al. (2002) is another popular methodology to estimate effective marginal tax rates but it uses
micro data with a forward looking approach.
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MRT have found EATRs consistently below the original rates published in 1994. These dis-
crepancies between rates highlight one of the main problems of using macro-backward meth-
ods: they are susceptible to revisions of data and, most importantly, changes in accounting
procedures for national accounts can make pre and post change rates non-comparable.
An important breaking point in the comparability of corporate EATRs from national data
occurred in 1993 when a major revision of the National Accounting standards was intro-
duced. Most countries (a notable exception is the US) generate their national accounts based
on the Standard National Accounting system (SNA), created by United Nations’ statistical
department.3 The system had its first major update in 1993, the previous version was SNA
1968, and brought major changes relevant to the estimation of effective average corporate tax
rates. These changes included new rules for computations of fixed capital consumption and,
the separation of corporations from unincorporated enterprises. This modification was very
important to the estimation of corporate EATR since, prior to SNA 1993, gross operating sur-
plus (a measure of a corporation’s profits) and mixed income (a measure of unincorporated
firms’ profit) was reported as a single measure. The term mixed income reflects the signifi-
cant share of entrepreneur’s income that comes from their labor input into the firm, while the
remaining comes from capital investments. Thus, treating mixed income and gross surplus
as similar measures of firms’ profits net of labor cost is erroneous and therefore I restrict my
analysis to national account data that is compliant with SNA 1993 to maintain consistency
across time.
3.2.1 EATRs from National Account data
Many previous studies based on MRT use the ratio of taxes paid on relative to net operat-
ing surplus (NOP), which is problematic if we are interested in making comparisons across
countries. Net operating profit is defined as gross operating surplus (GOP) minus the con-
3 The United States uses the NIPA account system which is developed by the BEA. The system follows the
main guideline of the SNA, and annual national accounts are created to be comparable to other OECD countries.
i.e follow the SNA standard
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sumption of fixed capital, but the computation of this last factor isn’t standard across nations.4
SNA provides guidelines to determine depreciation rates, but these are ranges or upper/lower
rates instead of exact numbers, leaving the final decision to the national authority.
Table 3.1 contains the summary statistics for the statutory tax rate (τ), EATR using NOP
(τnop) and, EATR using GOP (τgop); while figure 3.2 presents the time series of these differ-
ent tax measures. Both τnop,τgop have significantly lower means than the statutory rate and
they are always below the statutory tax rate in the time series, except for a handful of points.
These discrepancies between what is ought and what is paid by corporations is quite large
since the effective rate is around 30 to 60 percent of the statutory rate. This issue has been
key in fueling the public discomfort towards the current state of corporate taxation.
In the introduction I use the US to highlight the stark differences in assessing the corporate
tax environment depending on the measure use; I build on this and show that the ranking
of countries, according to their tax, changes with each measure i.e, the difference between
statutory rates and effective rates is not a common linear factor across countries. From table
3.1 we can readily observe that the top country in terms of taxation switches for each tax
measure. A Friedman test shows that the rankings for each measure are statistically different
from each other.5 The case of Germany is rather striking going from the top taxing country,
when using statutory rates, to bottom place, when using any of the two effective rates. The
German case seems extreme so as a check I conduct the Friedman test in the sample without
Germany, resulting in the same conclusion.
Unsurprisingly, both effective average tax rates are highly correlated (0.84 average cor-
relation) but the variance of τanop is more than twice than that of τagop. The extra source of
variability is likely to come from the changes in depreciation rates since this is the only dif-
4 Gross operating surplus is equal to gross value added minus labor cost, subsidies and other taxes on
production. Labor costs include wages, salaries and employer’s social contributions (employee contribution to
pension funds, etc). Net operating surpluses are found in national accounts instead of net operating profits (pre
tax) which are found in companies balance sheets. The main difference between both is the depreciation of
capital: consumption of fixed capital for national accounts (economic depreciation) versus amortization for the
balance sheets (fiscal depreciation). Balance sheet profits also include appreciation of inventory while operating
surpluses don’t.
5 See Friedman (1940)
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ference between NOP and GOP. On the other hand, statutory tax rates have a much lower
variability since once a rate is set it maintains that value for an average of 3 years.
To avoid that countries idiosyncratic depreciation schemes make the estimated EATR
non-comparable across countries, I use GOP as the denominator when computing the EATR.
Using gross operating profits has the disadvantage of underestimating the tax burden on cor-
porate profits, but improves comparability of the estimated tax rates across the countries
which is a key property of the EATR estimated from firm level data in the next section.
3.3 EATR using firm level data
Using the concept of the previous section I proceed to calculate the effective average tax
rates using balance sheet data from European companies. By using this particular data it
is possible to compute EATRs for different economic sectors and business size; moreover,
companies balance sheets are harmonized which allows for meaningful comparisons of the
obtained EATRs across countries. A brief description of the database used is provided in the
next subsection.
3.3.1 The new BACH database
In 1985 the General Directorate of Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Com-
mission embarked in the mission of creating reliable data for analysis of European compa-
nies’ financial structure, independently of where they operate. To achieve this goal, the Banks
for the Accounts of Companies Harmonized (BACH) database was created.6
The BACH database contains relatively harmonized balance sheets for non-financial com-
panies of 11 European countries. The data is aggregated at the sector level (using NACE rev2
6 BACH database: ECCBSO, Banco de España, Banco de Portugal, Banque de France, Czech National Bank
(in cooperation with the Czech Statistical Office), National Bank of Belgium, National Bank of Poland (calcu-
lations of National Bank of Poland on the basis of the data from the Central Statistical Office), Centraal Bureau
voor de Statistiek (the Netherlands), Centrale dei Bilanci - Cerved srl, Deutsche Bundesbank, Statec Luxem-
bourg, National Bank of Slovakia (calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance), Oesterreichische
Nationalbank
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classification, see table 3.3) and broken into company sizes.7 Aggregation of the data is
done using weighted averages (based on firms turnover) but quantile values are also provided
when the amount of firms ensures confidentiality.8 The weighted average values have a bias
towards large firms but using the median values, when available, avoids this problem.
Table 3.2 presents the countries and years included in the latest BACH database as well
as the maximum coverage rate of the surveys with respect to firms, employees and, turnover.
The database covers 11 countries for the years 2000 to 2014 with Netherlands providing the
least years of coverage (2009 to 2014). The surveys cover a respectable percent of operating
firms with Belgium and Portugal covering almost all of them. The Czech Republic, Germany
and France survey less than 30 % percent of firms but these account for most of the revenue
generated and/or the number of employees. Hence, the data for Germany and France might
suffer from oversampling of larger firms.
3.3.2 Effective Average Corporate Tax inferred from BACH
The breadth of data found in BACH allows for the computation of different measure of
EATRs; however, I choose tax on profits over gross operating profit, thereby maintaining
consistency with the EATRs presented in the previous section.9 Comparability is essential
to explore difference between EATRs obtained from firm level data and those from national
accounts. On one hand, small differences between the effective rates indicates that the MRT
method using macro level data is preferable because of the accessibility of data. On the
other hand, large and consistent differences between the effective rates would suggest that
EATRs inferred from aggregated data provide a misleading picture of the corporate tax envi-
7The BACH database classifies firms by net turnover amounts and not by number of employees. A small
firm in the context of BACH is a firm whose turnover is less than 10 million e, while a large firm is defined as
firms with turnovers above 50 million e. Because of this definition weighted averages based on turnovers, the
aggregate figures are bias toward high grossing firms and industries.
8The minimum number of firms for the release of quartile data is 6 for all countries except Germany which
requires a minimum of 12 firms. The Czech Republic doesn’t report quantile values.
9 I also present tables and results for the ratio that uses turnover as the denominator. This ratio was used as
a check because of concerns of the variability of profits during the Great Recession. Results and conclusions
using the ratio with turnover aren’t much different but important differences are stated in the main body of the
paper.
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ronment.10
Unlike previous studies, I also compute the effective rates using data of the median firm,
instead of only relying in the aggregated data through weighted averages, with the goal of
reducing bias towards larger firms. The trade off of using quantile data is an increase in
missing observations due to the confidentiality restrictions. This issue is further exacerbated
when trying to compute effective tax rates by firm size, which are the key variables necessary
to answer if larger firms are paying lower taxes relative to other firms. The EATR using
quantile data is denoted by τq and the EATR using weighted averages is denoted by τwa.
When taxes paid and/or GOP are negative it can result in a misleading sign of the ra-
tios τwa,τq. The following table presents the number of cases in the dataset that have to be
addressed:
Tax paid
+ -
GOP
+ X X
- 94 (7) 2 (1)
Number of cases that for which the sign of the EATRs isn't directly interpretable. The
values in parentheses are for quantile data.
When taxes paid and gross operating profit are negative it produces a positive EATR
that could be misinterpreted as a positive tax rate. Since the company received subsidies
(negative taxes), I keep this observations and assume that the rate of subsidy is equal to the
tax rate charged on positive profits; furthermore, this issue appears in only 2 out of 12504
observations, for the weighted average data, and 1 out of 11427 for the median firm value
data.11
The next problem is less straightforward to interpret and occurs when a positive tax is as-
sessed in negative GOP. The resulting EATR is negative which is misinterpreted as an effec-
10 Nicodeme (2001) also uses gross operating profits to calculate effective tax rates for corporations using an
older version of the BACH database. However, he is more concerned about the stability of net operating profits
rather than comparability with effective rates obtained from national accounts.
11 There are less observations in the dataset for the quantile data since the Czech Republic doesn’t report this
type of data
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tive subsidy to the firms even though they paid taxes. The number of observations presenting
this problem is relative low at 94, for the case of weighted average aggregate data, and only
7 cases for quantile data. From this problematic observations the “arts and entertainment"
sector (R in NACE classification) account for 54 (1) observations. For this reason I elim-
inate sector R from all countries and assign a missing value for the remaining problematic
observations instead of assigning an arbitrary positive value for τwa,τq.
After solving the issues mentioned I calculate different measures of effective corporate
tax rates and present the summary statistics of the rates for the overall economy and all firms
in Table 3.5. The first property of the average effective tax rate (across time), regardless of
denominator used, is that they are significantly lower than the statutory tax rate; a similar
property of the effective rates constructed with MRT method. Furthermore, τq is statistically
different and smaller than τwa in all countries; Figure 3.4 shows that this is consistent across
time and regardless of firm size. The time series plot also shows that the trends for the overall
effective corporate tax rate aren’t equal across the European countries in the sample, which
suggests that the race to the bottom observed in the statutory tax rates isn’t translating into
the effective rate. As expected, the effective rates using turnover as denominator for the ratio
are much lower than τwa,τq.
3.3.3 Differences between MRT, τaw and τaq
The EATR based on national accounts (MRT) differ in their levels substantially across the
years with those obtained from BACH, but the sign of the difference is not consistent across
the countries as seen in Figure 3.3. This figure presents the estimated rates for MRT and
τwa,τq (all sectors, all firms size) showing that there is no consistent pattern for the difference
across these rates; for some cases τwa,τq behaves as an envelope to MRT but for others they
are below/above MRT, making the national account rates a lower/upper bound on the rates
obtained from firm level data.
To complement the analysis I compute the difference between τMRT and τawa (∆1), as well
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as τMRT and τaq (∆2), with descriptive statistics shown in Table 3.4. On average τMRT is higher
than both EATRs from BACH in Belgium, Portugal and Spain; below both measures only in
Italy and in between both measures for the rest of countries. Looking at ∆1, we can observe
that for Italy and Germany the EATR from the national accounts tends to underestimate τawa
by around 9%, close to a third of the average statutory tax rate level for the period. The rest
of countries have average absolute differences below 4% and paired t-tests reject the null that
τwa =MRT for all countries but Belgium. Turning to ∆2, we observe that absolute differences
are over 5% and most countries have on average τaq below τMRT , this property doesn’t hold
when using τawa. Paired t-tests confirm that there is enough evidence to support the hypotheses
that τaq < τMRT for all countries but Italy.
3.3.4 Effective Tax Rates: all economy versus sectors
Another advantage of using BACH is that harmonization allows for direct comparisons of
the EATRs across the countries, hence I am not restricted to describing only the intra-country
patterns. The inferred BACH effective tax rates show that there are differences across sectors,
not only at levels but also trends, suggesting that governments have tax policies that allocate
the tax burden unevenly across sectors.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 provide the times series of τwa,τq for the agricultural, manufacturing,
construction and, wholesale sectors. From these graphs we can clearly see that the agricul-
tural sector has the lowest effective tax rate for all countries, but Slovakia; however, the levels
are very different across the countries with a negative time trend, except for Portugal which
shows an upward trend. Another commonality across countries happens in the construction
and wholesale sectors which is tax at a higher effective tax rate than the overall economy
in most countries. However, unlike the agricultural sector, there is no specific sector that is
consistently tax the most across the set of European countries in the data.
A surprising result is that there is no evidence of a “race to the bottom" for the manufac-
turing sector, which is often argued as the one that is more prone for competition for FDI.
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For most countries, the EATR for manufacturing is pretty stable over this time period, with
Austria being the only case in which an upward trend is observed when using median firm
data.
3.4 Taxation discrimination by size
A topic that often shows in taxation policy debates is whether large firms pay lower taxes
than smaller firms. To test this claim, I compare the mean differences of τawa, τaq by business
size using a one tail Welch’s t-test for unpaired data with unequal variance. Table 3.6 shows
the results for the null hypothesis that small business paid less taxes than large firms, for both
τawm and τaq , while table 3.7 contains the results for the null that small business face a lower
effective tax rate than medium size businesses.
At the whole economy level, there is enough evidence that large firms paid lower effective
tax rates than smaller firms in half of the countries (Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and Por-
tugal), a rather unexpected result. When τq is used we can only reject the null for Belgium,
which also rejected the null with τwa.
Conducting the analysis at by sectors provides a clearer picture that contrasts the results
obtained at the economy wide level. One interesting example is that of Germany and Austria,
which failed to reject the null at the economy wide level, yet close to 40% of their sectors
show that large firms had lower effective tax rates than small firms. For countries that rejected
the null at the economy wide level, we see that Belgium and Italy provide advantageous tax
environments for larger firms in most of their sectors.
Most countries provide favorable tax conditions for large business operating in the I.T,
technology and, service sectors. Specifically, all countries provide evidence to reject that
smaller firms are paying lower taxes in the “Administrative and support service" sector, fol-
lowed closely by the I.T and scientific sectors. On the contrary, the mining sector was the
least favorable to larger firms. These observations suggest that governments are trading tax
revenues for technology and shifting some of that tax burden to extractive sectors (mining
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and energy).
Finally, I carry the same analysis but for the null hypothesis that smaller firms have an
effective tax rate lower than the medium firm. Surprisingly, there is only evidence for Austria,
Italy and Portugal that medium firms are paying lower taxes than smaller firms. Combining
this result with those for large firms suggests that Italy and Portugal have a linear negative
relationship between effective taxes and size; however, the rest of countries seem to only give
favorable tax environments for the very large firms. Nonetheless, there is some consistency
regarding the technology and service sectors which show a favorable tax environment for the
medium firm in most countries, but not as consistent as it was for the case of larger firms.
3.5 Conclusions
Balance sheet data for companies in 11 European countries provides evidence that gov-
ernments tax larger companies at lower rate in certain economic sectors, but in the overall
economy there is no evidence of this behavior in all countries. At the economy wide level
I find that larger companies are taxed effectively lower in 5 countries; however, the story
changes when the analysis is done at the sector level, where I find evidence in several sectors
of favorable taxation of larger companies in all countries. This suggests that government use
discriminatory tax policies based not solely company’s size but also on the economic sector.
Consistently across countries, the technology and service sectors foster tax advantageous
environments for large firms. Thus there seems that a common policy of the European coun-
tries analyzed is to trade tax revenue for technological improvements; perhaps expecting
spillovers effects that would increase productivity for all.
Surprisingly, there is a lack of evidence to support that larger companies faced lower
effective tax rates in the manufacturing sector. This results runs contrary to expectations since
we often hear governments concerns of losing manufacturing jobs to other countries via FDI;
thus we would expect the manufacturing sector to be the one with a favorable tax environment
for large firms across countries. However, the data doesn’t support such view and coupled
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with the tax advantages for large firms in the technology and service sectors, there seems that
the governments of these 11 European countries bet on technological improvements to foster
jobs at home.
Finally, I showed that the choice of measure for corporate taxes is critical as each measure
paints a different picture of the tax environment. The statutory corporate tax rate showed that
countries engaged in a competition that lead to significant reductions in corporate tax rates
through the past decades. However, this dramatic decline in statutory rates is significantly
dampen (or erased for some countries) when effective corporate tax rates, from national ac-
count data, are used. Moreover, not all effective tax rates are alike as demonstrated by the
statistical significant differences of the effective rates obtained from firm level data and those
calculate from national account data. The effective tax rates from firm level data also showed
that time trends in certain sectors are not similar to that of the whole economy; furthermore,
we can observe sectors whose effective tax rates move in opposite directions across time.
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Figures and tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for the two diﬀerent EATRs, data restricted to 1990-
2011 to ensure comparability.
Means Std. Deviation Correlation
τ τanop τagop τanop τagop ρn,g ρs,g
Austria 32.06 17.41 9.31 2.51 1.36 0.97 0.19
Australia 33.05 32.99 21.01 5.19 3.60 0.97 -0.45
Belgium 37.52 24.92 12.92 6.19 2.56 0.98 -0.12
Canada 35.02 19.40 13.00 3.13 2.15 0.98 -0.21
Finland 28.64 22.09 12.42 8.68 4.43 0.66 0.09
France 35.57 26.84 14.71 5.66 2.94 0.95 0.33
Great Britain 30.73 21.24 14.01 3.53 2.53 0.92 -0.36
Germany 45.70 11.06 6.74 2.36 1.45 0.95 0.19
Italy 41.91 23.93 14.75 3.84 2.18 0.90 0.46
Japan 44.41 37.74 17.61 8.38 4.41 0.86 0.81
Netherlands 32.35 21.58 13.65 4.10 2.50 0.98 0.64
Norway 30.07 32.00 22.10 6.77 7.10 0.98 -0.39
Poland 28.65 30.92 16.04 16.86 6.68 0.96 0.90
Portugal 33.43 26.68 14.82 2.97 1.72 0.91 -0.15
Spain 33.98 24.80 14.33 9.35 4.96 0.99 0.30
Sweden 28.81 23.70 13.81 4.42 2.30 0.89 -0.49
Switzerland 30.15 21.02 10.25 4.39 1.82 0.89 -0.60
United States 39.36 25.71 15.04 3.01 2.19 0.97 -0.08
Overall(Panel) 34.55 24.73 14.36 8.72 5.02 0.84 -0.01
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Table 3.2: Coverage of the BACH database by diﬀerent measures.
Country Years % total firms % total turnover % employees
Austria 2000-13 53.88
Belgium 2000-14 99.6 99.67
Czech Rep. 2002-13 15.08
Germany 2000-14 10.62 77.41
Spain 2000-14 38.27 66.62
France 2000-14 30.08 81.58 78.19
Italy 2000-14 100 100
Netherlands 2009-14 69.17
Poland 2005-14 (*) (*) (*)
Portugal 2000-14 96.94 99.52 99.28
Slovakia 2005-13 63.74 92 81
(*)Poland provides exhaustive coverage
Table 3.3: Sectors in BACH database
NACE Code Description
Z0 Total NACE (includes M701, but excludes K642)
Zc Total NACE (without K642 and M701)
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing
B Mining and quarrying
C Manufacturing
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
E Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation act.
F Construction
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
H Transportation and storage
I Accommodation and food service activities
J Information and communication
K642 Activities of holding companies
L Real estate activities
M Professional, scientific and technical activities
Mc Total M (without M701)
M701 Activities of head offices
M702 Management consultancy activities
N Administrative and support service activities
P Education
Q Human health and social work services
R Arts, entertainment and recreation
S Other service activities
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for τMT R, τawa and τaq
Country Stats τMT R τawa τaq ∆1 ∆2 ∆3
BEL min 11.34 12.20 10.80 -0.87 -1.25 -1.45
mean 13.96 13.54 11.79 0.42 2.18 1.76
max 15.65 14.66 13.65 1.68 3.91 3.15
σ 1.52 0.93 0.72 0.86 1.88 1.44
FRA min 9.18 15.95 7.21 -6.77 1.93 6.28
mean 15.91 19.37 9.86 -3.46 6.05 9.52
max 19.99 21.29 13.90 -0.59 8.38 11.16
σ 2.83 1.74 2.12 1.87 1.84 1.49
GER min 2.76 12.81 3.15 -13.15 -0.68 8.88
mean 6.55 15.03 4.32 -8.48 2.23 10.71
max 8.58 17.21 5.79 -6.07 5.13 12.47
σ 1.82 1.25 0.87 1.76 1.44 1.06
ITA min 11.75 18.83 18.79 -15.97 -13.30 -1.26
mean 13.76 23.11 22.00 -9.35 -8.24 1.11
max 16.76 27.96 27.43 -2.56 -2.89 3.63
σ 1.79 3.16 2.68 3.80 3.42 1.64
POL min 8.50 11.76 1.52 -3.79 6.56 8.58
mean 10.86 12.94 2.79 -2.13 7.87 10.15
max 12.42 13.78 4.94 0.66 9.24 11.07
σ 1.51 0.80 1.17 1.55 0.97 1.02
POR min 13.53 10.99 4.27 -0.23 7.36 5.50
mean 15.11 12.41 5.71 2.69 9.37 6.70
max 17.76 14.24 7.19 6.64 12.24 7.88
σ 1.63 1.00 0.98 1.95 1.66 0.86
SPA min 8.00 6.83 0.00 -1.39 7.78 0.88
mean 15.75 11.86 4.44 3.89 11.31 7.42
max 24.79 18.03 7.06 9.19 19.58 11.91
σ 5.13 3.75 2.64 3.05 3.68 2.97
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics for the eﬀective corporate tax rates from BACH database. The variables τ represented ratios
using gross operating proﬁt while τ˜ represent ratios that used turnover.
Obs Mean σ Min Max Obs Mean σ Min Max
Austria Italy
τwm 1178 10.38 4.26 0 39.82 τwm 1095 25.7 8.11 -0.28 56.45
τq 1157 4.46 3.02 0 26.38 τq 1104 19.58 7.29 4.72 95.65
τ˜wm 1180 1.24 0.77 0 8.34 τ˜wm 1103 2.59 1.52 -0.68 25.08
τ˜q 1157 0.47 0.41 0 3.73 τ˜q 1104 1.73 0.88 0.19 7.69
Belgium Netherlands
τwm 1201 13.75 5.56 0 33.54 τwm 428 13.86 4.78 1.18 31.56
τq 1189 10.23 5.7 0.1 45.94 τq 432 3.71 5.19 0 27.7
τ˜wm 1210 1.92 1.52 0 21.33 τ˜wm 430 1.5 1.05 0.09 10.63
τ˜q 1189 1.6 1.57 0.02 8.7 τ˜q 432 0.31 0.63 0 4.16
Czech Rep. Poland
τwm 1013 11.24 6.22 -15.32 36.11 τwm 837 9.07 3.38 -1.9 22.16
τq τq 811 5.09 4.49 0 24.4
τ˜wm 1017 1.38 1.32 -6.4 18 τ˜wm 844 1.16 0.66 -1.02 6.42
τ˜q 51 0.36 0.21 0 0.7 τ˜q 811 0.46 0.46 0 3.6
Germany Portugal
τwm 1231 12.63 6.48 -3.41 44.69 τwm 1091 12.5 6.63 -28.03 54.95
τq 1265 4.28 3.54 0 15.62 τq 1064 6.46 3.9 0 46.51
τ˜wm 1265 1.47 2.21 -1.31 28.21 τ˜wm 1097 1.58 1.45 -19.46 10.61
τ˜q 1265 0.35 0.41 0 2.99 τ˜q 1064 0.7 0.76 0 7.57
Spain Slovakia
τ˜wm 1190 9.72 17.1 -175.7 102.38 τwm 624 13.72 7.32 -6.42 54.74
τ˜q 1176 5.15 4.82 -24.1 55.51 τq 663 4.93 6.59 0 73.68
τ˜wm 1196 1.25 2.79 -37.53 25.14 τ˜wm 641 1.36 0.99 -1.04 9.29
τ˜q 1176 0.48 0.82 -12.36 7.58 τ˜q 663 0.38 0.53 0 4.56
France
τwm 1278 18.72 6.49 -6.85 45.21
τq 1287 9.23 5.84 0 36.93
τ˜wm 1287 1.89 1.31 -1.8 12.9
τ˜q 1287 0.72 0.54 0 3.52
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Table 3.6: Welch's t-test with null hypothesis: H0 : τsmall < τlarge. Top rows are for aggregated data via weighted averages and
bottom rows are for data for the median ﬁrm.
All Sectors A B C D E F G H I J L Mc N Q
Austria x x x x x x X3 x x x X3 X3 X2 X3 X1
x x x x x X3 x x x X3 X3 x x X3
Belgium X3 x X3 X3 x X3 x x x x X3 X2 X3 X3 X3
X3 x X2 X3 x x x x X2 x x
Czech Rep. x x x x x x x x x x X3 x x X3 X3
Germany x x x x X3 x x X3 x X3 x X3 X3 X3
x x X3 x X3 x x X3 x X3 x X2 X3 x
Spain X2 X2 x x x X3 x x x X2 x x X2 X1 X2
x x x x x x x x x x x X2 x x x
France X3 x x x x x x x x X3 x X2 X3 X3 X3
x x x x x x x x x x x X2 x x x
Italy X3 X2 x X3 x x X2 X3 X3 x X3 x X3 X3
x x x X1 x x x x x x X2 x x x
Poland x x x x x x x x x x X3 x x X2 X3
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Portugal X2 X1 x x x x x X3 x x X3 x X3 X3
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Notes: Empty cells if no data available for one of the groups being tested
1 Null rejected at significance level of 0.10
2 Null rejected at significance level of 0.05
3 Null rejected at significance level of 0.01
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Table 3.7: Welch's t-test with null hypothesis: H0 : τsmall < τmedium. Top rows are for aggregated data via weighted averages
and bottom rows are for data for the median ﬁrm.
All Sectors A B C D E F G H I J L Mc N P Q
Austria X3 x x x x X3 X3 x x x X3 X3 x X3 X3 X2
X2 x x x x x X2 x x x X3 X3 X2 x X1 X3
Belgium x x X3 x X3 X3 x x x x X2 X2 X3 X3 x
x x x x X2 X3 x x x x x X3 x x x
Czech Rep. x x X1 X1 x X3 x x x X2 X3 X1 x X3 X3 X3
Germany x x x x x X3 x x x x x X3 X2 X3 X2 X3
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Spain x x x x x X2 x x x X2 x X3 X1 x x x
x x x x x X1 x x x x x X1 x x x x
France x x x x x x x x x X2 x X3 X2 x x X3
x x x x x x x x x X3 x X3 x x x X3
Italy X3 X3 x X3 x X3 x X2 X3 x X3 x x X3
x X1 x X1 x x x x x x x x x x
Poland x x x x x x x x x x X2 x x X3 x X2
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x X2
Portugal X3 X2 x x x X2 X2 X3 X1 X3 X2 X3 X2 X3 X3 X3
x x x x x X1 x x x x x x x x X3
Notes: Empty cells if no data available for one of the groups being tested
1 Null rejected at significance level of 0.10
2 Null rejected at significance level of 0.05
3 Null rejected at significance level of 0.01
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Figure 3.1: Statutory tax rates on corporate proﬁt from 1979 - 2011
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Figure 3.2: Eﬀective Average Corporate Tax rates based on MTR. NOP is the ratio
with net operating proﬁt as denominator while GOP uses gross proﬁt instead
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Figure 3.3: Time series plot for the diﬀerent EATRs
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Figure 3.4: Eﬀective Average Corporate Tax rates from BACH. The solid lines represent measure from weighted average values,
while the slash line is for ratios obtained from quartile data
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Figure 3.5: Eﬀective average corporate tax rate of selected sectors. Estimates using weighted aggregated data.
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Figure 3.6: Eﬀective average corporate tax rate of selected sectors. Estimates using data of the median ﬁrm
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Figure 3.7: Mean across time for τawa and τaq , subdivided by countries and ﬁrm sizes
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